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was appointed by President Van Buren register of the land office at Springfield. In the same year he was nominated for Congress in the Springfield district before he had reached the legal age, but was defeated by the Whig candidate, John T. Stuart, by 35 votes in a total poll of 36,742.15 In 1840, he was appointed secretary of state, and in 1841, elected a judge of the supreme court under the circumstances already mentioned. In 1843, he was elected to the lower house of Congress and was reëlected twice, but before taking his seat the third time he was chosen by the legislature, in 1846, Senator of the United States for the term beginning March 4, 1847, and was reëlected in 1852. In Congress he had taken an active part in the annexation of Texas, in the war with Mexico, in the Oregon Boundary dispute, and in the Land Grant for the Illinois Central Railway. In the Senate he held the position of Chairman of the Committee on Territories.

      In the Democratic party he had forged to the front by virtue of boldness in leadership, untiring industry, boundless ambition, and self-confidence, and horse-power. He had a large head surmounted by an abundant mane, which gave him the appearance of a lion prepared to roar or to crush his prey, and not seldom the resemblance was confirmed when he opened his mouth on the hustings or in the Senate Chamber. As stump orator, senatorial debater, and party manager he never had a superior in this country. Added to these gifts, he had a very attractive personality and a wonderful gift for divining and anticipating the drift of public opinion. The one thing lacking to make him a man "not for an age but for all time," was a moral substratum. He was essentially an opportunist. Although his private life was unstained, he had no conception of morals in politics, and this defect was his undoing as a statesman.

      On the 4th of January, 1854, Douglas reported from the Senate Committee on Territories a bill to organize the territory of Nebraska. It provided that said territory, or any portion of it, when admitted as a state or states, should be received into the Union with or without slavery, as their constitution might prescribe at the time of their admission. The Missouri Compromise Act of 1820, which applied to this territory, was not repealed by this provision, and it must have been plain to everybody that if slavery were excluded from the territory it would not be there when the people should come together to form a state.

      Douglas did not at first propose to repeal the Missouri Compromise. He intended to leave the question of slavery untouched. He did not want to reopen the agitation, which had been mostly quieted by the Compromise of 1850; but it soon became evident that if he were willing to leave the question in doubt, others were not. Dixon, of Kentucky, successor of Henry Clay in the Senate and a Whig in politics, offered an amendment to the bill proposing to repeal the Missouri Compromise outright. Douglas was rather startled when this motion was made. He went to Dixon's seat and begged him to withdraw his amendment, urging that it would reopen the controversies settled by the Compromise of 1850 and delay, if not prevent, the passage of any bill to organize the new territory. Dixon was stubborn. He contended that the Southern people had a right to go into the new territory equally with those of the North, and to take with them anything that was recognized and protected as property in the Southern States. Dixon's motion received immediate and warm support in the South.

      Two or three days later, Douglas decided to embody Dixon's amendment in his bill and take the consequences. His amended bill divided the territory in two parts, Kansas and Nebraska. The apparent object of this change was to give the Missourians a chance to make the southernmost one a slave state; but this intention has been controverted by Douglas's friends in recent years, who have brought forward a mass of evidence to show that he had other sufficient reasons for thus dividing the territory and hence that it must not be assumed that he intended that one of them should be a slave state. The evidence consists of a record of efforts put forth by citizens of western Iowa in 1853-54 to secure a future state on the opposite side of the Missouri River homogeneous with themselves, and to promote the building of a Pacific railway from some point near Council Bluffs along the line of the Platte River. These efforts were heartily seconded by Senators Dodge and Jones and Representative Henn, of Iowa. They labored with Douglas and secured his coöperation. So Douglas himself said when he announced the change in the bill dividing the territory into two parts.

      Most people at the present day, including myself, would be glad to concur with this view, but we must interpret Douglas's acts not merely by what he said in 1854, but also by what he said and did afterwards. In 1856 he made an unjustifiable assault upon the New England Emigrant Aid Company, for sending settlers to Kansas, as they had a perfect right to do under the terms of the bill; and he apologized for, if he did not actually defend, the Missourian invaders who marched over the border in military array, took possession of the ballot boxes, elected a pro-slavery legislature, and then marched back boasting of their victory. Troubles multiplied in Douglas's pathway rapidly after he introduced his Nebraska Bill, and it is very likely that an equal division of the territory between the North and South seemed to him the safest way out of his difficulties. That was the customary way of settling disputes of this kind. We need not assume, however, that he intended to do more than give the Missourians a chance to make Kansas a slave state if they could, for Douglas was not a pro-slavery man at heart.

      Senator Thompson, of Kentucky, once alluded to the division of the territory embraced in the original Nebraska Bill into two territories, Kansas and Nebraska, showing that his understanding was that one should be a free state and the other a slave state, if the South could make it such. He said:

      When the bill was first introduced in 1854 it provided for the organization of but one territory. Whence it came or how it came scarcely anybody knows, but the senator from Illinois (Mr. Douglas) has always had the credit of its paternity. I believe he acted patriotically for what he thought best and right. In a short time, however, we found a provision for a division—for two territories—Nebraska, the larger one, to be a free state, and as to Kansas, the smaller one, repealing the Missouri Compromise, we of the South taking our chance for it. That was certainly a beneficial arrangement to the North and the bill was passed in that way.16

      What were Douglas's reasons for repealing the Missouri Compromise? It was generally assumed that he did it in order to gain the support of the South in the next national convention of the Democratic party. In the absence of any other sufficient motive, this will probably be the verdict of posterity, although he always repelled that charge with heat and indignation. A more important question is whether there would have been any attempt to repeal it if Douglas had not led the way. This may be safely answered in the negative. The Southern Senators did not show any haste to follow Douglas at first. They generally spoke of the measure as a free-will offering of the North, both Douglas and Pierce being Northern men, and both being indispensable to secure its passage. Francis P. Blair, of Missouri, a competent witness, expressed the opinion that a majority of the Southern senators were opposed to the measure at first and were coerced into it by the fear that they would not be sustained at home if they refused an advantage offered to them by the North.17

      The Nebraska Bill passed the Senate by a majority of 22, and the House by a majority of 13. The Democratic party of the North was cleft in twain, as was shown by the division of their votes in the House: 44 to 43. The bill would have been defeated had not the administration plied the party lash unmercifully, using the official patronage to coerce unwilling members. In this way did President Pierce redeem his pledge to prevent any revival of the slavery agitation during his term of office.

      When the bill actually passed there was an explosion in every Northern State. The old parties were rent asunder and a new one began to crystallize around the nucleus which had supported Birney, Van Buren, and Hale in the elections of 1844, 1848, and 1852. Both Abraham Lincoln and Lyman Trumbull were stirred to new activities. Both took the stump in opposition to the Nebraska Bill.

      Trumbull was now forty-one years of age. He had gained the confidence of the people among whom he lived to such a degree that his reëlection to the supreme bench in 1852 had been unanimous. He now joined with Gustave Koerner and other Democrats in organizing the Eighth Congressional District in opposition to Douglas and his Nebraska Bill. Although this district had been originally a slaveholding region, it contained a large infusion of German immigration, which had poured into it in the years following the European uprising of 1848. Of the thirty thousand Germans in Illinois

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