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of the Battle of Kowada)

      Khubilai Khan’s first approaches to Japan were diplomatic ones. In 1266 he sent two envoys on a goodwill mission. The two men passed through Korea, where they were strongly urged to abandon any plans to visit Japan, and to return to China lest they risk their lives.⁶ This was a reaction that may well have puzzled the Chinese, because their traditional view of the Japanese had always been a positive one. From Japan had come many an earnest seeker after truth, such as the monk Saichō (767–822), who had introduced Tendai Buddhism to Japan. In 719 the arrival of a group of envoys from Japan had occasioned the comment that Japan was a “country of gentlemen.”⁷

      Following the failure of the 1266 embassy, a further mission was dispatched in 1269. After a year the envoy reported back to Khubilai Khan that, in his opinion, the Japanese were “cruel and bloodthirsty” and lived in “a country of thugs.”⁸ Japan was certainly projecting a very different image from that of the peaceful Nara period! The Japanese had, after all, experienced a century of warfare and the establishment of a warrior class, and this negative view may well have been one factor behind Khubilai Khan’s decision to subdue this unruly island empire and bring it under his sway. In addition to passing on his comments about the Japanese, the envoy had delivered Khubilai Khan’s demand for tribute from Japan, which had provoked a harsh reaction. The Japanese, who fully appreciated the threat of invasion conveyed by the demand, were placed very much on their guard, and they did not have long to wait for the outcome. Khubilai Khan gave orders to Korea to supply nine hundred ships and an army of five thousand men. The fleet that finally set sail in 1274 included fifteen thousand Yuan (Mongol) soldiers and eight thousand Koreans, together with a very large number of crewmen.⁹

      The First Mongol Invasion

      The Mongol invasions of Japan (Khubilai Khan’s army returned in 1281) provided the only occasion in over six hundred years when the samurai were fighting enemies other than themselves. The first Mongol attempt at invasion was a short-lived affair, fitting the usual Mongol pattern of sending out a reconnaissance in force prior to a major campaign. Much of their time was taken up in crossing from Korea and devastating the islands of Tsushima and Iki, the two islands that have always provided the easiest means of crossing the straits. The first landfall on Japanese territory was made on Tsushima, which lies much nearer to Korea than it does to Japan. Tsushima consists of two islands, and most of the invading force came ashore on the complex and ragged coastline between the two islands, where many safe anchorages could be found. A particularly fierce battle took place at Kowada, where a Shintō shrine now commemorates the battle.¹⁰

      In charge of Tsushima’s defense was Sō Sukekuni (1207–74), the deputy shugo (governor). He appears to have risen to the occasion splendidly, although in the subsequent fierce fighting the pace was first set by the Mongols, leaving the Japanese defenders confused by the invaders’ unfamiliar tactics. The most noticeable divergence from the Japanese tradition was the way in which the Mongols advanced in large dense groups, controlled by drums and to the accompaniment of much noise. In the lively, epic words of Yamada’s retelling of the story, they:

      ... advanced in phalanx, which was also a novelty to the Japanese, protecting themselves most effectually with their shields.... The Mongolian shafts harassed them terribly; still all the Japanese soldiers fought according to their own etiquette of battle. A humming arrow, the sign of commencing the combat, was shot. The Mongols greeted it with a shout of derision. Then some of the best fighters among the Japanese advanced in their usual dignified, leisurely manner and formulated their traditional challenge. But the Mongol phalanx, instead of sending out a single warrior to answer the defiance, opened their ranks, enclosed each challenger, and cut him to pieces. The invaders moved in unchanging formation, obeying signals from their commanding officers.¹¹

