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A Predictable Tragedy. Daniel Compagnon
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isbn 9780812200041
Автор произведения Daniel Compagnon
Издательство Ingram
Enjoying a two-thirds majority in both houses of Parliament, the ruling party could then change the Constitution at will. However, Amendment No. 18 was passed on 19 September 2007 with the support of MDC, thanks to mediation by the SADC. The amendment synchronized the presidential and parliamentary elections (with the effect of forcing ZANU-PF parliamentary candidates to support Mugabe in the presidential contest), removed presidential appointees in the lower house, and increased the number of seats in both houses—a means to foster Mugabe’s patronage, play on MDC’s divisions, and dissolve potential opposition in a ZANU-PF dominated Parliament. Yet the real purpose of the Act was to provide for an election procedure of a successor to Mugabe, through a two-thirds majority in the two houses, jointly sitting as an electoral college, should the president die, resign, or be impeached before the end of his term. The amendment also increased the powers of the Zimbabwe Electoral Commission—removing the redundant ESC and transferring formally to the ZEC the control over delimitation and registration—but fell short of the MDC’s demands for a new constitution and a bipartisan electoral commission. ZANU-PF and MDC negotiating teams agreed on a draft constitution on 30 September 2007129—known afterward as the “Kariba draft”—but the relationship soured, and by the end of the year it was clear Mugabe would not countenance constitutional reform prior to the elections.
As a result of the Mbeki-sponsored talks, however, the Electoral Act was also amended to provide for electoral observers in polling stations; more transparent procedures for counting ballots at the polling station—immediately after the end of the vote and with the results being displayed at station’s entrance—and the right to demand a recount; a guarantee of the opposition’s right to campaign unhindered around the country; and a more flexible access to the state electronic media during the campaign period. These limited changes nevertheless had an impact on the outcome of the March 2008 elections (see Conclusion). However, the government remained firmly in control of the electoral process beginning with the appointment of ZEC members, all of them Mugabe loyalists who, as usual, worked closely with the registrar general and other partisan officials. Interference from the JOC in the electoral process also was as important as in 2005—as the run-off in the 2008 presidential election later demonstrated.
Through the years Mugabe has established his personal control over the liberation movement, and then the state and the political arena in Zimbabwe, leaving any opposition from within or from outside the ruling party without breathing space. For sure it was not outright dictatorship: Mugabe maintained the façade of parliamentary democracy (including the old-fashioned, English style opening ceremony of Parliament) and just enough political bickering within the ruling party, although no one dared to challenge him. However, the outer limits of freedom were reached very fast in the late 1990s, and it became obvious that a truly democratic constitution, free press, independent judiciary, and transparent and fair elections were not compatible with the perpetuation of Mugabe’s rule. By closing the electoral route for the opposition, Mugabe has left the MDC without any viable, alternate strategy, and, incidentally, has dissuaded potential ZANU-PF dissenters eager to get rid of the aging despot from striking any deal with the opposition. By 2007 the divided MDC lacked viable political perspectives in spite of Mugabe’s fast-growing unpopularity. The cunning autocrat propelled the succession debate by suggesting repeatedly (as early as 1999 in ZANU-PF closed-door proceedings on the constitutional reform) that he would soon retire from active politics, but only to force his lieutenants to make their bids, and then play upon their rival ambitions. These factions’ leaders know very well that Mugabe trusts nobody—in line with the political culture of recklessness and deceit he has promoted within his own party—and will expect to die in office. Therefore, they fight each other primarily to prevent their rivals’ ascent to power, a fairly common sight in any decaying personal rule.
Chapter 2
Violence as the Cornerstone of Mugabe’s Strategy of Political Survival
Violence was crucial for ZANU-PF to secure victory in both the parliamentary elections in June 2000 and the presidential election in March 2002, and once again in the 2008 presidential run-off (although systematic rigging also played a determining role, especially in presidential elections). From a survey conducted of people coming out of the polling stations in June 2000, Professor R. W. Johnson estimated that up to 12 percent of the voters changed their vote from MDC to ZANU-PF as a consequence of the political violence inflicted on them during the electoral campaign,1 a figure corroborated by an October 2000 survey using the same methodology. It could be argued that only a minority of the electorate was affected, but this violence then targeted primarily the swing vote in the twenty constituencies where ZANU-PF eventually won with a margin of 500 votes or less. Therefore, it is very likely that without inflicting such violence the ruling party would have lost its absolute majority in Parliament. Moreover, with 75 seats the MDC would have been in a position to amend the constitution or impeach Mugabe. There was no public opinion survey after the presidential election. However, since political violence intensified rather than abated between 2000 and 2002, it is reasonable to assume that state-sponsored violence kept Mugabe in power for the first decade of the twenty-first century.
Many observers were caught off guard by the violent character of the Zimbabwe crisis. It seems that the façade of urbane language before some audiences and institutionalized procedures deluded many foreigners, who failed to listen to opposition parties’ pleas before 2000. “Political stability,” hailed by Western resident diplomats up to 1997 and seen as a guarantee for the security of foreign investment, was also used as a convenient justification for authoritarian rule among academic commentators. The other face of the Mugabe regime was ignored, and the role of political violence and oppression was assiduously downplayed. However, violence has been part of the ruling party’s political culture (even in the infancy of black nationalism in Rhodesia)2 and government’s policies from the outset. ZANU-PF leaders were not even secretive about it, and hundreds of actions and speeches can be cited from press reports over the last twenty-two years. Not a single electoral campaign since Independence has been free of violence, albeit with variable intensity and geographical extension.3 That illusions about “democratization” and “reform” prevailed for so long over the grim reality can only be explained by the convergence of Western powers’ constant search for an African showcase and the Third World’s perceptions of Mugabe as a freedom fighter. Nevertheless, February 2000 was a turning point: the intensity of violence and, more important, the cynicism of the state’s obvious involvement, its indifference for the law also meant that the regime had thrown off its mask in the fight for survival with no prospect of reversing such policy.
A Political Culture Rooted in Violence
Ruling party secretary for information Nathan Shamuyarira once cynically pointed out: “the area of violence is an area where ZANU-PF has a very strong, long and successful history.”4 Although Mugabe and his party enjoyed some strong support among the masses, especially in the early 1980s, and were able to mobilize the electorate in the rural areas until the mid-1990s, this popular backing was at best ambiguous since it was obtained partly through the use of political intimidation, sometimes through direct violence, but most of the