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power in Baghdad. Nor would Pakistan’s unelected president, General Pervez Musharraf, be allowed to conclude deals with pro-Taliban militants along the border of Afghanistan, while denying NATO forces access to that region.

      Clearly, we do have a national interest in containing Al-Qaeda. Yet even if that interest were worth more Canadian soldiers’ lives, it is not clear that the counter-insurgency mission is making progress towards that goal. After five years of efforts by American, British and Canadian troops, southern Afghanistan has become significantly more dangerous.

      Second, it is argued that the counter-insurgency mission is needed to restrict the production of opium. Illegal narcotics are certainly a concern. But despite the presence of Canadian troops, opium production has increased dramatically. In September 2006, the Senlis Council, an international policy think-tank with offices in Kabul, London, Paris and Brussels, reported that:

      [D]espite all counter-narcotics and alternative development funds, the opium crisis in Afghanistan is worse than ever, and entrenched in almost all facets of Afghan society. Five years of flawed counter-narcotics priorities have brought no positive change in Afghanistan. They have only served to undermine government legitimacy, stability, security and development, whilst farmers have lost confidence in the current Karzai administration. Ultimately, this loss of confidence has ultimately aided insurgents. Five years ago, the total area of cultivated hectares of poppy was less than half of the current total.

      Third, it is argued that the counter-insurgency mission is needed to protect the Afghan people. But, again, are we actually achieving this goal? In September 2006, I met Malalai Joya, a diminutive but fiercely courageous woman who, at 27 years old, was the youngest member of the Afghan National Assembly. Joya drew my attention to the appalling conditions in which most Afghans live. Five years after the U.S.-led intervention began, they have an average life expectancy of less than forty-five years (compared with eighty years in Canada), and 1,600 mothers out of 100,000 die during childbirth (compared with 6 out of 100,000 in Canada). Joya also identified the presence of many former warlords in the National Assembly, most of them accused of heinous crimes. She called the election that brought them to power “a sham” and decried the corruption that was siphoning off billions of dollars of much-needed foreign aid. She concluded: “I think that no nation can donate liberation to another nation. Liberation should be achieved in a country by the people themselves.”

      If protecting the Afghan people is our goal, we need to do a better job of ensuring that Canada’s overseas development assistance reaches those who need it most. In October 2006, Amir Attaran explained in the Toronto Star that almost all of the money provided by the Canadian International Development Agency to Afghanistan “is channelled through international middlemen, such as the World Bank or the UN Development Program,” who “commingle CIDA’s money with that of other countries.” When they do this, “CIDA refuses to divulge any monitoring, evaluation or audit reports without the agreement of those other countries” even though “nothing in the Access to Information Act obliges CIDA to consult so widely or to withhold project results.”

      Attaran concluded:

      A possible reason for CIDA’s secrecy is that the prognosis for Afghanistan’s development is lousy.

      Nearly five years after the Taliban’s ouster, even Kabul, the capital city, goes without full-time electricity. This year’s Afghan heroin trade will net a street value of more than $50 billion U.S. Compare that to Afghanistan’s current development aid from all countries: only $1.8 billion U.S.

      If Afghans follow the money then Afghanistan is not likely to develop as Canada wants.

      It is also time to talk with the Taliban. In August 2006, New Democratic Party leader Jack Layton called for the withdrawal of Canadian troops from the counter-insurgency mission “as soon as possible—working with our international partners to ensure a safe and smooth transition—but with a view to having it complete by February 2007.” At the same time, he indicated the need for a comprehensive peace process that would, necessarily, include elements of the Taliban.

      Layton’s position was derided by the Harper government and large segments of the media, but it resonated with many Canadians. This was demonstrated by an online poll on the Globe and Mail Web site the next day. Not only did 62 per cent of respondents support the proposition that “Taliban fighters should be included in a comprehensive peace process in Afghanistan,” the number of votes cast—43,039—far exceeded the usual numbers of votes in Globe online polls. The NDP leader’s suggestion was hardly radical, for as Winston Churchill once said, “To jaw-jaw is always better than to war-war.” Even former U.S. defence secretary Donald Rumsfeld and former U.S. Senate majority leader Bill Frist have mused openly about the need to negotiate with at least some of the Taliban.

      Fourth, it is argued that NATO’s credibility is at stake. But if that is the case, why have so many NATO members refused to step up to the plate? There are twenty-six NATO countries, and Canada—with our relatively small population and military—has made the fourth-largest contribution of troops to the counter-insurgency mission and suffered one-quarter of the casualties.

      And how much does NATO’s credibility matter? Fifteen years after the collapse of the Soviet Union—the raison d’être of the North Atlantic alliance—NATO is simply a collection of countries that may or may not choose to co-operate in any given situation. When the United States intervened in Afghanistan in 2001, it chose not to call on NATO for help.

      Fifth, it is argued that Canada’s credibility would suffer if we withdrew from the counter-insurgency mission. It is certainly true that, within NATO circles, we would be expected to provide reasonable notice. And so we should. But does anyone regard France or Germany as less credible because they refused to deploy into southern Afghanistan? Does anyone regard Spain or Italy as less credible because they chose to withdraw from Iraq? As Senator Roméo Dallaire has explained, the biggest blow to Canada’s credibility today is occurring elsewhere, as we sit on the sidelines while a genocide takes place in the Darfur region of western Sudan.

      Sixth, it is argued that Canada’s credibility in Washington would suffer. This is a serious argument. But it’s also the same argument that was advanced by those who thought Canada should join in the Vietnam War. It’s the same argument that was advanced by those who thought Canada should join in the 2003 Iraq War. All of which goes to show that Canadians are better judges of the Canadian national interest than Americans. As long as we provide reasonable notice, Washington has no reason to complain.

      If these are the arguments in favour of the counter-insurgency mission, what about the arguments against? What are the costs— above and beyond the all-important cost in lost and shattered young Canadian lives?

      First, there are financial costs. In May 2006, the Polaris Institute estimated “that the cost of Canada’s operations in the current fiscal year (2006–7) will exceed $1 billion, perhaps substantially, and will continue at that level as long as the Canadian mission lasts.” This $1 billion per year compares to the $1 billion over ten years that Canada is providing for reconstruction and development in Afghanistan, which works out to $100 million per year—or 10 per cent of what we are spending on the military mission.

      Second, these financial costs constitute opportunity costs. One billion dollars per year could provide a great deal of development and humanitarian assistance, and not just in Afghanistan. Wisely spent, this money could save millions of lives, especially in disease-and famine-ridden sub-Saharan Africa.

      Third, another form of opportunity cost concerns the other missions that the Canadian Forces cannot fulfill because of their current engagement. Later in this chapter, I will explain how Canada is missing two significant opportunities—in Lebanon and Dar-fur—to participate in, and even lead, UN peacekeeping operations in areas where Canada has a substantial national interest.

      Now, some people might decry the opportunities in Lebanon and Darfur as unsuitable for Canadian troops because they constitute “mere” peacekeeping. For almost a decade, Canada’s generals, along with a growing collection of politicians and pundits, have asserted that peacekeeping is passé and counter-insurgency wars are

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