      Yamada is, of course, making the assumption that the issuing of challenges and the seeking out of a worthy opponent were the norm in the warfare of the time—an assumption that was questioned in the previous chapter. But even if that had been the expected way to fight, surely no samurai would have been so stupid as to think that the Mongols spoke Japanese! The essential dichotomy between Japanese and Mongol tactics was that the samurai preferred to fight as individuals targeting other individuals, while the Mongols fought in dense groups. An anonymous work of the fourteenth century, called Hachiman Gudōkun, sets out precisely the problems that faced the samurai: “Calling our names to one another, as in Japanese warfare, we expected fame or ignominy to be found in contesting against individuals, but in this battle the hosts closed as one.”¹²

      The extant accounts of the actual fighting that took place on Tsushima, and afterwards on Iki island and the mainland of Kyūshū, show that the samurai were far from being stunned into inaction by the novelties of Mongol warfare. Language difficulties, of course, precluded the conventional name-shouting for any audience other than the samurai’s own comrades, but in terms of making a name for oneself, that audience was vital. It was also not impossible to figure out who were the officers among the dense Mongol phalanx, so the likely “worthy opponents” could indeed be targeted. And if the goal was simply to take the largest number of heads, the Mongol armies provided numerous targets for the mounted samurai archers. The clouds of Mongol arrows, some of which may have been poisoned, that were loosed in return from within the invading squads must have caused problems, but once the fight developed into hand-to-hand combat, there was no opportunity for such haphazard archery. It was then that the samurai sword came into its own. The long, curved, and razor-sharp blades cut deeply into the brigandine-like coats of the Mongol invaders, whose short swords were much inferior.

      One outstanding example of a Tsushima samurai dealing successfully with the Mongol tactics appears in Yamada’s account, and tells of a samurai called Sukesada (his surname is not given, but he was probably of the Sō family) who killed twenty-four men on the Mongol army’s flank, probably with his bow. A grove of trees had conveniently broken up the Mongol phalanx, and at least one senior Mongol officer became Sukesada’s victim. But the enthusiastic Sukesada became isolated from his comrades, and a shower of arrows hit him, three of which pierced his chest.¹³

      From a devastated Tsushima, the Mongol army moved on to Iki. Iki is a much smaller place than Tsushima, and in 1274 was under the governorship of Taira Kagetaka. Kagetaka received intelligence of the Mongols’ attack on Tsushima and immediately sent a request for reinforcements to Dazaifu, the regional center of government on Kyūshū. Unlike the samurai of Tsushima, however, the Japanese defenders of Iki were quickly driven back from the beaches and sought refuge inside Kagetaka’s castle—which was probably little more than a wooden stockade. Here the Japanese defenders held out, hoping for relief. When none came, Taira Kagetaka prepared to lead his men out in a final charge, but as they approached the gates with their bows drawn, they were confronted by a human shield consisting of scores of their fellow countrymen, who had been chained together. Abandoning their bows and arrows, the samurai drew their swords and plunged into the Mongol host. They were soon overwhelmed, and, in the face of certain defeat, Kagetaka withdrew to his castle to commit suicide along with his family. With resistance at an end, Iki was overrun, and among the cruel punishments inflicted upon the population, their prisoners had their hands pierced and were strung in a line along the Mongol ships that then proceeded to Kyūshū.

      The Mongol “reconnaissance in force” was completed by a landing on the beaches of Hakata Bay. More details are known of this part of the operation than of the Tsushima and Iki raids because of the existence of a remarkable set of scroll paintings called the Mōko Shūrai Ekotoba.¹⁴ The scrolls are among the most important primary sources for the appearance and behavior of samurai of the thirteenth century, but were never intended to be a historical document for posterity. They were instead created purely and simply to press the claim for reward being put forward by a certain Takezaki Suenaga. It is his achievements that are recorded there, the first scroll covering the 1274 invasion, and the second dealing with the 1281 action.¹⁵ As a gokenin (house-man or retainer) of the ruling Hōjō shikken, Suenaga had rushed to defend Japan against the Mongols, but his motives were clearly more than simple patriotism. At the conclusion of hostilities, Suenaga felt that he had been denied the rewards that were properly his, so he took his complaints directly to the Hōjō’s capital of Kamakura. His efforts to obtain a reward were every bit

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