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however, included German and Italian nationalism in the Western model (Plamenatz 1973).

      Anthony Smith defined a distinction between the civic and political nationalism of the West and an ethnic and genealogical Eastern variant. Smith, however, argued in his later works that these historical distinctions did not imply that one was necessarily better than the other. According to Smith, civic nations, which are more typical in the West

      may demand eradication of minority cultures on the common assumption, shared by Marxists and liberals, not just of equality through uniformity, but also of the belief that the “high cultures” and “great nations” are necessarily of greater value than “low” cultures and small nations or ethnies.

      In support of his arguments concerning the ethnic origin of nations, Smith further maintained that the “pedagogical narrative of Western democracies turns out to be every bit as demanding and rigorous—and in practice ethnically one-sided—as are those of non-Western authoritarian state-nations, since it assumes the assimilation of ethnic minorities within the borders of the national state through acculturation to a hegemonic majority ethnic culture” (Smith 1995: 101). In other words, Western civic nationalism is not necessarily as tolerant and ethnically unbiased as its self-image suggests. The distinctions defined between Eastern and Western, ethnic and civic nationalism, however, are widespread and difficult to avoid, as all scholars agree that there are differences in how nationalism evolved in various parts of Europe and in the world in general. The notion of “good” civic Western nationalism in relation to “bad” ethnic Eastern nationalism is especially widespread in the media, and in political rhetoric (and therefore in public discourse). However, this distinction is rather more deceiving than revealing.

      So, is there a theoretical justification for distinguishing between Eastern and Western, Ethnic and Civic nationalism? Do these distinctions point to important and inherent characteristics of nationalism?

      In fact, the cultural and political dimensions of nationalism have not been clearly and persuasively elaborated. An attempt by Michael Ignatieff (1993) to equate “ethnic” and “cultural” nationalisms in order to explain why such nationalisms tend to be exclusive, as opposed to civic inclusive nationalism, has been criticized as short-sighted. Will Kymlicka has argued that Ignatieff and others have defined a false distinction, since both ethnic and civic nationalisms have a cultural component. As he points out:

      Membership in the American nation, just as in the Quebecois nation, involves participation in a common culture. It is a legal requirement for children to learn the English language and American history in schools, and all levels of American government had insisted that there is a legitimate governmental interest in promoting a common culture (Kymlicka 1999, 133).

      Rogers Brubaker (1998) argued that the distinction between civic and ethnic nationhood and nationalism is both normatively and analytically problematic. His view is similar to Kymlicka’s: he argues that, if we consider what is cultural in ethnic nationalism, virtually all nationalisms would be coded as ethnic or ethnocultural. In this sense, even the “paradigmatic cases of civic nationalism—France and America—cease to be counted as civic nationalism, since they have a crucial cultural or ethnocultural component” (Brubaker 1998, 299).

      An enquiry into the history of the American nation and nationalism brings yet another dimension to the discussion. Not all authors agree that the American nation is similar in nature to European ones such as, for instance, the German or French nations. It is argued that this nation of immigrants from Europe is inclusive, democratic and liberal in its nature and therefore is not a nation with an ethnic, “bad” nationalism (See Yack 1999). On the other hand, as Kymlicka argues, America’s civic nationalism has historically justified the conquering and colonizing of national minorities and the coercive imposition of English-language courts and schools. The experience of the United States, and of other American nations, namely those in Latin America, illustrates that civic nations can be military dictatorships as easily as liberal democracies (e.g., Peru and Brazil, which are multiethnic societies, granting equal citizenship to whites, blacks, Indians and Asians). According to Kymlicka, North Americans often overlook this fact, because they fail to distinguish immigrants from national minorities. In fact, nationalist policies of the U.S. government led to the forced incorporation of Indian tribes, native Hawaiians, and Puerto Ricans into the American state and their coerced assimilation into American culture. This is, according to Kymlicka, only one example of the link between aggressive expansionism and civic American nationalism.

      However, other scholars have pointed out that there is a cultural aspect of American nationalism that has been evident in attempts to define an ideological norm for the American nation as a whole. As Anthony Richmond pointed out, the McCarthy era in the United States was an attempt to impose a single nationalistic ideology and to regard any non-conformity as “un-American” (Richmond 1984, 11). The British social psychologist Michel Billig, however, pointed out that such “philosophical” American nationalism is just as easily adaptable to the post-communist world. Since 1991, the old Soviet demons were quickly replaced in the nationalism of Pax Americana with new enemies: the religious fundamentalists and misguided extremists. He describes this as follows:

      This philosophical nationalism, unlike some other forms, does not speak with narrow ferocity. Instead, it draws its moral force to lead the nations from its own proclaimed reasonableness. The global ambitions are to be presented as the voice of tolerance (‘our’ tolerance), even doubt (‘our’ doubt, ‘our’ modesty). All the while, ‘we’ are to keep a sense of ‘ourselves’. And a sense of ‘others’: the mad and the bad, who cling to dangerous absolutes, opposing ‘our’ pragmatic, non-ideological politics (Billig 1995, 172).

      Billig calls this sort of nationalism “banal nationalism,” because it denies its own nationalism while arguing at the same time for loyalty to the nation-state, to “our” nation. Such banal nationalism is, in his opinion, typical for all Western democracies that deny that “their” nationalism is nationalist, because “it is a part of common-sense imaging of ‘us’, the democratic, tolerant and reasonable nation, rightfully inhabiting ‘our’ homeland” (Billig 1995, 161).

      If, in fact, Western democracies are not less nationalist when it comes to “their” homeland, even though they repress and deny this fact, can nationalism be democratic and liberal? As Erica Benner (1995) discovered (in the writings of Marx and Engels), in the mid-nineteenth century nationalist movements in Europe were in fact either politically conservative or indeed democratic. In fact, this was, according to Benner, the main contribution of Marxism—to distinguish democratic and non-democratic nationalism and, thereby, to bring politics back into the study of nationalism. The founders of Marxism believed that both within oppressed nations and within their oppressor states, there were despotic as well as democratic nationalists, chauvinists and internationalists. Benner reflects on how Marx viewed the political nature of different nationalisms:

      To be eligible for support, he argued a nationalist movement should demonstrate that it is authentically ‘national’ in his democratic sense: it should, that is, positively address the concerns of a broad section of a nation’s people by improving social conditions and expanding the bases of political participation. He cited the Krakow insurrection of 1846 as an example of such a movement, applauding not only the political reforms advanced by the nationalist rebels but also their social and economic programme which represented, as Marx declared, Poland’s attempt to ‘break the chains of feudalism’ (Benner 1995, 155).

      If it was possible to distinguish democratic forms of nationalism among the nineteenth century nationalist movements struggling for the right of self-determination, is it possible to apply the same principles to contemporary Europe with mostly established frontiers? Is it possible to do so outside a Marxist paradigm that, in fact, proved ineffective in handling nationalism?

      There is a growing school of thought suggesting that liberal nationalism is not only possible, but also the only acceptable future for nationalism, if it is to have any future at all. The Israeli scholar Yael Tamir (1993) proposed combining the liberal admiration of personal freedom and individual rights with the nationalist emphasis on belonging, loyalty and solidarity. Tamir believes that people have the right to their own

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