LITMIR.BIZ

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(regional) secretaries, he would not be allowed to take the reigns. And the growth of interest and sympathy to Stalin by the end of Brezhnev’s rule was already a search for an alternative.

      Slowly and gradually it is becoming clear that what is happening in Russia requires deciphering, that the logic of the civilized world is impossible to apply to this country, that there is a certain mechanism of goings-on there that needs to be identified.

      The most important thing is understanding that the only goal of all actions of the Russian ruling elite is the securing of their lifelong irremovability in power. Part of this is Putin’s projected lifetime presidency, possibly combined with the rotation of people in the elite. Or Putin’s replacement with a more acceptable figure. There are many different options, but all within the framework of one political culture.

      This goal must be achieved at all costs. No economic, political, humanitarian catastrophes can stop the government in this determination.

      Games around the appointment/election of governors, elections based on party list or partial withdrawal from them, the emergence of a “tandemocracy” that wipes out the institution of the presidency, the revision of the Constitution for the extension of the presidential term and its direct violation by the law restricting the jurisdiction of the jury, as well as broadening the notion of “high treason” – all this and many other significant alterations did not cause any reactions of the society.

      These developments definitely look like signs of an institutional crisis. Observing them and their evaluation, one can judge about the legal self-identification of the authorities. In the public-law dimension, these actions reduce their legitimacy. But in an archaic way of thinking it looks like reinforcement. Similarly absurd is the reaction to any manifestations of independence in public and cultural life, campaigns against corruption, ban on the adoption of Russian orphans by Americans, then legal harassment of NGOs or homosexuals, the historians and even smokers.

      The destruction of civilized statehood shows the way into the stage of the formation of a totalitarian quasi-state entity, in which, like in Soviet times, the concept of “crisis” becomes quite different. In order for the crisis to become visible, serious changes are needed in the established power balance, redistribution of spheres of influence, significant personal changes in power.

      Any public manifestation of the crisis, even mass unemployment, inflation and hunger, is not considered a crisis in this political system. Moreover, all these phenomena can be provoked and even organized by the authorities themselves for the purpose of their own strengthening, tightening, and also in connection with the principles of intraspecific competition.

      It is useless to project the methods of crisis description and analysis applicable to developed countries to the current Russia. Market mechanisms are probably similar, and even identical, but the actors in Russia are quite different.

      The notion that terrorism is one of the destabilizing factors of the crisis is highly inaccurate. Major acts of terrorism coincide with the stages of the formation of Putin’s political system formation. The authorities, which have demonstrated their purposefulness and ability to complex multi-stage combinations in the Yukos affair, in the cancellation of the gubernatorial elections and party-parliamentary reform, in carrying out the policy of destabilization in neighboring states, when using force against them, have not done anything to protect peaceful citizens from terror. Moreover, sometimes these citizens do not know who is causing them greater harm – terrorists or anti-terrorist actions. Such perplexity is felt by many residents of Chechnya, Ingushetia, other North Caucasian republics, victims of “Nord-Ost” and Beslan.

      And the question arises whether the government cannot suppress terrorism or does not want to do it. In any case, one must admit that the main difference between the present Russian state and the model that it pretends to conform to is that terrorism in modern Russia is part of the political system, and not directed against it. It is systemic, not anti-systemic.

      There is an extreme point of view, which is concisely formulated in the title of the well-known book “The FSB is blowing up Russia.” This, of course, is one of the equally plausible versions, indirectly confirmed by the absolute mortality of those who were related to this issue. And also by the prohibitory injunction on this book in Russia as extremist. It is appropriate to recall that the symbiosis of terrorism and security services has a tradition in Russia, traced back to at least to the time of Narodnaya Volya (People’s Will) movement. The eventual merger of terrorists and security forces occurred under totalitarian Cheka/KGB and GRU. But the very existence of such a version is also in a certain sense useful to the authorities. Their opponents and denunciators can’t recognize, that any demonization of the current government plays into its hands and adds more intimidating ammunition to it.

      I do not claim that terrorist attacks are pleasant to them, but it is beyond doubt that the government benefits from them. The material accumulated since the nineties, allows us to draw a conclusion that terrorism is the most important means of legitimizing power. The post-Beslan reforms had nothing to do with the fight against terrorism, but the terrorist attack created the necessary information background. The authorities take full advantage from everything that increases fear in society; fear in general, any kind, regardless of its source.

      The final session of the State Duma in the summer of 2016 was marked by the adoption of laws, in which the fear of terrorism is manifestly used to strengthen the repressive component of the regime. The case in point is “the antiterrorist draft of legislation”, introduced by representative Irina Yarovaya and Senator Viktor Ozerov. It involves dozens of Russian laws, bringing changes that will have the most serious impact on Russian population.

      As of July 20, 2016 non-reporting of a crime became a criminal offense. Under the threat of imprisonment for up to one year, people will have to report to the authorities the suspected preparation of a terrorist attack, armed insurrection and some other kinds of offences against the law, the list has more than a dozen entries.

      Appeals to terrorism and its justification on the Internet were equated with similar statements made in the mass media. Responsibility for such statements has become tougher: citizens will be held responsible according to the same norms as the media. The maximum penalty is seven years of imprisonment.

      Now the mobile communication providers are required to store all call records and any messages exchanged by users within six months. Within three years they must store meta-data, that is, not the very content of conversations and correspondence, but information that such a conversation or such an exchange of SMS messages took place on such and such a date at such and such an hour. This also applies to “organizers of the dissemination of information on the Internet”.

      Another important amendment is applied to “the organizers of the dissemination of information”: if an Internet service – an instant messenger, a social network, a mail client or just a website – supports encryption of data, the providers are under the obligation to help the FSB decrypt any message that the security forces need. A penalty is imposed for refusal; for legal entities it is from 800 thousand to one million rubles.

      The document gives an extremely broad definition of “missionary activity”, which only registered organizations and groups allowed to be engaged. In this respect, any missionary activity outside the specially designated premises is prohibited. Violations are subject to a fine of one million rubles. The law began to be applied immediately to non-Orthodox Christians, who are fined for sharing the Bible in private apartments. There is no freedom of conscience in Russia anymore24.

      The “antiterrorism package” contains amendments that increase the punishment for what is called extremism. Fines and terms of imprisonment are raised. In some cases, the changes are very significant. For example, the funding of extremist activities (282.3 CC), the maximum prison term is raised from three to eight years.

      A new item in the Criminal Code article on mass

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