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      The independent incomers to the North Caucasus viewed it as a destination area (intending to make a long-term stay) or simply as a transition point (intending to make only a short-term stay). They were usually not registered as evacuees prior to their arrival. Consequently, neither the central government nor the local authorities in the region anticipated their arrival. Nevertheless, they had to be provided for, much like the organized evacuees. Thus, since the regulations issued by the central government did not envisage giving a different treatment to unofficial newcomers and organized evacuees,³⁹ the considerable overstretching of the Caucasian resources from the start of the War led to the inappropriate treatment of refugees in the North Caucasus in 1941–1942. The local Caucasian inhabitants were receiving much reduced allocations of food, fuel, and other commodities following the arrival of so many evacuees, which would probably have increased their resentment towards the newcomers.

      The authorities were extremely alarmed over the anticipated penetration of enemy agents disguised as evacuees, as the “Directive Letter of the Committee of the VKP(b) of the Krasnodar Territory on the Work with the Evacuees” from September 1941 demonstrates:

      Fascists are dispatching inhabitants of the occupied areas to the Red Army’s rear, in order to carry out diversions, gather intelligence on the deployment of Soviet units, send up rockets to signal to German planes the location of military units, [and] spread panic about the might of the German army [and] about its allegedly good behavior towards POWs and the [civilian] population.⁴⁰

      Echoing this appraisal, the Bolshevik Party Committee in one of the localities in the Krasnodar territory stated during this period that:

      Owing to the evacuation of the [civil] population of Western Ukraine and Western Belorussia [now Belarus] from the areas occupied by the enemy, we have refugees. It is a legal possibility to dispatch anyone [here], and it is probable that this is indeed being done on a large scale. People are arriving and telling such stories that cannot be described and [as a result], it creates an impression of panic . . . all kinds or rumors are being spread.⁴¹

      Finally, on October 6, 1941, the NKVD Administration for the Krasnodar territory ordered a security check of all the newcomers.⁴²

      Evacuees were dispatched to locations all over the North Caucasus region, to towns⁴³ as well as villages,⁴⁴ including Russian localities and Cossack settlements (stanitsy).⁴⁵ According to a Soviet report, 226,000 people were evacuated to the Krasnodar territory in 1941, but only 51,353 remained there as of January 1942, out of whom 39,100 had been allocated to villages.⁴⁶ There is no record that the Jewish evacuees were ever sent to Muslim villages, which probably indicates the reluctance of the Jews to reside in an entirely unfamiliar setting.

      2.2.2. In 1942

      After the Red Army repelled the German advance in the North Caucasus in late November 1941, the situation on the Southern flank of the Soviet-German front stabilized. The Soviet victory at Rostov-on-Don, though limited, had several important repercussions. First, the Soviet civil and military administration became over-confident in its ability to check any further German advance. Therefore, in contrast to the previous months and despite the fact that the Germans remained camped only a few hundred kilometers away from Rostov-on-Don, the Soviet administration placed a ban on civilians leaving the city.⁴⁷ Second, some people, including a small percentage of the Jews, were enthusiastic about the Soviet recapture of Rostov-on-Don, and decided to return to the city of their own volition.⁴⁸ However, others, apparently the majority, remained skeptical.

      Other North Caucasian areas situated further from the front line than the city of Rostov-on-Don became a destination of state-run evacuation from Leningrad, which was under siege. The decision was carried out in the winter months of 1941–1942, when evacuation from Leningrad was possible over the ice-covered Lake of Ladoga. Central Soviet planners designated the whole North Caucasus region and the Volga region for the evacuation of 11,000 people from Leningrad.⁴⁹ However, in April 1942, the local authorities recorded that 36,000 evacuees from Leningrad were accommodated in the Krasnodar territory alone.⁵⁰ In addition, many people from other threatened areas, such as the Crimea and Rostov-on-Don, were also evacuated by the authorities to the Caucasian interior in the first half of 1942.⁵¹

      Thousands of Jews were evacuated to the region in 1942, among them the staff and, in particular, the students from Leningrad’s institutions of higher education.⁵² Sometimes they were accompanied by elderly family members. Occasionally, elderly people also arrived unaccompanied.⁵³ Again, there was a significant proportion of children: among 36,000 evacuees from Leningrad accommodated in the Krasnodar territory in April 1942, there were more than 10,000 children (almost 28%).⁵⁴ At the time of the German occupation in August 1942, the Jewish evacuees outnumbered the relatively insignificant number of native Jewish residents in the region.

      The newcomers were settled in the region in an organized way. Once more, Jews were dispatched all over the North Caucasus, especially to the resort towns of the Stavropol territory.⁵⁵ They were also brought, albeit on a somewhat smaller scale, to villages,⁵⁶ again including Russian and Cossack settlements.⁵⁷ As in 1941, there were no records of Jewish refugees being sent to Muslim villages. In contrast to 1941, however, there is no evidence that Jewish refugees brought to the North Caucasus in 1942 were provided with employment. This may have been the result of the Soviets’ logistic inability to provide masses of newcomers, including many white-collar workers, with suitable employment in the region. Alternatively, it is possible that the authorities did not consider that these evacuees would be staying in the Caucasus for a long period of time.

      2.3. The Micro Level

      2.3.1. Making Decisions

      The Soviet Jews made their evacuation-related decisions on the basis of what they knew of the danger that the German occupation might cause them and the proximity of the German army. What did the Jewish evacuees and refugees in the Soviet Union know about the German treatment of Jews? By November 1941, the knowledge of the Soviet Jews about the Germans was acquired from official Soviet reporting, contact with refugees, and previous, often prewar information.

      Regarding the media reporting, the situation was apparently more or less similar in the whole country⁵⁸—the information was available, but it was not emphasized. However, local nuances were also at play. With respect to the Holocaust-related information available to the Jews living in the Caucasus up to mid-1942, little information could be acquired from listening to the radio.⁵⁹ The local press, such as the main newspapers of the Rostov district—Molot (Hammer), the Stavropol territory—Ordzhonikidzevskaya pravda (Ordzhonikidze Truth), and the Krasnodar territory—Bolshevik,⁶⁰ were a more important source of information. Precise analysis of relevant articles published in these newspapers is provided in the chapters dealing with the Ginsburg letters. Here I will confine myself to several general observations. Throughout the whole period from June 1941 to July 1942, not a single word was written about the evacuation from the North Caucasus. The dominant motive of the Soviet propaganda in this region, as seen from the local newspapers, remained “business as usual”—until the Germans reached the gates of the North Caucasus.⁶¹ References to German mistreatment of Jews were rare,⁶² and information on the advance of the German armies towards the Caucasus was clearly outdated.⁶³ Finally, even though this information was sometimes available, its importance was partly offset by the skepticism that the average Soviet citizen felt towards the official propaganda.

      Consequently, rumors coming mainly from refugees from such areas as Ukraine,⁶⁴ as well as from Red Army personnel (especially if there were Jews among them)⁶⁵ turned out to be a most important source of information. The effect of rumors is indicated in a postwar Jewish testimony pertaining apparently to the Krasnodar territory:

      The five members of my family stayed in the village of Ivanovka for [about] 4 to 6 weeks. In about November–December 1941, it was rumored that Jews gradually abandoned [their places of residence]. So, my family decided to move to Krasnodar.⁶⁶

      With respect to Rostov-on-Don

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