LITMIR.BIZ

Скачать книгу

supreme political leader took the ceremonial and official position as the commander in chief of the armed forces. But Kim Il Sung took it a step further than Stalin, Mao, and Castro — he had himself declared a Marshal (similar to a five-star general or General of the Army status), and it was in this capacity as commander of the KPA that he signed the Korean Armistice on July 27, 1953, along with Peng Dehuai, commander of the Chinese People’s Volunteers, and Mark W. Clark, commander of the UN Command. Moreover, Kim Il Sung went even further than his Soviet and Chinese contemporaries by controlling the assignment and promotion of every senior military officer. Kim’s son, Kim Jong Il, had the title of Marshal conferred upon him when he was appointed deputy chairman of the National Defense Commission (NDC) in 1992. The NDC is the highest war control and military command organization in North Korea.

      Party-Army Relations: Structure vs. Mindset. In 2007, the organizational model of North Korea’s armed forces is a hybrid of Soviet and Chinese models and modified to peninsular objectives and refined with lessons learned from recent global conflicts. But more important are the distinctly Korean Partisan characteristics that emerged from the guerrilla origins of the armed band led by Kim Il Sung in Manchuria in the 1930s and 1940s (see “Origins and Evolution” in the Conventional Forces section). Indeed, psychologically, the KPA is very much an indigenous force that considers itself to be heir to the tradition of Kim Il Sung’s Partisans. Officially, the KPA traces its roots back to the band of communist fighters founded by Kim on April 25, 1932.

      This tradition embraces the concept of self-reliance and self-sufficiency consistent with the ideology of Juche. But the reality is one of multiple military traditions and considerable arms and technical assistance from abroad, especially from the Soviet Union and China. Significant numbers of the soldiers who formed the first KPA force in the late 1940s trained and fought with Chinese communists while others — including Kim Il Sung in the years from 1941 to 1945 — trained and fought with the Soviets. Nevertheless, KPA leaders are indoctrinated to believe they are 21st century Partisans. North Korean military leaders therefore are imbued with intense nationalism combined with significant distrust of foreigners and foreign governments, including Russia and China.

      Military politics appears to have evolved through three models of communist types. During the period prior to the establishment of the communist regime in Pyongyang in 1945, the model of civil-military relations was “Partisan,” in which the party and the army leadership were one and the same. During the period from the establishment of a Pyongyang regime to the Korean War armistice in mid-1953, the KPA approximated the “Soviet” model whereby military and civilian leaders worked closely together. But by the end of the Korean War, Kim Il Sung had purged many military (and civilian) leaders, hence ensuring that relations between the top KWP leadership and KPA leadership were much closer and similar to the symbiotic relationship characteristic of the “Chinese” model to become a hybrid or distinctively “Korean” model.”

      Military Industrial Complex (MIC ). Consistent with the prominent role of the military in the DPRK with the highest priority for national resources, the core of North Korea’s economy is controlled by the KPA, managed by the Second Economy Commission, and directed towards supplying the needs of the armed forces. The top economic priority afforded defense in the DPRK is not surprising. But what is surprising is that North Korea’s Military Industrial Complex (MIC) is far more sizeable relative to its economy than any other in a communist PMS. Indeed, a leading expert has declared that the DPRK has the “most militarized economy on earth.”

      Most analyses of North Korea’s defense sector estimate that defense spending constitutes between one-quarter and one-third of all government spending. As of 2003, according to the International Institute of Strategic Studies, North Korea’s defense budget consumed some 25 percent of central government spending. In the mid-1970s and early 1980s, according to figures released by the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, between 32 and 38 percent of central government expenditures went towards defense. Moreover, one economic expert estimates that between 20 and 40 percent of North Korea’s economic output is produced by the KPA.

      The MIC has its origins some half century ago, in the aftermath of the Korean War (what the DPRK officially calls the “Fatherland Liberation War”), when Pyongyang struggled to make itself self-sufficient in armaments production through the development of an indigenous defense industry. The outputs include artillery, munitions, missiles, etc. Moreover, production is not just to satisfy North Korea’s own defense needs but for export to earn hard currency. For example, over the years, North Korea has been one of the leading proliferators of ballistic missiles. In addition, the KPA is believed to manage the illegal production and export of counterfeit brand name cigarettes and pharmaceuticals, counterfeit foreign currencies, and illicit narcotics.

      Control and Command. North Korea is a totalitarian, cult-centered, nepotistic, and crony-dominated regime that focuses on the interests of its elite rather than national interests. While the regime is eroding, it still is ruled by an all-powerful dictator who exerts strict control over his regime and the North Korean people. The populace lives in a condition of terror under the thumb of an extremely repressive coercive apparatus with a centralized economy, and the regime exerts almost a total monopoly over mass communication. Thus, it might be better to rank control before command.

      All political, governmental, and military control within North Korea begins with Kim Jong Il, who is simultaneously Chairman of the NDC (the NDC also is Kim Jong Il’s wartime command vehicle), General Secretary of the KWP, and Supreme Commander of the KPA (a unified armed force consisting of the ground, navy, and air forces). The effectiveness of this control and command to support high tempo warfare, combined arms, or combined operations is suspect. As the NDC Chairman and supreme commander of the KPA, Kim Jong Il directly controls the military.

      By elevating the status of the NDC in 1998, Kim Jong Il harnessed the expertise within the senior leadership critical to national security decision-making. Under Kim Il Sung, control and command of the armed forces was exercised through the KWP. The information flow was directly through the chain of command: the KPA to the Central Military Committee (CMC) to Kim Il Sung. With the restructuring of the regime in 1998, Kim Jong Il has engineered a more direct relationship with the military. Information travels through various channels from the KPA and security forces directly to Kim’s office via his personal secretariat. This gives the high command several avenues through which to gauge Kim’s thinking on a particular issue and then exert influence, while allowing Kim to detect if someone in the chain is hiding or altering information.

      The NDC was designated a separate organization in the 1992 revision of the constitution, and under the 1998 constitutional revision, the NDC became the primary organ of power in the state, to which other branches of power are now subordinate. It is an independent entity in charge of overall decision-making and guidance for defense projects, with the MPAF under its control. Figure 2 provides one view of the lines of power, influence, and control during peacetime. The NDC and, more importantly, the Supreme Commander (Kim Jong Il) has the power to declare war, issue mobilization orders in an emergency, promote senior military officers, and guide the armed forces and defense construction work.

      The NDC membership also is unique in that its membership does not appear to be linked to ceremony, but the members of this commission are there because they have a particular competency or have a responsibility for a critical security-related portfolio.

      The CMC (of the KWP) is next in order of seniority and guides development and production of munitions and has command and control over North Korea’s armed forces, that is, the day-to-day running of the military. Since the 1998 restructuring and the elevation of the NDC, the CMC no longer plays a vigorous role in military policy. Nevertheless, the CMC plays an important role on three levels: (1) propagates the party line on military policy; (2) is critical to regime security in that it is populated with essential personnel and plays a role in power politics within the regime; and (3) on the policy side, it ensures that the KWP apparatus fulfills its defense-related responsibilities.

      Source: Used courtesy of Ken Gause, Director of the Foreign Leadership Studies program, CNA Corporation, Alexandria, VA.

      

Скачать книгу