LITMIR.BIZ

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      This is a significant, but not the sole difference. The perestroika discussions were really public. Although they were encouraged and moderated from above, they stirred up a genuinely live response. What was initiated in the new times cannot be called discussion. Those were PR campaigns conducted by powerful propaganda machine aimed at virtually zero audience.

      That is, despite the demonstration of goodwill towards the philosophical community, it was left high and dry, and not engaged for servicing power. Indeed, it would be strange if the political regime, which doesn’t allow public assessment of its decisions, not using the help of applied scientific disciplines, would seek close cooperation with the philosophers, of all people. They were not needed even as an audience listening the exhortations of the authorities, as it used to be in Soviet times. For the authorities just a few people proved to be sufficient enough.

      In principle, there is nothing a priori bad in the governmental patronage of philosophy, as well as other scientific disciplines and different kinds of arts. But the fact of the matter is that in the present situation, philosophy in Russia, like other humanitarian disciplines, somehow exists by their own, beside the authorities. The authorities can call the tune, but they never pay the piper. They don’t bother to seduce or intimidate the performers.

      Philosophy was appealing by its fundamental objectlessness. Sociologists, economists, independent historians and political scientists are by nature disloyal to the authorities, for loyalty implies the willingness to verbalize what the authorities themselves assign to be made public, and not their own observations of reality. This process went in parallel with the nurturing of the young people’s pro-Kremlin movements, which were an authoritative institution of a new type of totalitarian society – all game and no ideology. Any “ism” is a superfluous element, too much weight. A piece of philosophy can be both Kantian and Orthodox, nationalistic and cosmopolitan.

      Meanwhile, the real social prerequisites for change existed. And there was demand for them, too.

      Economic growth is a double-edged sword. It does somewhat soften social tensions, but it also contributes to the growth of self-esteem and social claims of a fair number of independent and active people. And they will not be happy with any kind of thaw.

      There was a possibility of emergence of a situational opposition, formed of professionals, competent people, deprived, firstly, of social growth prospects; denied, secondly, of participation in a dialogue about problems of the country as a whole and their group role in particular; and thirdly, having no substantial public rostrum. Moreover, the blame for the latter was not so much on the power, but rather on the democratic opposition.

      In the Medvedev’s faux thaw, the absence of coherent political programs among the opposition, its reluctance to notice that the center of public activity has moved to the regions became evident. The concentration of attention to what is happening in Moscow – until the announcement of Luzhkov’s resignation, seen as the opposition’s achievement – robbed the democratic movement of the nationwide program and exacerbated the atomization of Russian society.

      Nobody was listening to those who spoke about the futility of adaptation to power discourse, the need for a human alternative to power, which could not be substituted with participation in elections, with coalitions created to fit the next election campaign. Nobody noticed the subservient nature of the democratic movements towards the authorities, the fact that the democrats never addressed the needs of society, did not try to initiate discussions on socially significant topics, confining themselves to only responding to the speeches of the ruling elite.

      The contradiction between the public democratic demand and the political supply became more and more noticeable. Previously, everyone proceeded from the premise that parties, movements, organizations, positioning themselves as democratic, are something qualitatively different from the party of power. But in today’s Russia political declarations mean nothing – all political platforms here are tailored on the basis of political practice.

      It became clear that the opposition was qualitatively, that is, in the first place, stylistically akin to the authorities. Gradually the leadership in the parties have been falling into the hands of people without any political past and experience, political strategists and spin doctors with no knowledge, beliefs, principles, or strategic goals. Therefore, they were unable to lead political organizations for a long time, and this was not part of their plans. They were only able to carry out their pre-sale preparation.

      Judging by some private evidence, when forming coalitions, the main criterion was not so much political influence as the sponsor potential of the participants, which resembled the creation of joint-stock companies, rather than political associations.56 But this is all, so to speak, the expenditure part. As far as the political (inseparable from economic) dividends in today’s Russia concerned, this is a separate issue. Whatever the theorists say, democratic opposition organizations are unable to lobby anyone’s interests. This market is monopolized by the party of power. Another matter is their complicity in the formation of the facade democracy and the simulation of political life.

      The authorities demonstrated tenacity, ingenuity, cunning and other qualities, as necessary means of ensuring their own irremovability, calm and comfort. At the same time, the opposition hardly ever bothered them.

      In late 2009 Valeria Novodvorskaya brought up the issue of the Sovok (USSR) restoration57. But the experiences of all previous restorations show that there has never been a complete restoration of previous models: inevitable is the interaction of the restored with what emerged in the course of its destruction. There is a historical synthesis. In this case, this synthesis led to the emergence of a new model of totalitarianism. That was a move towards further alienation of Russia and the Russians from humanity.

      This, in fact, is the essence of totalitarianism. In an open society, the nation is the mediator between man and humanity; in totalitarian societies it becomes an instrument of alienation of individuals from the human race. Perfect totalitarianism implies a complete dehumanization, but, like an ideal gas, it does not exist in reality.

      Totalitarianism proved to be very flexible in adaptation to the latest information technology. It has easily created the illusion of change, forming a new social base – from the semi-moronic members of the power-hungry youths to highbrow intellectuals, who were attracted, as it often happened in the past, by the opportunity of cooperation with the authorities in governing the country.

      To tell the truth, there was no cooperation, it was not even intended, but to many such a prospect seemed possible.

      The main feature of the so-called protest movement in the brief period of Medvedev’s illusions was that it was headed not by intellectuals and high-culture figures, but by representatives of a mass culture that fit perfectly into the new system. With the termination of the games around Medvedev, they didn’t feel not even a slightest threat to their status – they would not have been touched. They were frustrated by the fact that they were never invited to get their share in the power. I do not reprove their success at all. They were honest businessmen, but the market conditions required them not so much to praise the authorities as not to have a loose tongue.

      And then everything went only downward: via Bolotnaya Sqare to Navalny, Roizman, and the lucky ones got their pass to Putin’s Valdai talkfest and on TV screen. Medvedev’s waht was the final stage in the formation of a totalitarian society, which was still masquerading as civil society. Now nobody remembers that in the very beginning of Putin’s rule, in November 2001, the presidential administration chose five thousand people to represent civil society at the Civil Forum58. The fact that the very principle of selection contradicted the nature of civil society did not bother anyone. In the future, all these gatherings turned exclusively into a means of budget disbursement. Actually, the very first forum was already a budgetary entry. It has initiated

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