How Sentiment Matters in International Relations: China and the South China Sea Dispute - David Groten International and Security Studies

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official Chinese public diplomacy tends to frequently adopt respect terminology.

      As status and status concerns represent the core component of the shared definition of national respect as the perceived adequate recognition of an actor’s self-ascribed self-worth by others (expressed in words, gestures and deeds), status constitutes the second and perhaps most crucial indicator of respect dynamics. In line with sociology and social psychology, status is often understood as “social esteem and respect that usually yields influence” (Ridgeway, 2006, p. 301). That said, groups seek to be treated in a manner congruent to their self-ascribed status and “rightful position” (Wolf, 2011, p. 3). Status misrecognition or deprivation, in contrast, is expected to cause the opposite effect, namely disrespect. As discussed earlier, states may seek status for material or self-evaluative reasons. For instance, a powerful (not necessarily positive) international image and reputation may have a positive effect on the political legitimacy of China’s political elite, for instance due to dominant patriotic and nationalist sentiments among Chinese citizens desiring international respect for self-esteem grounds (Lepsius, 1990; Noesselt, 2012, p. 128). Likewise, conduct by interaction partners viewed by China as adequately reflecting its status entitlements can serve as an external confirmation of China’s self-worth and its related psychological needs. Moreover, this second indicator seeks to examine whether a link between status self-perception and the status of interaction partners can be observed. In this vein, it is scrutinized whether a greater Chinese status is accompanied by higher sensitivity to questions of status or not. This is because Chinese FPTTs are expected to be more eager to obtain respect from a high-ranking actor and more likely to perceive that actor’s conduct in a more critical manner than that of a lower-status actor (Fikenscher & Wolf, 2015, p. 170). Against this background, manifestations and signs of status awareness and concerns are located, contextualized and qualified here.

      “Interests can conflict and must be balanced; rights must be defined so that they do not conflict” (Scanlon, 2008, p.68).

      States pursue external recognition of their self-ascribed rights associated with its status and identity, let alone self-worth conceptions. Conversely, [54] misrecognition (whether deliberatively or coincidental) of such rights71 is associated with disrespect. Rights, as understood here, can involve rather material factors72, for instance, the right to economic prosperity and security, and somewhat non-material aspects such as (legal) equality, fair treatment, legitimacy or ‘voice’73. A distinction between the two is neither straightforward74 nor feasible for this project’s purpose as they are both, closely related to status and respect. In this vein, external support of a country’s rights75 can serve as a signal of self-worth (incl. status and identity), whereas neglect, violation or inadequate consideration thereof can inflict harm and negatively affect an actor’s self-worth. In sum, this third indicator discusses the most frequently invoked political, legal, economic and military rights affected by external parties’ conduct.

      To reiterate, studies of social and political psychology (recognition, justice and status research) have shown that acknowledgment and verification of an actor’s distinctive identities, reflected in an external interaction partner’s [55] behavior, determine whether that conduct is regarded as respectful or not76. As the PRC has been, and perhaps still is, facing a critical period of national identity-formation77 (chapter 4.1), it is argued that in such a period collective actors are particularly dependent on external respect through confirmation of their self-defined identity78, not least as it serves as some kind of reassurance of its own significance (Ringmar, 1996, 2002). In anticipation of the results of the qualitative content analysis (QCA), four national identity79 narratives appear to dominate Chinese foreign policy discourses in general:

      - China, the exceptional country (achievements, merits, culture, history),

      - China, the victim (of foreign intervention and oppression),

      - China, the harmonious country,

      - China, pursuing the Chinese Dream.

      These narratives all relate to respect concerns in one way or another. For instance, comments by Chinese scholars stressing China’s exceptionalism can, depending on the context, be interpreted as respect expectations. Accordingly, conduct perceived as violating China’s self-defined identity (or significant parts thereof) is regarded as a disrespect experience80. Furthermore, reconciling with the upcoming indicator (emotional critique), such perceived misrecognition is likely to arouse negative emotions such as anger, contempt, aggression and frustration (Lindemann, 2010; Ringmar, 1996; Taylor, 1991). For instance, a sense of victimhood is likely to be associated with a feeling of injustice and frustration capable of negatively affecting China’s status and self-worth. In this vein, conduct regarded as an attempt to slow down or halt China’s rise is a possible example of such inadequacy81. Moreover, a sense of [56] victimhood usually demonstrates that other parts of Chinese identity narratives, such as harmonious country and the Chinese Dream, are neglected or misinterpreted at the same time. In addition, ‘impression management’82 by Chinese FPTTs, for instance, manifested by a constant and strong emphasis on China’s benign intent and its positive image, may signal identity misrecognition as well. In total, this fourth respect indicator seeks to scrutinize frequent identity references and the context in which they occur in order to spot underlying disrespect experiences.

      Closely related to each of the previous indicators, emotional complaints about the way China feels treated by external actors constitute the fifth respect indicator. Such complaints may differ in degree, ranging from an uncommon wording, given the usually rather pragmatic and diplomatic language adopted in official publications in China, up to fully-fledged outrage and “unproportionate critique” (Wolf, 2008, p. 21). As negative emotions are especially associated with the non-material and non-instrumental dimension of disrespect (disrespect as a sentiment) and are not just mere side-effects83 of disrespect experiences but a possible cause thereof,84 they are devoted an independent indicator. For the sake of this project, emotional complaints are expected to particularly take the shape of anger and frustration, hence affecting the way in which external conduct is perceived. For instance, if anger (let alone resentment) is prevalent, an actor’s threshold determining whether certain conduct is disrespectful or not is expected to be lower than in the absence of such emotions (Dodge et al., 1990; Graham & Hudley, 1994). In total, indicator four is concerned with emotions (limited to the input dimension) aroused by (or preceding) external conduct in the SCS. Its main focus will be placed on emotional critique in reaction to the presumed external misrecognition of China’s status and identity. That said, emotions shall be captured and recognized, on the one hand, by tracing emotional terms and terminology (e.g. aggression, affront, provocation) adopted including strong criticism voiced. On the other hand, the discursive context in which those terms and representations are spotted is to be taken into consideration as well. Moreover, the level of anger and frustration is assumed to be negatively affected if any external conduct is regarded as deliberate or hazarding the consequences, directed against oneself, lacking an excuse or justification, involving third parties, or gaining public attention (Miller, 2001).

      In addition, a close look at China’s perception of decision-making processes and international negotiations is another approach to gauge the role of (dis)respect. Negative emotions resulting from disrespect experiences may incline actors to propose (or in the case of states: pursue) fast and hasty measures, largely ignoring possible costs and other negative (material) consequences implied (Rosen, 2005). For instance, policy recommendations (cf. Hypothesis III) suggesting fierce policy measures even though a more cooperative approach

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