The Prince - Никколо Макиавелли

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malignity of fortune.

      There never was nor is at this day any government in the world by which one man has rule and dominion over another, but it is either a commonwealth, or a monarchy. Monarchies are either hereditary, where the ancestors of the sovereign have been a long time in possession, or where they are but new. The new are either so wholly and entirely (as Milan was to Francis Sforza), or annexed to the hereditary dominions of the conqueror (as the kingdom of Naples to the kingdom of Spain). These territories thus acquired are accustomed either to be subject to some prince, or to live at liberty and free, and are subdued either by his auxiliaries or own forces, by his good fortune or conduct.

      I shall omit speaking of commonwealths, as having discoursed of them largely elsewhere, and write in this place only of principalities, and how, according to the foregoing division, the said principalities may be governed and maintained. I do affirm, then, that hereditary states, and such as have been accustomed to the family of their prince, are preserved with less difficulty than the new, and because it is sufficient not to transgress the examples of their predecessors, and next to comply and frame themselves to the accidents that occur. So that, if the prince be a person of competent industry, he will be sure to keep himself in the throne, unless he be supplanted by some great and more than ordinary force; and even then, when so supplanted, fortune can never turn tail, or be adverse to the usurper, but he will stand fair to be restored. Of this Italy affords us an example in the Duke of Ferrara, who supported bravely against the invasion of the Venetians in 1484, and afterwards against Pope Julius X, upon no other foundation but his antiquity in that government; for a natural prince has not so much occasion or necessity to oppress his subjects, whereby it follows he must be better beloved, and retain more of the affections of his people, unless some extraordinary vices concur to make him odious; so that the succession and coherence of his government takes away the causes and memory of innovations; for one new change leaves always (as in buildings) a toothing and aptitude of another.

      But the difficulties consist in governments lately acquired, especially if not absolutely new, but as members annexed to the territories of the usurper, in which case such a government is called mixed. The tumults and revolutions in such monarchies proceed from a natural crossness and difficulty in all new conquests; for men do easily part with their prince upon hopes of bettering their condition, and that hope provokes them to rebel; but most commonly they are mistaken, and experience tells them their condition is much worse.

      This proceeds from another natural and ordinary cause, necessitating the new prince to overlay or disgust his new subjects by quartering his army upon them, taxes, or a thousand other inconveniences, which are the perpetual consequents of conquest. So that you make them your enemies who suffer, and are injured by your usurpation, but cannot preserve their friendship who introduced you, because you are neither able to satisfy their expectation, or employ strong remedies against them, by reason of your obligations; wherefore, though an usurper be never so strong, and his army never so numerous, he must have intelligence with the natives if he means to conquer a province. For these reasons Louis XII of France quickly subdued Milan, and lost it as quickly; for the same people which opened him their gates, finding themselves deceived in their hopes, and disappointed in the future benefits which they expected, could not brook nor comport with the haughtiness of their new sovereign: it is very true countries that have rebelled and are conquered the second time are recovered with more difficulty; for the defection of the people having taken off all obligation or respect from the usurper, he takes more liberty to secure himself by punishing offenders, exposing the suspected, and fortifying wherever he finds himself weak; so that Count Lodovick having been able to rescue Milan out of the hands of the French the first time only by harassing and infesting its borders, the second time he recovered it it was necessary for him to arm and confederate the whole world against the said king, and that his army should be beaten and driven out of Italy; and this happened from the aforesaid occasions: nevertheless the French were twice dispossessed. The general reasons of the first we have already discoursed, it remains now that we take a prospect of the second, and declare what remedies the said King Louis had, or what another may have in his condition, to preserve himself better in his new conquests than the King of France did before him. I say, then, that provinces newly acquired, and joined to the ancient territory of him who conquered them, are either of the same country, or language, or otherwise. In the first case they are easily kept, especially if the people have not been too much accustomed to liberty; and to secure the possession there needs no more than to extirpate the family of the prince which governed before; for in other things maintaining to them their old condition, there being no discrepancy in their customs, men do acquiesce and live quietly, as has been seen in the cases of Burgundy, Bretagne, Gascoigne, and Normandy, which have continued so long under the government of France; for though there be some difference in their language, nevertheless, their laws and customs being alike, they do easily consist. He therefore who acquires anything, and desires to preserve it, is obliged to have a care of two things more particularly; one is, that the family of the former prince be extinguished; the other, that no law or taxes be imposed: whereby it will come to pass, that in a short time it may be annexed and consolidated with his old principality. But where conquest is made in a country differing in language, customs and laws, there is the great difficulty; their good fortune and great industry is requisite to keep it. And one of the best and most efficacious expedients to do it would be for the usurper to live there himself, which would render his possession more secure and durable, as the great Turk has done in Greece, who, in despite of all his practices and policies to keep it in subjection, had he not fixed his imperial residence there would never have been able to have effected it. For being present in person, disorders are discovered in the bud and prevented, but being at a distance in some remote part, they come only by hearsay, and that, when they are got to a head, are commonly incurable. Besides, the province is not subject to be pillaged by officers, by reason of the nearness and accessibleness of their prince, which disposes those to love him who are good, and those to dread him who are otherwise; and if any foreigner attacks it, he must do it with more care and circumspection, in respect that the prince’s residence being there it will be harder for him to lose it.

      There is another remedy, rather better than worse, and that is, to plant colonies in one or two places, which may be as it were the keys of that State, and either that must be done of necessity, or an army of horse and foot be maintained in those parts, which is much worse; for colonies are of no great expense; the Prince sends and maintains them at very little charge, and intrenches only upon such as he is constrained to dispossess of their houses and land for the subsistence and accommodation of the new inhabitants, who are but few, and a small part of the State; they also who are injured and offended, living dispersed and in poverty, cannot do any mischief, and the rest being quiet and undisturbed, will not stir, lest they should mistake and run themselves into the same condition with their neighbours.

      I conclude, likewise, that those colonies which are least chargeable are most faithful and inoffensive, and those few who are offended are too poor and dispersed to do any hurt, as I said before; and it is to be observed, men are either to be flattered and indulged or utterly destroyed—because for small offences they do usually revenge themselves, but for great ones they cannot—so that injury is to be done in such a manner as not to fear any revenge. But if instead of colonies an army be kept on foot, it will be much more expensive, and the whole revenue of that province being consumed in the keeping it, the acquisition will be a loss, and rather a prejudice than otherwise, by removing the camp up and down the country, and changing their quarters, which is an inconvenience every man will resent and be ready to revenge, and they are the most dangerous and implacable enemies who are provoked by insolences committed against them in their own houses. In all respects, therefore, this kind of guard is unprofitable,

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