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evacuees on the state of mind of local Jews, it should be noted that the city proved to be a very important transition point, through which thousands of refugees, including many Jews, fled eastwards. But when it came to the direct impact of rumors on decision-making by Rostov Jews, it seems to have been limited and diluted by Soviet propaganda more than was the case in the areas with weaker Soviet control, such as smaller towns and/or areas closer to the frontline.⁶⁷

      The developments in the city were remarkable in another respect, namely, the unique fate of Rostov-on-Don and its Jewish population in 1941: the brief occupation of the city by the Germans from November 21–28, 1941 and its quick recapture by the Red Army limited the time available for attacking the Jewish population.⁶⁸ This experience would have made the rumors of the German threat less believable for the Rostov Jews.

      The third source, that is, the Jews’ previous, often outdated, knowledge about the German attackers seems to be the most difficult to describe properly. Yet it was frequently mentioned in testimonies. The degree to which the available information was understood and acted upon depended on the strength of the Jews’ group identity, their level of intelligence, and their prewar whereabouts and contacts.

      One factor the Soviet Jews used to decide on assess the German threat was the memories they retained about the attitudes of the German army towards Jews during World War I. At the outbreak of World War II, many North Caucasian Jews were newcomers to this region, so their conduct reflected their memories of the other regions in which they used to live, especially Ukraine.⁶⁹ In the North Caucasus, the only areas occupied by the German army during World War I were the Rostov district, and especially the city of Rostov-on-Don. Available testimony, from newcomers and Rostov Jews alike, point that Jews had good memories of the Germans’ behavior in that earlier period, which influenced their unwillingness to move further away from the German advance.⁷⁰

      By and large, if we attempt to sum up the North Caucasian Jews’ view of the Germans’ attitude towards the Jews, available testimonies indicate that, in fall 1941, there were still a considerable number of Jews who were ignorant of the German persecution of the Jews in other places. In particular, many consciously chose to disregard the information that was available. The opinion of one Jewish intellectual: “I do not believe that the civilized nation of Goethe and Schiller can behave like barbarians”⁷¹ is characteristic in this regard. However, by the summer of 1942, the number of Jews in these two groups had decreased to such a point that it can be claimed with certainty that an absolute majority of the Ashkenazi Jews living in the North Caucasus did not wish to stay under German rule.

      2.3.2. Implementing Decisions

      Influenced by the Soviet media and/or rumors, many North Caucasian Jews came to view the situation as fraught with danger and reached the conclusion that they would be better off evacuating. Yet, there was a significant gap between their intentions and the feasibility of their plans. Jews often failed to leave because of illness and physical disabilities. The high proportion of mothers with children, unaccompanied children, and elderly persons among the Caucasian evacuees made this factor especially meaningful. People were also reluctant to leave their native area. The father of a witness from Nalchik suggested that they should leave, but the mother refused, asking: “Why should I abandon my house and go?”⁷²

      Additionally, the people were afraid of the economic hardships involved in the evacuation.⁷³ It should be noted that evacuation was a costly enterprise. The incoming evacuees had to pay most of their own expenses, as state subsidies did not suffice. It is no wonder therefore that potential evacuees, including Jews, endeavored to procure sufficient means, mainly movable assets like money, well in advance. This could be achieved by selling their possessions to those who were reluctant to evacuate. At this stage, the laws of the market came into play: if there was a massive flight, then very large numbers of refugees sold their valuables at the same time, and prices declined sharply. The following testimony, describing how a mixed Russian-Jewish family, on the eve of their evacuation from Grozny in Chechnya, sold their possessions, underscores the point. After returning from the city market in the summer of 1942, the Russian mother said:

      Do you know what’s happening at the market [tolkuchka]? It is impossible to buy anything. Everyone is selling; they are almost ready to give their belongings away for nothing. Chechens are the only ones who are buying; they are really getting rich.⁷⁴

      As we see, this exchange did not have anything to do with anti-Jewish bias, but rather, it illustrates how expensive it was to become evacuees at this period.

      Once an individual Jew or a family decided to escape, they faced the Soviet bureaucracy in charge of this process. The incoming evacuees now formed the majority of the Jewish population in the North Caucasus. Most of them were officially unemployed, and therefore did not need official authorization in order to become eligible to apply for evacuation permits. However, a small minority of the newcomers and probably the majority of local North Caucasians were employed and had to go through the process of obtaining evacuation clearance.⁷⁵ This could take a longer or a shorter time, depending on the specific circumstances of each applicant, but if they wished to leave in an orderly manner, they could not avoid this process. It seems reasonable to assume that, before those Jews who were employed perceived that the situation was truly threatening, the vast majority of them were thinking of making an orderly evacuation.

      Once Jews, individually or with their families, obtained all the necessary papers and received evacuation permits, they were entitled to leave. But still, this did not necessarily mean that all of them would succeed in realizing their plans. They could be prevented from doing so because of Soviet bureaucratic mistakes. For example, in Krasnodar, a Jewish woman received evacuation authorization, but was not allowed to leave until she had removed all the goods from her storage area.⁷⁶ A significant obstacle was the lack of the necessary transport services. The problem became particularly acute after the start of the German drive into the Caucasus, when the units of the retreating Red Army requisitioned all means of transport.⁷⁷

      We should also consider the impact of the food conditions in the region on the behavior of the Jewish refugees. In contrast to most other Soviet rear areas during the War, in the North Caucasus there was a relative abundance of food.⁷⁸ This was especially important for refugees coming from the besieged city of Leningrad, who had already suffered terrible starvation during the siege of the city since September 1941. Moving elsewhere from such a blessed region as the North Caucasus was fraught with uncertainty, and was therefore frowned upon by potential refugees.

      Same as in other parts of Russia that were in the line of attack from the German army, the place of residence could also influence the intention and ability of the Jews in the Caucasus to escape from the approaching German forces. Other conditions being equal, a big city was the best place to get information about the German advance, and the best place to obtain Holocaust-related information. Especially favorable in this regard were large transportation centers through which Jewish refugees were trying to make their way eastwards. Conversely, it was more difficult to obtain information in smaller cities and towns, and in particular in villages, where geographical distance prevented Jews from learning about the proximity of the danger.⁷⁹

      However, in summer 1942 the situation changed. “Urban” Jews still seemed to be better informed with respect to the proximity of the German forces. But their ability to escape decreased dramatically because of the enormous transportation problems caused by the retreat of the Red Army and by the German bombardment of the main transportation centers. Conversely, Jews living in rural areas had some chance to escape on their own, provided that their point of departure was far enough away from the advancing German troops. Finally, it should be remembered that the evacuation from such a vast area as the North Caucasus was a multi-stage process: it was possible to escape the first wave of German attack in the region and still be swept away by the second wave.⁸⁰

      Moreover, the military developments in the southern part of the Soviet-German War zone in 1941–1942 were very confusing for those North Caucasian Jews who were trying to figure out whether and when they should run away. On the one hand, the victories of the Red Army during the winter campaign of 1941–1942⁸¹ partly assuaged their fears. On the other hand,

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