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A Predictable Tragedy. Daniel Compagnon
Читать онлайн.Название A Predictable Tragedy
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isbn 9780812200041
Автор произведения Daniel Compagnon
Издательство Ingram
Therefore, in most instances, police officers stood by when MDC members were assaulted, only to charge the victims themselves for allegedly “inciting violence” or to refuse to take reports from the victims (which enabled the police spokesman to declare afterward that he knew nothing of the incident since it had not been reported to the police!). Sometimes they would say that the docket was lost so that police investigations would not lead to prosecution. Arbitrary detention without charge increasingly became a pattern of police behavior toward the MDC in 2001 and 2002. Some police officers took an active part in the harassment of opposition supporters or human rights activists in several cases documented by human rights groups,81 and this behavior tended to spread as time went on, while increasing numbers of War Vets were drafted into the force and speedily promoted. By mid-2002 the riot police and some officers from rural police stations were involved in torture cases against the opposition members. Police officers also colluded with militias looting the properties of MDC supporters or the white-owned farms by providing transport for the looted goods and sharing the spoils.
Between 2000 and 2002 a minimum of 2,000 police officers were transferred. Suspected MDC sympathizers—or just politically neutral officers—were purged, posted in bureaucratic assignments (the infamous “Commissioner’s pool” in Harare headquarters for senior police officers), or kicked off the force. Others resigned out of frustration or in fear of harassment, while War Vets in the police were promoted to the head of rural police stations in order to cooperate with ZANU-PF militias.82 Chihuri’s excuse for purging senior officers—that they were remnants of Rhodesian Selous Scouts and British South Africa Police83—betrays the war mentality still dominating ZANU-PF leadership. All these “political policemen” report to Mugabe directly rather than to their commanding officers. When the station head is a professional officer, his orders might be overruled by a deputy or junior officer who is a War Vet, especially when incidents on white-owned farms or politically motivated violence are involved. As if a legitimate excuse, the phrase “it is political” became the customary, official response when police were criticized for inaction as the crisis mounted. More War Vets and ZANU-PF youth were recruited by the police, hastily trained, and dispatched in the rural areas prior to the presidential election at a time when scores of professional policemen had left the force. Through these changes in both personnel and behavior the ZRP was transformed into another de facto party militia and all pretense of impartiality has been dropped. On several occasions, assistant police commissioner Wayne Bvudzijena professed no knowledge of cases of assault and torture documented by NGOs and lately cynically dismissed numerous reports of politically motivated rapes as “cheap propaganda,” when in fact many victims who reported to the police were sent back and told that they or their parents should not have voted for the wrong party. The police as a major institution of the state has been compromised and corrupted for political expediency, thus destroying the underlying basis of the rule of law. The police nowadays tend to ignore court orders when they are opposed to the government’s interests, and they see themselves increasingly as being above the courts.
The same process has affected other branches of the state. Army generals see themselves as above the law since the abduction and torture of two independent journalists by military intelligence in January 1999. Officers suspected of supporting the opposition have been removed from commanding positions, sometimes paid their salary but with no duties to perform, or transferred to lower-status postings. Others have been forced into early retirement, while less qualified former guerrillas were promoted ahead of them.84 The promotion of noncommissioned and junior officers on the basis of political loyalty rather than professional ability has eroded the army as an institution of the state. In the process the amalgamated national army created in 1980 is being transformed into a partisan private army to serve Mugabe’s interests.
Other segments of the public service have been targeted by retribution violence and have ceased to function normally, including the educational system with about 48 rural schools closed down by mid-2002 in various parts of the country—since assaulted or raped teachers had fled to safety—especially in MDC electoral strongholds. The health care delivery system and several rural councils were also affected. However, the lack of funds and shortage of qualified people also played a role in the collapse of these services. The idea was to destroy MDC’s local organization to leave no dissenting voice in the rural areas so that government officials (including chiefs and headmen on the government payroll) would cow the people into voting for Mugabe, but the purge went on until well after the presidential ballot. The district administrators of Matobo and Umzingwane—who are the representatives of the state in the local arena—were pushed out of their offices by War Vets in July 2002 after Minister Chombo accused civil servants of delaying the land redistribution exercise. As in a Maoist-style “Cultural Revolution,” nobody is untouchable except Mugabe’s inner circle. Thus continuing violence is eroding the effectiveness of state institutions. Zimbabwe was, up until the mid-1990s, a relatively well administered state in comparison with many African countries (petty corruption was contained, law and regulations were enforced and records more or less kept), but in the future, incompetence and arbitrary rule might prevail. Violence is also damaging the fabric of society, undermining values such as justice, truth, and accountability. The longer this situation endures the more strenuous it will be to restore law and order afterward. Under these circumstances the government is likely to find that it has opened a Pandora’s box that will be hard to close again.
Civil War or Militarized Autocracy?
A neglected aspect of the crisis so far is the potential loss of control by Mugabe and his lieutenants of these party militias created to fight the opposition and chase the whites away from the land. Although the government had no difficulty in reining in War Vets from invading businesses in Harare when it suited its interests, this does not mean that the state could evict them from the farms or disband them without provoking violent reactions. State-sponsored violence might then evolve into outright anarchy in the wake of the state collapse if not into a full-fledged civil war.
After the death of Hunzvi, the ZNLWVA was rocked by quarrels between individuals who vied for the top job (Andrew Ndlovu, Andy Mhlanga, Patrick Nyaruwata, or even Harare-based Joseph Chinotimba) and by corruption scandals. It transpired that the mismanagement of Zexcom, the ZNLWVA investment fund in which most members had invested the gratuities received in 1997, would cost most members their savings. ZANU-PF strategists preferred to delay the ZNLWVA congress, which was due to elect a new chairman, and they confirmed Hunzvi’s deputy as the acting chairman. In late July 2002, the inquiry into the misappropriation of ZNLWVA’s funds led to the imprisonment for embezzlement of Andrew Ndlovu,85 the acting chairman. Hunzvi had also been charged with defrauding Zexcom of Z$3 million. Factional strife among the War Vets was a logical development of the competition for spoils but may also have been fanned by the CIO as a control technique. Although there were places like Nkayi and Lupane in Matabeleland North where the local chapters of ZNLWVA were less prone to violence during the parliamentary election campaign,86 this situation changed radically later and these two districts saw the worst incidents of violence during the presidential ballot. Some of the War Vets’ victims mention Ndebele speakers alongside Shona speakers among their torturers, thus indicating that wartime political cleavages were less relevant among ex-combatants. This does not necessarily preclude an ethnic rift from developing in the future.
As ZNLWVA squabbles proceeded, a movement that had begun during the farm invasions developed very rapidly: every district chairman or local prominent War Vet became a law on to himself and tended to act independently from the organization’s leaders in Harare. If the Third Chimurenga was a new kind of war, some of the War Vets certainly behaved like local “warlords”—a media catchword to suggest autonomy and paramount authority in a certain territory. A notable example was former army captain “Comrade Chiweshe,” who terrorized the Marondera farming area during election campaigns, acting as if he was the true local government authority, helped by young militiamen to implement his decisions. Others enjoying various degrees of autonomy were “Comrade Jesus” in Kariba and “Biggie” Chitoro in Mberengwa. Taking their line from mysterious national directives coming from Harare, War Vets masquerading as “land committees”