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possibility of existence in time.”¹¹³ Related to this was his concept of Gleichzeitigkeit,¹¹⁴ time without change, which was the correlate of the absolutized self. Here Adorno was making a criticism similar to that leveled by Horkheimer a few years later against Bergson’s idea of durée, as discussed above.

      Along with his analysis of the philosophical implications of inwardness, Adorno included a sociological probe of what he referred to as the bourgeois intérieur in Kierkegaard’s time. Subjective inwardness, he argued, was not unrelated to the position of rentier who was outside the production process, a position held by Kierkegaard himself. In this role he shared the typical petit-bourgeois sense of impotence, which he carried to an extreme by ascetically rejecting the natural self in its entirety: “His moral rigor was derived from the absolute claim of the isolated person. He criticized all eudaemonism as contingent in contrast with the objectless self.”¹¹⁵ It was thus no accident that sacrifice was at the center of his theology; the absolutely spiritual man ended by annihilating his natural self: “Kierkegaard’s spiritualism is above all hostility to nature.”¹¹⁶ Here and elsewhere in his book Adorno expressed a desire to overcome man’s hostility to nature, a theme that would play an increasing role in the Institut’s later work.

      Although he wrote an occasional article on Kierkegaard in later years,¹¹⁷ Kierkegaard: Construction of the Aesthetic was really Adorno’s Abschied (farewell)¹¹⁸ to the Danish philosopher. In 1934 he left the Continent for England, where he studied at Merton College, Oxford. Except for occasional trips back to Germany, he remained in England for the next three and a half years. While continuing his interest in music and producing articles for the Zeitschrift on related topics, he found the time to begin a long study of Edmund Husserl, in whose work he had been interested since his doctoral dissertation in 1924. By the time it appeared in 1956, its tone was scarcely less critical than that of his earlier treatment of Kierkegaard. In this work, too, many of the ideas that Horkheimer and Marcuse were simultaneously developing can be found. Although certain sections of the work—the third chapter and the introduction—were not written until the fifties, an examination of Towards a Metacritique of Epistemology does give some insight into Critical Theory’s attitude towards phenomenology in the thirties.

      In his first book, Adorno had singled out Husserl as someone who shared Kierkegaard’s stress on the self.¹¹⁹ Accordingly, he now concentrated on the epistemological aspects of Husserl’s work, especially those contained in his early Logical Investigations, which was published in three volumes in 1900, 1901, and 1913. He applauded Husserl’s desire to go beyond psychologism as an explanation of cognition, but when Husserl spoke of a transcendent subject, Adorno sensed a desire to annihilate the contingent individual. In the same spirit as Kierkegaard, Husserl betrayed a fundamental yearning for ontological certainty. In attacking his “reductive” method, which sought eternal essences through a phenomenological exploration of consciousness, Adorno, like Horkheimer, argued for the importance of mediation (Vermittlung).

      Husserl’s search for first principles revealed an inherent identity theory, despite his anti-idealistic pretensions. The need for absolute intellectual certainty, Adorno argued, was likely to be a reflex of personal insecurity: “freedom is never given, always threatened. . . . The absolutely certain as such is always unfreedom. . . . It is a mistaken conclusion that what endures is truer than what passes.”¹²⁰ A true epistemology must end the fetish of knowledge as such, which, as Nietzsche demonstrated, leads to abstract systematizing. The truth was not what was “left over”¹²¹ when a reduction of subject to object, or vice versa, took place. It resided instead in the “force field”¹²² between subject and object. Absolute realism and absolute nominalism, both of which could be found in Husserl’s work, led to equally fallacious reifications. As Adorno wrote in another article on Husserl, “whoever tries to reduce the world to either the factual or the essence comes in some way or other into the position of Münchhausen, who tried to drag himself out of the swamp by his own pigtails.”¹²³

      By seeking the immutable, Husserl implicitly accepted the reality of the current “administered world.”¹²⁴ Husserl, Adorno wrote, was “the most static thinker of his period.”¹²⁵ It was not enough to look for the permanent within the transient, or the archaic within the present. A true dialectics, Adorno argued, was “the attempt to see the new in the old instead of simply the old in the new.”¹²⁶ Although Husserl had tried to puncture the reified world by means of his reductive method based on intuition (Wesensschau), he had failed. Adorno admitted that intuition was a legitimate part of experience, but ought not to be elevated into an absolute method of cognition. In doing just that, Husserl had expressed an unconscious rejection of the “real world,” which was “ego-alien” to him.¹²⁷ Being could no more be divorced entirely from the facts of perception than it could be equated with them.

      From Husserl’s epistemology Adorno went on to criticize his mathematical realism and logical “absolutism.” The triumph of mathematical thinking in the West, Adorno argued, contained a mythical element. The fetish of numbers had led to a repudiation of nonidentity and a kind of hermetic idealism. Similarly, the reliance on formal logic as a mental absolute contained mythical traces. These modes of thought were also not without social significance. The reification of logic, Adorno asserted, “refers back to the commodity form whose identity exists in the ‘equivalence’ of exchange value.”¹²⁸ Instead of formal logic, which perpetuated the false dualism of form and content, Adorno suggested a more dynamic alternative that referred back to Hegel. “Logic,” he wrote, “is not Being, but a process that cannot be simply reduced to the pole of ‘subjectivity’ or ‘objectivity.’ The self-criticism of logic has as its result dialectics. . . . There is no logic without sentences, no sentences without the synthetic mental function.”¹²⁹ Formal logic with its laws of contradiction and identity was a kind of repressive taboo that ultimately led to the domination of nature.¹³⁰ Adorno also strongly objected to a mimetic theory of perception, and he found it even in Husserl’s phenomenology, despite its stress on intentionality. The locus of truth, when correctly understood, he contended, “becomes the mutual dependency, the production through one another (sich durcheinander Produzieren) of subject and object, and it should no longer be thought of as static agreement—as ‘intention.’ ”¹³¹ By whatever means, Husserl’s attempt to uncover the essential truth, he argued, was in vain: “Only in the repudiation of every such illusion, in the idea of imageless truth, is the lost mimesis preserved and transcended (aufgehoben), not in the preservation of its [the truth’s] rudiments.”¹³²

      Husserl’s tendency to reify the given, Adorno argued, was related to advanced bourgeois society’s destruction of Erfahrung (experience) and its replacement by administered, lifeless concepts. The disappearance of true experience, which Benjamin had also stressed as a characteristic of modern life,¹³³ corresponded to the growing helplessness of modern man. To Adorno, phenomenology thus represented the last futile effort of bourgeois thought to rescue itself from impotence. “With phenomenology,” he wrote, “bourgeois thought reached its end in dissociated, fragmented statements set against one another, and resigned itself to the simple reproduction of that which is.”¹³⁴ In doing so, it turned against action in the world: “The denigration of praxis to a simple special case of intentionality is the grossest consequence of its reified premises.”¹³⁵ But worst of all, the assumption of absolute identity and immediacy could well lead to the political domination of an absolute ideology. There was, Adorno suggested, a subterranean connection between phenomenology and fascism—both were expressions of the terminal crisis of bourgeois society.¹³⁶

      Among the members of the Frankfurt School Adorno perhaps most consistently expressed abhorrence of ontology and identity theory. At the same time, he also rejected naive positivism as a non-reflective metaphysics of its own, contrasting it with a dialectics that neither denied nor fully accepted the phenomenal world as the ground of truth. Against those who stressed an abstract individualism, he pointed to the social component through which subjectivity was inevitably mediated. He just as strongly resisted the temptation to acquiesce in the dissolution of the contingent individual into a totality, whether of Volk or class.

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