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would more likely produce humanoids—beings like humans but not necessarily identical to us. There might be at least as many Wookies in the universe as there are humans” [2.75].

The first question the ratiocentric astrobiologist will ask about our extraterrestrial contacts will be this: Are they intelligent? If so, just how intelligent? We mean it when we employ a term such as ETI, extraterrestrial intelligence.

      In anticipation of contact with alien intelligence in a form that reasonably resembles Homo sapiens on Earth, perhaps we should consider engagement with three possibilities: extraterrestrial biotic individuals who are inferior to us (intellectually less intelligent), our peers (equal in intelligence), and superior to us (more highly intelligent) [2.58]. Each of these three categories implies a different set of moral responsibilities [2.58].

      Curiously, for decades prior to the advent of the field of astrobiology, astronomers and science fiction writers measured the variety of extraterrestrial beings according to scales of intelligence. The mere existence of astrocognitionists among astrobiologists demonstrates the preoccupation we have with intelligence. “The multidisciplinary field of astrocognition,” according to David Dunér, “could be generally defined as “the study of the origin, evolution and distribution of cognition in the Universe,” or simply “the study of the thinking Universe” [2.28]. Until recently, coffee conversation among astrobiologists distinguished between stupid microbial life, on the one hand, and intelligent or even super-intelligent aliens, on the other. Elsewhere I have argued that all life is intelligent, even microbial life; and what we are dealing with are relative levels of intelligence [2.61].⁷

      Regardless of my position on continuity of intelligence, the astroethicist must speculate about possible and probable ETI scenarios. We may make new galactic friends with beings inferior to us in intelligence, equal to us in intelligence, and even superior to us in intelligence. Some might be hostile. Some might be friendly. Others might even be benevolent. Each possible extraterrestrial scenario would shape our terrestrial response and our responsibility. In what follows we will get specific about each scenario.

2.4.1 What is Our Responsibility Toward Intellectually Inferior ETI?

      If intelligence can be measured in terms of higher and lower, what if the extraterrestrials we engage exhibit lower intelligence than Earth’s Homo sapiens? Might the ethical framework for discerning our responsibility toward intellectually inferior ETI be analogous to our responsibility toward Earth’s animals? [2.66].

      If we answer affirmatively, then we would find ourselves in a classic dialectic. On the one hand, instrumentalist values are obtained. The human race exploits all other life forms—both plants and animals—for human welfare. Animals provide food, work, clothing, and even company. Animals can be sacrificed in medical research to develop therapies that will benefit only human persons. On the other hand, intrinsic values are obtained. We human beings have a sense of responsibility toward the welfare of animals. We respect them as intelligent beings; and we are concerned about preventing suffering to animals. In some instances, we exert considerable energy and effort to preserve their species from extinction and to insure the health of individual animals. In the case of pets, we love them to a degree that rivals loving our own family. We treat our pets as if they possess intrinsic value. In sum, we have inherited this double relationship to our inferiors already here on Earth.

      What about ETI whose intelligence level is similar to that of the animals we have come to know? In terms of our responsibility, I believe we should take the initiative to extend concern for the welfare of such ETI on the model of our current concern for the subjective quality of animal experience. We should do what we are able to protect ETI from suffering and enhance their experience of wellbeing. In short, an astroethics of responsibility suggests that we respect ETI and show them care.

      2.4.2 What is Our Responsibility Toward Peer ETI?

      In the event that the aliens with whom we make contact and engage in transplanetary community approximate the intelligence level of Homo sapiens on Earth, an astroethics of responsibility strongly suggests that we earthlings would treat them as possessing dignity. That is, we would treat our extraterrestrial equals as possessing intrinsic value; and imputing dignity is the principal form in which response and care would become manifest [2.52] [2.57] [2.66].

Might the Golden Rule provide an ethical superstructure? Jesus’ version of the Golden Rule is familiar to us all: ^NRS Matthew 7:12 “In everything do to others as you would have them do to you.” Even though philosopher Immanuel Kant found weaknesses in the classical Golden Rule, his categorical imperative universalized it. The formal principle from which all moral duties are derived is this: “I ought never to act except in such a way that I also will that my maxim should become a universal one” [2.38]. In short, we should treat peers as equal to ourselves; and we should care for their welfare just as we would care for our own.

      Is there any reason to expect that our new friends living on a hypothetical exoplanet will have developed moral standards that correspond to ours? Yes, answers Michael Ruse. After all, extraterrestrial creatures must have evolved and adapted to the same laws of physics operative everywhere in the universe. Their logic and mathematics would be the same. Morality also? Yes, perhaps.

      “Two of the greatest and most widely accepted enunciations of the supreme principle of morality are the Greatest Happiness Principle and the Categorical Imperative. The former specifies that one’s actions ought to be such as will maximize happiness [John Stuart Mill]. The latter…entreats one to regard one’s fellow humans as ends, and not simply as means to one’s own gratification [Kant]. Either or both of these could find their equivalent on our hypothetical planet elsewhere in the universe” [2.74].

      Our takeaway is this: if we earthlings ascribe intrinsic value and treat intelligent aliens with dignity, it is reasonable to expect the aliens will understand us and perhaps even respond in kind. Earthling care for ETI might be accepted and, hopefully, reciprocated.

      Messaging Extraterrestrial Intelligence International (METI) founder and director, Douglas Vakoch, gives voice to such an astroethical responsibility at the moment of contact. “Relevant responsibilities to address include (1) looking out for the interests of humankind as a whole, (2) being truthful in interstellar messages, and (3) benefiting extraterrestrial civilizations” [2.87] [2.88].

      With METI in mind, let’s refine the peer ETI category into two subcategories: hostile and peaceful. If hostile, ETI could become a threat to us. Should we hide in hopes that we can avoid detection? Should we mount a defense? A preemptive offense?

      Fearing such a threat, Stephen Hawking along with some of METI’s own advisors argue that Active SETI should be stopped. We should hide Earth electronically so that hostile aliens cannot find us. Such a rejoinder arises from the fear that aliens will turn out to be just like earthlings: beset with the desire to conquer, subjugate, and pillage.

What about a preemptive offense? One of the problems we have learned from history is that we earthlings can become unnecessarily hostile and pose a threat to our fabricated enemies. We are subject to demagoguery. Even if the ETI civilization in question is peaceful, a terrestrial demagogue could persuade us earthlings that the aliens are hostile; and we earthlings, like a mob, would support military action against them. Theologians are particularly worried about human hostility, regardless of how pacific ETI might be.

      Whether hostile or peaceful, peer ETI should be afforded respect in the form of dignity. In the event that peer ETI prove to be neutrally peaceful or even benevolent, then the principles giving expression to Enlightenment values should prevail without challenge: equality, liberty, dignity, and mutuality. And, yes, we should care about their well-being if not flourishing.

      2.4.3 What is Our Responsibility Toward Superior ETI or Even Post-Biological Intelligence?

      Among the array of possible futures, intellectually superior ETI we encounter could be hostile, peaceful, or even benevolent. In all cases, our inherited Enlightenment

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