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      ISSN 0948-1338

      ISBN 978-3-631-80238-0 (Print)

      E-ISBN 978-3-631-82386-6 (E-Book)

      E-ISBN 978-3-631-82387-3 (EPUB)

      E-ISBN 978-3-631-82388-0 (MOBI)

      DOI 10.3726/b17039

      © Peter Lang GmbH

      Internationaler Verlag der Wissenschaften

      Berlin 2020

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      About the author

      Tobias Lechner is a political scientist and lecturer at University of Nairobi, Kenya. He received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Freie Universität Berlin and holds a master’s degree in International Relations and a Magister Phil. in History and German Studies. His research focuses on economic statecraft in international relations and on bad and good governance.

      About the book

      Anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests that economic sanctions, a popular tool of modern foreign policy, have a negative collateral damage to the political system of the target state. However, it is not clear under which circumstances sanctions have an autocratizing effect. Newer data on sanctions and regimes enable testing the most plausible hypotheses. The quantitative analysis finds that sanctions with high economic costs do not cause autocratization. Sanctions are not as bad – and perhaps not as useless – as many fear.

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      For Mina and Ginnie

      Contents

List of abbreviations

Abstract

Executive summary

1 Sanctions: Useful toys of diplomacy or disastrous weapons of mass destruction?

1.1 Anecdotal evidence

1.1.1 Yugoslavia 1992–1995

1.1.2 Iran 2006–2016

1.2 The analytical puzzle

1.3 Relevance and novelty

1.4 Defining and conceptualizing sanctions

1.5 Outline of the book

Part I Reviewing

2 The collateral damage of sanctions

2.1 Economic sanctions in an age of interdependence

2.1.1 Pre-modern era

2.1.2 League of Nations

2.1.3 United Nations

2.1.4 Re-design: Targeted sanctions

2.2 Impact on democracy

2.3 Redistribution of wealth

2.4 Rally around the flag

2.5 Repression

2.6 Destabilizing

       2.7 Determinants of sanctions effectiveness

       2.8 Determinants of autocratization

       2.8.1 Democracy in retreat

       2.8.2 Autocratization

       2.8.3 Triggers of autocratization

       3 Explanatory factors

       3.1 A multidimensional definition of democracy and autocracy

       3.1.1 State capacity

       3.1.2 Political rights

       3.1.3 Civil liberties

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