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in the face of Perry’s gunboat diplomacy and while most men in Japan blindly opposed Open the Country, Kaishū, then an obscure Tokugawa retainer, had submitted a letter to the Bakufu. In this famous document he expressed the urgent and unavoidable necessity for Edo to lift its centuries-old ban on the construction of large oceangoing vessels and to develop a modern navy. To this end, international trade would be imperative to raise capital for building warships and manufacturing Western-style guns. Although these and other of Kaishū’s proposals were adopted by the Bakufu during the 1850s, in the spring of 1863—and for years to follow—Japan was still a technologically backward nation. While most of his countrymen ranted and raved about expelling the foreigners through virtue of their “samurai spirit,” Katsu Kaishū, always ahead of his time, continued to profess that without foreign assistance—i.e., modern military technology—Japan could not hope to stand up to Great Britain, France, Russia, or the United States. Unless Japan prepared itself for the future, it would share the fate of China and India, under the yoke of foreign subjugation. Kaishū knew, as did a small handful of other farsighted men both within and outside the Tokugawa camp, that Edo’s proposed promise to expel the foreigners was at best appeasement, at worst deception, of the Imperial Court.

      In April of the previous year, Shimazu Hisamitsu, the father of the Satsuma daimyō and de facto ruler of that powerful clan, had led an army of one thousand men into Kyōto in an unprecedented display of military might by an outside lord. Hisamitsu, a sometimes ally of the Tokugawa, urged the Imperial Court to accept Edo’s much vaunted call for a Union of Court and Camp. By uniting with Kyōto to shore up national strength against the foreign threat, Edo hoped to regain its unchallenged authority of the past. The reasoning: once the union had been completed, the Imperial Loyalists could no longer oppose the Bakufu, for so doing would be tantamount to siding against the Imperial Court. Lord Hisamitsu, meanwhile, had ulterior motives. In his role as great mediator, he would strengthen his influence at Edo and gain prestige at Kyōto, at the expense of his Chōshū rivals.

      The local Tokugawa magistrate in Edo had kept a close watch on Kiyokawa. He was aware of Kiyokawa’s openly anti-Tokugawa views. The magistrate used the incident of the slaying as an excuse to order Kiyokawa’s arrest. But Kiyokawa would not be arrested. Instead, he traveled through western Japan to recruit shishi into the Loyalist fold and wielded significant influence among the radicals of Chōshū, Satsuma, and Tosa. Although the uprising in Fushimi had indeed been crushed, Kiyokawa would not abandon his ultimate objective of Imperial Loyalism and Down with the Bakufu.

      The first visit to Kyōto by a shōgun in over two centuries demonstrated Edo’s diminishing ability to dominate Japan. It served to further empower the radical elements at the Imperial Court and to embolden the Loyalists. On February 8, 1863, the third year of Bunkyū, the Rōshi Corps left Edo for Kyōto as an advance guard to the shōgun’s entourage.

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