LITMIR.BIZ

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however. There were contradictory statements regarding how and when the refugees should return. As the RPF consolidated its hold on power, it seemed that the Hutu population was being systematically marginalized, and the government was not making it easy for the refugees to return.⁸⁸ The RPF had engaged in massacres at the end of the war, and as one NGO worker observed, “Bodies appeared regularly in the Kagera River until May 1995, long after the RPF gained control of the country.”⁸⁹ Further, the Rwandan jails were overflowing with suspected génocidaires, and the refugee leaders were able to capitalize on this to demonstrate the danger of returning.⁹⁰ They were thus able to maintain and tighten their grip on the camps, which served as the staging ground for destabilization.

      Early Efforts to Return the Refugees

      Within a couple of months after the refugees left, it was clear to most of the main actors in the region that the refugees needed to return. The camps were likely to become destabilizing. It was also felt that reconciliation would be easier if the refugees returned sooner rather than later because there would be less time for further hate and suspicion of the refugees to develop within Rwanda. The debate revolved around when. UNHCR argued for an early return.⁹¹ On 23 July 1994, High Commissioner for Refugees Sadako Ogata stated that UNHCR wanted to encourage refugees to return.⁹² UNHCR offered to take a group of twenty camp leaders from Goma back to Rwanda so they could see for themselves the conditions the refugees would be returning to and report back to the camps. They refused—an indication of the resistance and defiance among the leaders.⁹³ UNHCR first tried to repatriate refugees from Goma on August 23. This was stopped by the militias and camp leaders. Yet many thousands of refugees did repatriate from Goma during the last part of 1994, accompanied by a Zairian security escort to the border. At the same time, UNHCR suspended its repatriation assistance to Rwanda in September because of alleged human rights abuses there.⁹⁴

      Two issues permeated discussions within UNHCR about return. The first was the actual conditions in Rwanda. That is, was it safe for the refugees to go back? Conditions varied throughout the country, UNHCR did not have access to significant portions of Rwanda, and there was much contradictory information. It was thus hard for it to make a firm decision.⁹⁵ The second issue was that of the voluntary nature of the return. The principle of voluntary repatriation is generally recognized.⁹⁶ Yet, given the situation in the camps and the fact that the refugees, for the most part, were not able to make the decision to repatriate because of the intimidation and violence on the part of the militants, this principle took on new meaning. If the refugees themselves are not able to make the decision whether or not to return, almost by definition any returns, particularly on a large scale, will not be “voluntary.”

      By October it was clear that the militants were expanding their organization and consolidating their grip over the camps.⁹⁷ That month, Ogata said: “The aim [of the camp militants] appears to be to control the refugee population, block their voluntary return to Rwanda and build resistance against the Government in Kigali.”⁹⁸ By the end of the year, some NGOs pulled out of Goma and Ngara in Tanzania because of the worsening situation. UNHCR considered this, although, as Dennis McNamara, director of the UNHCR Division of International Protection, stated: “the agency’s mandate and the humanitarian imperative of caring for the majority of vulnerable and needy civilians, women and children, made a withdrawal impossible.”⁹⁹ Both MSF France and the International Rescue Committee decided that the consequences of continuing to provide assistance—allowing the militants continued safe haven—overrode the humanitarian imperative.¹⁰⁰ The realization of the effect humanitarians might have turned out to be a significant turning point. While most other organizations stayed—including MSF Holland and MSF UK¹⁰¹—the debate about withdrawal highlighted how embedded the humanitarians were in the situation. One official from CARE UK suggested that CARE should continue to provide assistance only if the génocidaires were brought to justice, a somewhat naïve position given the reality on the ground in the camps, the lack of international support for separating out the génocidaires so they could be arrested, and the sheer number of those to be brought to justice. Another CARE UK official, however, disagreed, focusing solely on feeding people.¹⁰² This also led to a much wider debate about whether or not the humanitarian imperative could be absolute, and whether humanitarians need to focus more on the “do no harm” principle. While the debate at the time varied widely within and among NGOs, Fiona Terry identifies five main justifications used by NGOs to continue their work:

      (1) humanitarian imperative;

      (2) attempts to affect the way the camps were administered from within and minimize the aid diverted to militants through “résistance humanitaire”;

      (3) focus on technical issues of relief provision, ignoring ethical issues;

      (4) the “institutional logic” of NGOs, which prioritized the media coverage and funding that having a presence in the camps would generate;

      (5) sympathy with the Hutu militants, in particular on the part of Catholic organizations.¹⁰³

      The obvious first step was to separate out the génocidaires and militant leaders from the rest of the population. Various plans to accomplish this were floated as early as mid-August 1994, when the Zairian prime minister requested that 20,000 ex-FAR be relocated away from the border. When family members were included, the total number of people to be relocated climbed to 80–90,000. Identifying all the ex-FAR would have been problematic. This plan would have been very costly, estimated at $90 to $125 million (whereas it was estimated that the solution ultimately adopted cost only about 2 percent of what a full-fledged peacekeeping operation would have).¹⁰⁴ Furthermore, such an undertaking would have entailed deploying a significant number of troops. The international community showed almost no support for this, and by January 1995 the Secretary-General admitted defeat in his attempt to put such a force together. Further, he put the responsibility for addressing the security issue on UNHCR, thus abdicating the responsibility of the UN to maintain international peace and security to its humanitarian arm.¹⁰⁵ The palliators were asked to act as protectors, which of course they could not do.

      A lesser option was then pursued—deploying a security force in the camps. Its mandate would not include separating extremists. Rather, its focus would be to maintain security in the camps for the refugees and make sure relief supplies could be distributed unhindered. However, it was hoped that the security force would undermine the hold the extremists had in the camps, making it possible for the refugees to make the decision to go home. This was the main reason UNHCR Goma requested this deployment. UNHCR negotiated with Zaire to create the Zairian Camp Security Contingent (ZCSC). Deployed in February 1995, it was comprised of 1,500 elite Zairian troops and paid for by UNHCR. The Zairian minister of defense referred to them as “‘Ogata’s troops.’” Yet, they were not, and could not be, under the command of UNHCR. While it could try to exercise influence in how the troops carried out their mandate, the orders came from the government. Obviously, however, the government wanted to be able to place the blame on UNHCR in case anything went wrong.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, Ogata, as head of a humanitarian agency, did not have a mandate for controlling military forces of any kind. This abdication of its security role by the Security Council highlights the fact that UNHCR, and humanitarian actors more generally, are being called upon to carry out functions that they are not equipped to do and which are the purview of international security actors, like the Security Council. The international community had proven itself incapable of providing the support necessary for humanitarian agencies to carry out their work or, indeed, to obviate the need for humanitarian action in the first place. Furthermore, some felt that the ZCSC was a bad idea, precisely because it was not under UNHCR control, and when the war broke out, some of the troops fought, rather than providing protection to the refugees.¹⁰⁷ Although the ZCSC did arrest a few “small fry” leaders, most leaders, although known to the ZCSC, remained untouched by the force.¹⁰⁸ Further, the Zairian government provided resources to the militants, and rather than undermining their position, worked to strengthen it.¹⁰⁹ Given the lack of support from all quarters to separate the extremists, there seemed little prospect for a quick return of the refugees.¹¹⁰ A massacre of 2,000 people at the Kibeho internally displaced camp in Rwanda on 22 April 2005

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