Algorithms to Live By: The Computer Science of Human Decisions - Brian Christian

Скачать книгу

what is the quickest way to determine which compound is likely to be effective against a disease? Gittins tried to cast the problem in the most general form he could: multiple options to pursue, a different probability of reward for each option, and a certain amount of effort (or money, or time) to be allocated among them. It was, of course, another incarnation of the multi-armed bandit problem.

      Both the for-profit drug companies and the medical profession they serve are constantly faced with the competing demands of the explore/exploit tradeoff. Companies want to invest R & D money into the discovery of new drugs, but also want to make sure their profitable current product lines are flourishing. Doctors want to prescribe the best existing treatments so that patients get the care they need, but also want to encourage experimental studies that may turn up even better ones.

      In both cases, notably, it’s not entirely clear what the relevant interval ought to be. In a sense, drug companies and doctors alike are interested in the indefinite future. Companies want to be around theoretically forever, and on the medical side a breakthrough could go on to help people who haven’t even been born yet. Nonetheless, the present has a higher priority: a cured patient today is taken to be more valuable than one cured a week or a year from now, and certainly the same holds true of profits. Economists refer to this idea, of valuing the present more highly than the future, as “discounting.”

      Unlike previous researchers, Gittins approached the multi-armed bandit problem in those terms. He conceived the goal as maximizing payoffs not for a fixed interval of time, but for a future that is endless yet discounted.

      Such discounting is not unfamiliar to us from our own lives. After all, if you visit a town for a ten-day vacation, then you should be making your restaurant decisions with a fixed interval in mind; but if you live in the town, this doesn’t make as much sense. Instead, you might imagine the value of payoffs decreasing the further into the future they are: you care more about the meal you’re going to eat tonight than the meal you’re going to eat tomorrow, and more about tomorrow’s meal than one a year from now, with the specifics of how much more depending on your particular “discount function.” Gittins, for his part, made the assumption that the value assigned to payoffs decreases geometrically: that is, each restaurant visit you make is worth a constant fraction of the last one. If, let’s say, you believe there is a 1% chance you’ll get hit by a bus on any given day, then you should value tomorrow’s dinner at 99% of the value of tonight’s, if only because you might never get to eat it.

      Working with this geometric-discounting assumption, Gittins investigated a strategy that he thought “at least would be a pretty good approximation”: to think about each arm of the multi-armed bandit separately from the others, and try to work out the value of that arm on its own. He did this by imagining something rather ingenious: a bribe.

      In the popular television game show Deal or No Deal, a contestant chooses one of twenty-six briefcases, which contain prizes ranging from a penny to a million dollars. As the game progresses, a mysterious character called the Banker will periodically call in and offer the contestant various sums of money to not open the chosen briefcase. It’s up to the contestant to decide at what price they’re willing to take a sure thing over the uncertainty of the briefcase prize.

      In fact, the index strategy turned out to be more than a good approximation. It completely solves the multi-armed bandit with geometrically discounted payoffs. The tension between exploration and exploitation resolves into the simpler task of maximizing a single quantity that accounts for both. Gittins is modest about the achievement—“It’s not quite Fermat’s Last Theorem,” he says with a chuckle—but it’s a theorem that put to rest a significant set of questions about the explore/exploit dilemma.

      Now, actually calculating the Gittins index for a specific machine, given its track record and our discounting rate, is still fairly involved. But once the Gittins index for a particular set of assumptions is known, it can be used for any problem of that form. Crucially, it doesn’t even matter how many arms are involved, since the index for each arm is calculated separately.

      In the table on the next page we provide the Gittins index values for up to nine successes and failures, assuming that a payoff on our next pull is worth 90% of a payoff now. These values can be used to resolve a variety of everyday multi-armed bandit problems. For example, under these assumptions you should, in fact, choose the slot machine that has a track record of 1–1 (and an expected value of 50%) over the one with a track record of 9–6 (and an expected value of 60%). Looking up the relevant coordinates in the table shows that the lesser-known machine has an index of 0.6346, while the more-played machine scores only a 0.6300. Problem solved: try your luck this time, and explore.

      Looking at the Gittins index values in the table, there are a few other interesting observations. First, you can see the win-stay principle at work: as you go from left to right in any row, the index scores always increase. So if an arm is ever the correct one to pull, and that pull is a winner, then (following the chart to the right) it can only make more sense to pull the same arm again. Second, you can see where lose-shift would get you into trouble. Having nine initial wins followed by a loss gets you an index of 0.8695, which is still higher than most of the other values in the table—so you should probably stay with that arm for at least another pull.

      Gittins index values as a function of wins and losses, assuming that a payoff next time is worth 90% of a payoff now.

      But perhaps the most interesting part of the table is the top-left entry. A record of 0–0—an arm that’s a complete unknown—has an expected value of 0.5000 but a Gittins index of 0.7029. In other words, something you have no experience with whatsoever is more attractive than a machine that you know pays out 70% of the time! As you go down the diagonal, notice that a record of 1–1 yields an index of 0.6346, a record of 2–2 yields 0.6010, and so on. If such 50%-successful performance persists, the index does ultimately converge on 0.5000, as experience confirms that the machine is indeed nothing special and takes away the “bonus” that spurs further exploration. But the convergence happens fairly slowly; the exploration bonus is a powerful force. Indeed, note that even a failure on the very first pull, producing a record of 0–1, makes for a Gittins index that’s still above 50%.

      We can also see how the explore/exploit tradeoff changes as we change the way we’re discounting the future. The following table presents exactly the same information as the preceding one, but assumes that a payoff next time is worth 99% of one now, rather than 90%. With the future weighted nearly as heavily as the present, the value of making a chance discovery, relative to taking a sure thing, goes up even more. Here, a totally untested machine with a 0–0 record is worth a guaranteed 86.99% chance of a payout!

image

      Gittins index values as a function of wins and losses, assuming that a payoff next time is worth 99% of a payoff now.

      The Gittins index, then, provides a formal, rigorous justification for preferring the unknown, provided we have some opportunity to exploit the results of what we learn from exploring. The old adage tells us that “the grass is always greener on the other side of the fence,” but the math tells us why: the unknown has a chance of being better, even if we actually expect it to be no different, or if it’s just as likely to be worse. The untested rookie is worth more (early in the season, anyway) than the veteran of seemingly equal ability, precisely because we know less about him. Exploration in itself has value, since trying new things increases our chances of finding the best. So taking the

Скачать книгу