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PRUDENTIA IURIS: TOWARDS A PRAGMATIC THEORY OF NATURAL LAW (2000).

      21 21. For an excellent overview of that many-faceted debate, see generally Aileen Kavanaugh, Recasting the Political Constitution: From Rivals to Relationships, 30 KING’S L. J. 43 (2019).

      22 22. See the clearheaded comments by Professor Conor Casey of the University of Liverpool in a video lecture for the Oxford/ Blackfriars Common Good Series, https://youtu.be/MpZCKrpE5gw.

      23 23. See Adrian Vermeule, Liberalism and the Invisible Hand, 3 AM. AFFAIRS 149 (2019); Adrian Vermeule, Echoes of the Ius Commune, 66 AM. J. JURIS. (2021) (reviewing Barber, Principles of Constitutionalism, note 11 above).

      24 24. As I explain at length in ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW’S ABNEGATION: FROM LAW’S EMPIRE TO THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2016).

      25 25. See generally CASS R. SUNSTEIN & ADRIAN VERMEULE, LAW AND LEVIATHAN: REDEEMING THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE (2020).

      26 26. Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984).

      27 27. Adrian Vermeule, Rationally Arbitrary Decisions in Administrative Law, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. S475 (2015).

      28 28. See generally John Dewey, Liberty and Social Control, in 11 JOHN DEWEY: THE LATER WORKS, 1925–1953 360 (Jo Ann Boydston, ed., 1987); Robert L. Hale, Coercion and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State, 38 POL. SCI. Q. 470 (1923).

      29 29. See BERNARD WILLIAMS, ETHICS AND THE LIMITS OF PHILOSOPHY 108–10 (1985).

      30 30. For an argument reaching the same conclusion from different premises, see Jordan L. Perkins, On the Necessity of a “Common Good”: Or, Against Originalism, https://www.jordanlperkins.com/post/on-the-necessity-of-a-common-good-or-against-originalism.

      31 31. Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 240–41 (1984).

      32 32. See Bostock v. Clayton Cty., Ga., 140 S. Ct. 1731, – (2020) (“Only the written word is the law … This Court normally interprets a statute in accord with the ordinary public meaning of its terms at the time of its enactment”). To be sure, there are endless, variant definitions of originalism, the sign of an unstable research program. In an older version, the watchword was “original intent”; in newer versions, “original law” or “original methods” originalism; and so on. The differences among these sub-conceptions do not make any difference to the points I will make. Hence I will speak (like the Court in Bostock) of original public meaning originalism, which emphasizes the supposed “fixation” of original meaning at the time of enactment. As discussed in Chapter 3, there is much less to fixation than meets the eye.

      33 33. Ibid.

      34 34. Rafael de Arízaga, Notes on the Ius Commune Part I: The Hydra of Legal Positivism, IUS & IUSTITIUM (Feb. 23, 2021), https://iusetiustitium.com/notes-on-the-ius-commune-part-i-the-hydra-of-legal-positivism. At the level of scholarly justifications, the leading theoretical defenses of originalism today are explicitly positivist. See, e.g.,William Baude, Is Originalism Our Law?, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 2349, 2353 (2015); Stephen E. Sachs, Originalism as a Theory of Legal Change, 38 HARV. J. LAW & PUB. POLY. 817 (2015). However, there have always also been normative, non-positivist justifications for originalism, sounding in principles of political morality. Perhaps the most famous of these is an early argument of Antonin Scalia’s that originalism appropriately constrains judicial discretion. See Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CINN. L. REV. 849 (1989). As discussed in note 15 above, in Chapter 3, and elsewhere, such justifications either fail on their own terms or, where successful, merely replicate the constraining and structuring devices of the classical law, which are themselves justified by reference to the common good. Those devices by no means allow any judge or other official to consult the full range of first-order moral considerations whenever the judge wants to. In other words, the reigning positivist version of originalism is the version that gives it distinctive content, and hence it is the version on which I will focus, although other versions are addressed at various points throughout. See, in particular, the discussion of hybrid versions of originalism in Chapter 3.

      35 35. Here and elsewhere, some of the relevant text is incorporated into a forthcoming work co-authored with Professor Conor Casey in the HARVARD JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY, tentatively entitled “Myths of Common Good Constitutionalism.”

      36 36. See generally Stephen E. Sachs, Finding Law, 107 CALIF. L REV. 527 (2019).

      37 37. See JANNEKE GERARDS, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 160–97 (2019).

      38 38. R.H. Helmholz, What Explains the Disappearance of Natural Law? SYNDICATE (Mar. 17, 2021) (responding as part of a symposium about ANDREW FORSYTH, COMMON LAW AND NATURAL LAW IN AMERICA: FROM THE PURITANS TO THE LEGAL REALISTS (2019)), https://syndicate.network/symposia/theology/common-law-and-natural-law-in-america.

      39 39. Ibid.

      40 40. 198 U.S. 45, 65–74 (1905) (Harlan, J., dissenting).

      41 41. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889).

      42 42. 299 U.S. 304 (1936).

      43 43. 140 S.Ct. 1731 (2020).

      44 44. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.

      45 45. 140 S.Ct. 2183 (2020).

      46 46. 576 U.S. 644 (2015).

      47 47. Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).

      48 48. Annex to the Letter Dated 2 December 2020 from the Permanent Representative of the United States of America to the United Nations Addressed to the Secretary-General: Geneva Consensus Declaration on Promoting Women’s Health and Strengthening the Family, U.N. Doc. A/75/626 (Dec. 2, 2020), https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N20/344/30/PDF/N2034430.pdf?OpenElement.

      49 49. See Dworkin, Law’s Empire, note 9 above.

      50 50. Examples are too numerous to mention, but compare the titles of these two: Garrett Epps, Common-Good Constitutionalism Is an Idea as Dangerous as They Come, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/common-good-constitutionalism-dangerous-idea/609385; Randy E. Barnett, Common-Good Constitutionalism Reveals the Dangers of Any Non-Originalist Approach to the Constitution, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 3, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/04/dangers-any-non-originalist-approach-constitution/609382.

      51 51. A recent spate of excellent work includes Conor Casey, “Common Good Constitutionalism” and the New Debate Over Constitutional Interpretation in the United States, (2021) 4 PUBLIC LAW 765–87; Timon Cline, Common Good Constitutionalism and Vaccine Mandates, APPALACHIAN LAW JOURNAL (forthcoming 2021); Stéphane Sérafin, Kerry Sun, & Xavier Foccroulle Menard, The Common Good and Legal Interpretation: A Response to Leonid Sirota and Mark Mancini, 30 CONST. F. 39 (2021); RACHAEL WALSH, PROPERTY RIGHTS AND SOCIAL JUSTICE: PROGRESSIVE PROPERTY IN ACTION (2021). See also the entries in the symposium on common-good constitutionalism hosted by Ius & Iustitium in September

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