SOE Manual: How to be an Agent in Occupied Europe - Special Executive Operations

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activities and times them all to fit in, like a railway schedule. Each single act of sabotage, of propaganda, or of political subversion ought to be part of a definite plan of attack.

      The plan naturally varies with each country and there are several factors which govern it. There is first of all, naturally, military strategy, for all our subversive efforts are governed by what the main plan of attack may be – and subversion is only one part of a very large whole. It is no use, for instance, laying on an ambitious plan of sabotage for a country which the High Command has decided at the last moment not to attack – unless it is a deliberate plan of diversion.

      It is naturally also influenced by the German economic situation. For instance, one of the main German weaknesses at the moment is communications, and that is why they are so constantly attacked both by the R.A.F. and saboteurs. Then there is the question of the political situation. The relations between the Allies and some so-called neutral countries are so delicate that no subversive operations can be contemplated in those countries for the time being, even though it is apparent that they may be the next on the list for attack by the Germans. There is also the nature of the country to be considered – the density of its population, and the degree of industrialisation. It is obvious that the plan for small densely populated and highly industrialised countries, such as Belgium and Holland, would be different from that for the deserts of Libya – if there is one.

      Lastly the attitude of the civil population may make a considerable difference to the plan. In some countries secret organisations already exist in fairly large numbers and they may have to be taken into consideration. The attitude of some Occupied countries is far more virile than that of others, who are inclined to lie down and do nothing about it. In some parts of the country there may even be an active pro-Nazi element. All these factors have to be weighed.

      The general policy in whatever country you may be sent to can be divided into two phases – the pre-invasion phase and the invasion phase. Let us take the pre-invasion phase first.

      The first essential is to organise each country, area by area. Naturally the organisation in each country will vary enormously according to factors of geography, population and Industry, so that no two countries will be entirely alike. For the same reasons the organisation inside each area may be extremely simple, or, on the other hand, it may be a fairly complex organisation, closely knit together. In addition to the factors I have already mentioned, there is the dominating factor of the German counter espionage control. It is their activities which mostly dictate what kind of organisation one can stage. Then there is the question of the native organisations already working inside the country – the so-called secret armies. Here again the policy varies so much from country to country and according to the run of the war, that it is impossible to lay down any universal principle. In some countries organisers may be asked to go out as pioneers and organise some guerrilla bands, with various objectives to be attacked when the “day” comes. In other countries agents are sent out regularly to form part of the powerful secret organisations already existing, and to fill niches in those organisations, such as arms instructors, sub-area organisers, W/T operators, etc. Yet in other countries, the organisation of which you form a part functions entirely separately from these organisations, which are probably too well known to the Boche. But even in these cases some attempt must be made to take note of these local societies and to assess their value.

      Naturally most of your activities will form a preparation for the great day when your countries come to be liberated, and the invasion phase should, therefore, see your activities at maximum stretch. Everything depends on the secrecy and efficiency with which these preparations are made. The more that each separate operation can be prepared, and even possibly rehearsed, the better it is likely to go off when the day comes.

      Here again the operational orders naturally vary considerably for each country, so that it is impossible to lay down any universal plan to apply to all countries. Nevertheless the activities, some part of which you will probably be asked to prepare for, will include such things as:–

      a). A whole series of combined attacks on the enemy’s rail, road and telecommunications. If, for instance, it were possible to isolate completely, for even 48 hours, a vital strategic centre 50 miles behind the enemy’s lines just at the moment when the Allies were landing, just think what a gift this would be to the Allied commander. If it were impossible for the enemy to get his troops up to the threatened spot at the right moment because his communications were temporarily sabotaged, it might make all the difference to the success or failure of the operations – in that sector at all events.

      b). Demolishing important river bridges which are vital to the enemy’s communications. Or, conversely, preventing the enemy from doing so when he wishes to prevent the Allies from advancing. The campaign of 1940 in the Low Countries showed what tragic results to the defence can result from a single important bridge failing to be demolished. And it is about time that the Germans had some of their own medicine.

      c). Attacks on enemy H.Q.’s, telephone installations, wireless vans, etc. A small gang of disciplined men can very soon deal with even an important enemy H.Q. if the operation is thoroughly studied and planned beforehand. If the sentries are attacked at exactly the right moment and the men in the guard-room overwhelmed, one can very soon over-run a whole H.Q. building by running down the corridors and throwing bombs or grenades in each room. They are fairly effective weapons in those conditions.

      d). Blocking roads which must be used by the enemy’s transport, but care must be taken not to block roads which may be required by the advancing Allies. It has been rightly pointed out that it is impossible to block any road for more than a certain time. Nevertheless if the enemy had to vacate a town at a moment’s notice, with a large amount of transport, and then have to deal with road blocks, or possibly road craters, it might make all the difference to them, more especially if the sky was then filled with bombing aeroplanes which left them no respite.

      e). The question of the civil population is a very important one, for it was their action in pouring out on to all the roads before the advancing Germans in 1940 that seriously handicapped the Allies in their attempts to deal with the German invasion. Here again detailed plans will be worked out in due course to tell the civil population what they can do to help, and especially what they can avoid doing to hinder. No doubt the B.B.C. will play a large part in this, but one cannot rely on the civilian population having receivers in an area threatened by invasion, and it may well be that your services may prove extremely useful in coping with an urgent problem of this kind.

      Where does the organiser fit into all these schemes? The organiser is the key man in all of them, and it is on his work and organisation that the smooth carrying out of all the plans depends. You will have seen enough from what I have told you to realise that any one organiser has only a very small part – although an important one – in a vast organisation, and that any work he carries out is only a minute part of a big general plan. You will therefore appreciate the absolute necessity of team work. Too much individualism on the part of any one organiser might go far to wreck the plan.

      The roles of the organiser are various. More often than not he is sent into the field with a specific mission to carry out. He may be given a target to demolish; he may be asked to foment industrial unrest in a particular area; he may be asked to organise a small guerrilla band in a certain district. On the other hand, he may be sent out as a pioneer with instructions to organise a certain area. In that case, he starts from scratch. He will have to make a survey of his area, and decide what are the most suitable targets to attack, and what type of organisation is best adapted to the purpose. If he is working not too far from this country, and is in fairly close touch, he will probably report back either by W/T or by letter, or, more likely still, return on a short visit. On the other hand, if the spot to which he goes is at the other end of the earth, we may not see him back again before the end of the war, and he will have to use his own initiative throughout.

      It is obvious he can do none of these things unless he is properly trained and equipped for his task. That is why you have come to Beaulieu. During the next . . . . weeks you will have the task of studying the underground life in every aspect – starting with the moment at which you arrive on the ground and disengage yourself from your parachute. You will have to learn how to bury it safely, and to start your new life in your new surroundings.

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