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Commission, the amount spent on television and radio by U.S. political candidates had increased 150 percent between 1956 and 1964. In 1970, the year before the passage of FECA, a study by the National Committee for an Effective Congress found that in the seven largest states where Senate elections were held, 11 of 15 candidates were millionaires.³

      Ironically, FECA was destined to have little or no effect in controlling campaign costs. A provision was included that limited candidates for federal office to 10 cents per voter on “communications media.” This was replaced by a more comprehensive series of limits in 1974, which, in turn, were declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1976 (see section below on the Buckley v. Valeo decision).

      However, other provisions of the FECA have, over the past two decades, shed a great deal of light on the ways in which American campaigns are conducted. The Act established a framework for comprehensive campaign disclosure for presidential and congressional candidates, and set an example that state legislatures across the country were to look to as a model. Today, all 50 states require some form of campaign finance disclosure for statewide and state legislative candidates - and often for local campaigns as well.

      Under the provisions of FECA, political committees with $1 000 or more in receipts or expenditures are required to file regular reports. This monetary test closed the long-standing loophole in the Federal Corrupt Practices Act that had required reporting only by those committees operating in two or more states; this had long allowed committees operating in just one state to avoid disclosing their receipts and expenditures.

      FECA also required that expenditures and donations of more than $100 by and to federal candidates and political committees be itemized and listed for disclosure, including the contributor’s name, address, occupation, place of business and the date and amount of the contribution. (The 1979 FECA amendments raised the threshold for itemization to in excess of $200.) And, in another contrast to the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, the new law’s disclosure requirements covered primaries as well as general elections.

      Finally, FECA firmly established the principle of both pre- and postelection disclosure in federal campaign finance. The current FECA filing schedule (the 1979 FECA amendments made some relatively minor adjustments to the 1971 law) calls for congressional candidates to file quarterly reports during an election year and semi-annual reports in the “off years.”

      In addition, office seekers must file reports 12 days before primary and general elections, and thereafter report last-minute contributions of $1 000 or more in writing within 48 hours. Like congressional hopefuls, presidential aspirants file semi-annually except for a year in which the presidency is at stake; they then must file monthly if they have raised more than $100 000. (This, of course, differs markedly from the Canadian parliamentary system, in which the uncertain scheduling of elections and the short duration of campaigns provide obstacles to disclosure once the election has been called.)

      To collect and monitor the required financial information, the Senate-passed version of the 1971 law proposed the creation of an independent commission to administer and enforce the law. But this proposal was killed by the House of Representatives, and it would be another three years before Congress would create such an independent agency.

      The episode illustrates the dichotomy between the Senate and the House on campaign finance reform that persists to this day. It is a split that transcends partisan affiliations. Many House members represent relatively homogeneous districts that provide them with “safe seats”; they are consequently leery of anything that disturbs the electoral status quo. On the other hand, members of the Senate - many of whom represent large, diverse states - are more accustomed to competitive elections and generally are less fearful of enhancing opportunities for political challengers.

      President Richard M. Nixon signed FECA on 7 February 1972, and it took effect on 7 April 1972. Ironically, the law was to play a key role in the Watergate affair that led to Nixon’s resignation two and a half years later.

      Revenue Act of 1971

      President Nixon also signed the Revenue Act of 1971 after exacting a concession from Congress that public financing of presidential elections would be postponed until after the 1972 election. This saved Nixon, then seeking his second term, from having to compete under a system of public financing.

      The Revenue Act of 1971 had its origins in the 1966 Long Act (named for Sen. Russell B. Long, D-Louisiana). The Senate thwarted the implementation of that Act in 1967. The 1971 law reflected the Long Act in that it created a Presidential Election Campaign Fund supplied by a $1 “checkoff” on federal income tax returns. But the Revenue Act revised Long’s original proposal so that the funding would go directly to presidential candidates rather than being funnelled through political parties. The latter proposal had engendered criticism from several legislators who feared it would place excessive power in the hands of party chairpersons.⁴

      The income tax checkoff has been a fixture on federal income tax returns since 1972. Anyone with at least $1 in income tax liability is permitted to designate that amount ($2 on joint returns) to the Presidential Election Campaign Fund. (See “Presidential Campaigns” section of “Issues for the 1980s” for a discussion of declining taxpayer participation in the checkoff.)

      The Revenue Act of 1971 also provided for a tax credit and tax deduction to encourage political contributions. However, these incentives turned out to be short lived. The deduction was raised in 1974 from $50 to $100 ($200 on a joint return) but was then repealed by the Revenue Act of 1978. Meanwhile, the tax credit for one-half the amount of contributions up to a limit of $12.50 was raised to $25 ($50 on a joint return) in 1974 and then to $50 ($100 on a joint return) in 1978 to counterbalance the repeal of the deduction. But the credit was repealed when Congress overhauled the federal income tax system in 1986. There have since been numerous calls to reinstate the credit as a means of encouraging small donations from individual contributors, much as the Canadian system seeks to accomplish this by providing tax deductions for donations of less than $500 Canadian.

      FECA Amendments of 1974

      The Watergate scandal brought passage of the Federal Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, which represented the most sweeping change imposed on the interaction between money and politics since the creation of the American Republic almost 200 years earlier. The 1974 law continues to have a profound impact on the ways in which today’s federal election campaigns are conducted.

      In July 1973, the Senate passed a bill that put a ceiling on campaign spending, limited individual contributions and created an independent election commission. But, once again, the measure stalled in the House.

      In the spring of 1974, after shutting off a filibuster by southern Democrats and conservative Republicans, the Senate passed a second reform bill that combined its 1973 measure with a call for public funding of congressional as well as presidential elections. Finally, just hours before Nixon announced his resignation from the presidency on 8 August 1974, the House overwhelmingly passed campaign reform legislation. But it differed markedly from the Senate bill in that it provided public financing only for presidential elections. After an often bitter standoff between House and Senate negotiators that lasted for weeks, the Senate conceded, and the final bill, signed by President Gerald R. Ford on 15 October 1974, contained public funding only for presidential elections.

      However, the FECA Amendments of 1974 greatly expanded upon the Revenue Act of 1971, which had provided grants to presidential candidates for the general election only. Included were public matching funds for small private donations raised during the prenomination period, flat grants to political parties for their national nominating conventions, and large grants to major party presidential nominees to provide full public financing of general election campaigns. This structure also contained spending limits on presidential candidates in both the pre- and post-nomination periods. Coincidentally, the Canadian system of spending ceilings and public funding for political parties was enacted the same year. (See “Presidential Campaigns” in the next section for a description of the U.S. public funding structure.)

      The presidential financing system,

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