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in class or rank. In accordance with the primary division in classes, punishment was inflicted with differing rituals and in varying measures according to the rank of the criminal, with the warriors bearing the heaviest brunt of the penal code for any infractions, which were seen as a direct insult to the system they represented and were expected to uphold.

      In examining the primary morality of feudal Japan, we saw that the rapport upon which the whole conception of the state rested was that of master-subordinate. The particular interpretation of Confucianism which the Tokugawa government adopted as its inspirational theory of state was that of Chu Hsi (in Japanese, Shu Ki, 1130-1200), who had stressed the unquestioning and loyal attitude of inferior toward superior. His presentation of Confucian ideas (shushi-gaku or sogaku) became “the theoretical foundation for feudal society” (Goedertier, 273), to the point of forcing the exclusion, by edict (kansei igaku no kin), of heterodox learning from the state schools.

      Shushi-gaku emphasized the concepts of vertical hierarchy and stern pragmatism in discharging the duties assigned by one’s superior within the hierarchy. There was no mention of social preeminence based upon personal merit rather than heredity, nor was the conception of social justice impartially and broadly applied (to everyone, including the emperor and shogun) a part of this interpretation. This version of Confucian theory concerning government and society was to spark a revival of interest in Chinese studies and give birth to a school of thought which was not necessarily favorable to the military dictators. In the main, however, and for quite an extended period of time, this interpretation confirmed the shoguns’ position and justified their consolidation of power. It also provided material for the clearer formulation of the warrior’s “creed” (bukyo) and the samurai’s “way” (shido)—both of which were to blend harmoniously in that particular code of honor known as “The Way of the Warrior” (bushido).

      All these legalistic, philosophical, military, and social devices made it extremely unlikely that anything “unexpected” could happen within the country, in practice as well as in theory, without the Tokugawa being immediately informed. They are said to have acquired “the dubious distinction of being one of the first governments in the world to develop an extensive and efficient secret police system and to make of it an important organ of state. With the centuries of experience in such practices, it is not surprising that the secret police should have loomed so large in the political make-up of Japan in recent years” (Reischauer1, 83-84).

      In such a martial culture, there was no place for new ideas or even for ancient but contradictory theories that might have forced a man to confront the problem of personal responsibility, of individual values different from, if not actually contrary to, those of his society. As in every military dictatorship the world has ever known, knowledge was considered a dangerous commodity and its wide dissemination strictly forbidden. Although limited “Dutch studies” (rangaku) were allowed under close official supervision, any breach of the regulations was punishable by death. Not only the members of other classes, but “intrepid samurai, such as Sakuma Shozan, Watanabe Kazan, and Yoshida Shoin, paid with their lives for their desire for wider horizons in knowledge” (Blacker, 305). And even during the declining years of the Tokugawa rule, when the country and its entire social structure groaned and shuddered within the confines of its military bonds, and afterward, when the restoration of political power to the emperor had activated an intense process of adaptation to a frighteningly new international reality, “almost any conceivable obstacle was placed in the way of the aspiring student of Western learning. There were no grammars and few dictionaries; the weight of feudal and Confucian disapproval and even the assassin’s sword was directed against him” (Blacker, 305).

      The Daimyo

      Immediately beneath the Tokugawa clan in order of importance were the clans headed by the daimyo—“the territorial rulers of self-contained political units called han which were at once minor states and fiefs” (Tsukahira, 18). The word daimyo may be translated as “great names” and seems to have been derived from a combination of dai (great) with myo or myoden (used to identify a rice-producing fief). Notoriously belligerent and generally rapacious, the lords of such estates capable of sustaining them and their military retainers had fought ceaselessly among themselves throughout the early and middle periods of Japan’s feudal era. Only leaders such as Nobunaga, Hideyoshi, and, ultimately, Ieyasu had been able to coerce them into a sort of uneasy alliance wherein their individualistic and expansionistic tendencies were controlled by a severely repressive system of checks and balances. Ieyasu and his descendants were (and remained throughout the succession of Tokugawa dynasties) aware that the downfall of the emperor and his court nobles had, to a large extent, been due to lack of control over the provincial centers of military power, which, however necessary for peacekeeping purposes throughout the realm (as well as that of maintaining the other classes of the nation in a state of subjugation), had become increasingly self-sufficient and, in the end, alienated from the emperor and his nobles.

      Due to this lack of centralized control, the feudal “barons” had been able to apply and tighten their stranglehold upon the crown and upon all the other classes of Japanese subjects who stood in their way, thus effectively displacing them all. Eventually, the only obstacle revealed itself to be themselves and their individual ambitions. For the Tokugawa, the feudal governors (from whose ranks they had emerged) were, and always remained, the chief source of trouble since they owned and ruled over independent fiefs, maintained their own cohorts of warriors, and had the necessary wealth to finance armed adventures. It was not only conceivable but, in an age of still rampant political instability and military turbulence, a relevant possibility that these daimyo might, if left to their own devices, increase and organize their own military forces beyond the limits considered advisable by the central government in Edo. Those forces, in turn, might be used to unseat the Tokugawa in accordance with the ancient and famous principle of displacing the superior in order to make room for the inferior (gekokujo)—a principle of political gamesmanship which had become almost commonplace during pre-Tokugawa times and which the Tokugawa themselves had successfully applied on several occasions.

      Accordingly, if on one side these daimyo were not only the powerful leaders of military clans, but also the main instruments of indirect control over the country at large, on the other side, as Tsukahira wrote, “it became the chief preoccupation of the early Tokugawa to weaken and divide” them in order to maintain that control. The measures adopted by the Edo bakufu for this purpose were many and thorough. Differences in fief size, income, and rank at the court of the shogun in Edo were established to create artificial barriers among the daimyo, and, naturally, “mutual jealousies and rivalries were kept alive and fostered” (Tsukahira, 27). Continuous and intense surveillance by the shogun’s sinister censors (metsuke) of the various daimyo (when in Edo in periodical attendance, at home in their own territories, or even in transit from one to the other) insured that their activities would be properly assessed by the shogun on a regular and continuing basis. Finally, their obligatory attendance at the shogun’s court every other year, with the concomitant obligation to leave their wives and children in Edo when they returned home, reduced their freedom of action substantially.

      The number of daimyo during the Tokugawa period seems to have been about 260. Their status was qualified according to several interconnecting criteria. The first criterion was based upon and determined by the feudal relationship between a daimyo and the shogun himself. Daimyo who were collateral members of the Tokugawa house, for example, were qualified as “related feudatories” (shimpan) or “family daimyo” (kamon). They included the “three exalted families” (sanke), occupied provinces closer to Edo, and held important offices in the central government.

      The shimpan daimyo were followed by the “hereditary daimyo” (fudai), who had been vassals of the Tokugawa since before the great and decisive battle of Sekigahara. They also occupied important positions in the bakufu, and their fiefs protectively surrounded the central contiguous territories which were under direct Tokugawa supervision.

      The “outside” daimyo (tozama) were those important clan leaders, once peers of Ieyasu, who had acknowledged his title of shogun after the battle of Sekigahara. Their fiefs were generally located beyond those of the fudai.

      These

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