LITMIR.BIZ

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hundreds of members jailed.

      The Sinn Féin Ard Fheis held on 22 February successfully delayed a split in the party with almost universal support for a motion to adjourn proceedings for a period of three months ‘to avoid a division of the Sinn Féin organisation and to avert the danger to the country of an immediate election, and give an opportunity to the signatories of the London Agreement to draft a constitution’.71 The motion was passed amid a spirit of hope and comradeship; however, the postponement worked to the advantage of the pro-Treaty leadership by delaying an open debate with the membership. In a similar vein, Dáil Éireann agreed, on 2 March, that no election should be held until the new Free State constitution was presented to the people and the Dáil was adjourned until the end of April, allowing the Free State leadership further time to consolidate power.

      While the IRB was important in maintaining bonds of allegiance among republicans to Michael Collins and the National Army, outside Dublin, Collins’ control of the IRB did not give him the personal sway he anticipated. The South Munster Division of the IRB rejected the supreme council’s directive to support the Treaty in January 1922, with the entire Cork membership unwilling to obey the directive.72 In the west and north of the country, the IRB was weaker and had minimal influence over Volunteer officers.

      The much anticipated army convention was formally announced by Richard Mulcahy at the end of February for 26 March, but as the strength of republican sentiment became apparent, it was banned by the Free State on 15 March and an order issued that any officer attending would be dismissed from the National Army. The republican ‘Military Council’ pressed ahead with preparations for the convention; however, the threat of dismissal from the Free State Forces scuppered hopes of unification, and, as Florence O’Donoghue reflected, ‘a disaster, worse than any defeat in the field, had struck the army’.73

      The growing anxiety among the government that elements within the republican leadership were considering a military coup d’état was re-enforced by an interview to the press given by Rory O’Connor on 22 March, four days before the army convention.74 Fielding questions alone, O’Connor purported to speak for the anti-Treaty leadership and presented the most extreme republican position. Claiming the Irish Republican Army represented 80 per cent of Volunteer officers, O’Connor argued that the army would return to its original constitution at the upcoming convention as Dáil Éireann no longer had any moral authority. O’Connor claimed that by accepting the Treaty, the government had ‘abolished itself’ and ‘has done something it has no moral right to do’. Stating that the actions republicans were contemplating ‘are no greater than the men took in 1916’, O’Connor claimed ‘the army has overthrown the government in the same way in many countries’. When asked ‘if the parliament and the people go wrong, will they have to take the consequences?’, O’Connor replied, ‘Yes, that is so.’ When pressed further by reporters, ‘if the army executive refuses its consent to the government set up by the people, will we have a military dictatorship?’ O’Connor replied, ‘Yes, you can take it any way you like.’

      Coming four days before the army convention that effectively established two rival armies, O’Connor’s reckless interview made it problematic for republicans to seek any political accommodation with the Free State and presented the republican leadership as being committed to the overthrow of a democratically elected government. O’Connor’s comments did not represent the views of the republican leadership, however, which contained a diverse range of opinion. For most republican officers, particularly in the crucial First Munster and Fourth Northern Divisions, unity within the army remained the priority, and O’Connor falsely presented the most extreme republican position as the agreed policy of the entire republican leadership. A point of no return had been established that was problematic for republicans to retreat from, and which ultimately benefitted the Free State, which now had carte blanche to take extreme measures against republicans.

      Mellows presided over the army convention that was attended by 211 officers from 49 brigades and officially established the Irish Republican Army on 26 March. The IRA was controlled by an executive of sixteen members elected by ballot, from which an army council of five was elected. On 9 April, a second IRA convention elected an army council containing both militant and more conciliatory republicans: Liam Lynch (Cork, 1st Munster Division), Chief of Staff; Joseph McKelvey (Belfast, 3rd Northern Division), Deputy Chief of Staff; Florence O’Donoghue (Cork, 1st Munster Division), Adjutant General; Liam Mellows (Dublin/IRA GHQ), Quartermaster; Rory O’Connor (Dublin/IRA GHQ), Director of Engineering; and Ernie O’Malley (Tipperary, 2nd Munster Division), Director of Organisation. In terms of the balance of opinion within the army council, Lynch and O’Donoghue remained hopeful of achieving unity with the Free State Army, while O’Connor, supported by Mellows and O’Malley, represented uncompromising republicanism.

      The establishment of the new governing body marked a definitive break and a further step towards conflict but did little to unify republicans; as Florence O’Donoghue conceded, ‘the Executive never fused into an effective unit. It never had a common mind or a common policy. There was not time. Many matters, not strictly the concern of the Army, obtruded in discussions, social theories were aired and debated, projects were considered in an atmosphere of unreality, stresses developed which weakened the fabric of authority.’75 Ernie O’Malley recalled executive meetings where ‘there was no attempt to define a clear cut policy. Words ran into phrases, sentences followed sentences.’ ‘A drifting policy discussed endlessly in a shipwrecked way.’76

      The new IRA Executive occupied the extensive Four Courts complex on the Dublin Quays on 13 April but the decision was criticised by many senior officers, including Tipperary commander Seamus Robinson, who left after one week after ‘a whale of an argument’ with Mellows and O’Connor over the ‘foolishness of the Headquarters of the Army having all its eggs in one basket’.77 IRA officer Alfred White believed that Mellows hoped to consolidate control of the republican forces by establishing a ‘shadow government’ that would take ‘firmer control’ of the IRA; ‘Liam envisaged that the shadow government would be made a target for propaganda and persecution, but that this would keep the issue alive.’78 The occupation of the Four Courts was symbolic rather than tactical, providing republicans with a central point of focus to rival the Free State government. According to Ernie O’Malley, ‘we of the Four Courts were the centre of the armed republican resistance. We had to defend the independence of our country, and whether we made mistakes or not, we were going to make a last attempt to prevent the stampede of the nation.’79 Republican chief of staff, Liam Lynch, remained insulated from the precarious reality of their position and in a letter to his brother shortly after the occupation, he wrote, ‘I am absolutely certain that the Free State was sent to its doom by our action last week.’80

      Ernie O’Malley recalled a change in Mellows after the occupation, ‘he seemed gayer, more cheerful now. Perhaps action, such as it was, after the long period of inaction had made him more light hearted.’ For O’Malley and his comrades, the decision to occupy the complex ‘counted for something. We had come out into the open; no more hole and corner work’.81 Senior anti-Treaty officers and their staff now worked, slept and ate in the compound, including typists, cooks and clerical staff. With scant regard for the nation’s heritage, Mellows converted the Records Office that housed priceless manuscripts of Irish civilisation into a munitions factory with explosives, grenades and other machinery. In early April, he drafted a memorandum on behalf of the IRA Executive, outlining the conditions under which the unity of the army might be attained. The IRA executive demanded that the army commit to the following:

      1. To maintain the existing Republic.

      2. That Dáil Éireann, as the Government of the Republic, be the only government of the country.

      3. To maintain the army as the Irish Republican Army, under the control of an elected independent Executive.

      4. Disbanding of the Civil Guard, the policing of the country to be carried out by the Irish Republican Army, as decided by the Executive of that Army.

      5. All financial liabilities of the army to be discharged, and future requirements met by the Dáil.

      6. No elections on the issue at present before the country to be held while the threat of war exists.

      Mellows’

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