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promote the communal rather than merely an individual focus. What does this quandary tell us about the relationship between the mean and the commandments and also between the soul and the commandments? To bridge the two and to minimize this tension, Maimonides interprets the commandments from both the politico-religious and from the individual viewpoints. In other words, when the Torah commands something, it includes both the social (politico-religious) and the individual (religious) value. In Eight Chapters, Maimonides interprets the commandments as being good for the soul (i.e., generosity benefits the poor—the community as a whole, and the soul of the one who is generous—the individual). Specifically, in chapter 4, Maimonides argues that the perfect commandments make people perfect¹⁸⁶ since the commandments are “a discipline for the powers of the soul.”¹⁸⁷ We posit here an analogy to Shinran’s thought in relation to the fact that becoming embraced by Amida also means attaining a higher state of perfection. However, contrary to Shinran who exercises a non-dualistic view of human beings, for Maimonides, one’s soul can succumb to evil inclinations generated by matter.

      But how does Maimonides see a prophet in terms of a higher state of perfection? We already mentioned that he is less skeptical in his assessment of imagination in relation to prophecy and prophets. Maimonides discusses the nature of prophecy in a number of sources,¹⁸⁸ but for our purpose we turn only to the GP II: 32 and 36 where he emphasizes the political aspects of the perfected life. Given Maimonides’ view of Moses as a politico-religious leader, Maimonides considers prophecy as “a certain perfection in the nature of man.”¹⁸⁹ In GP II: 36, Maimonides stipulates that the nature of perfection is not limited to one’s moral and rational faculties, but relates also to “the imaginative faculty in respect of its original disposition.”¹⁹⁰ However, in line with his skeptical view of the role of matter, he offers the following caveat: “the perspective of the bodily faculties, to which the imaginative faculty belongs, is consequent upon the best temperament, the best possible size, and the purest possible matter, of the part of the body that is the substratum for the faculty in question.”¹⁹¹ For Maimonides, Moses exemplifies a model of both theoretical and practical virtues. As GP I: 34, II: 36, and III: 33 discuss, to establish and preserve a society requires to have a leader with certain ethical traits. However, Maimonides does not always connect ethical skills to intellectual perfection. The prophets and Moses in particular, appear to be the exceptions. But what can we suggest about Maimonides’ overall perception of human perfection?

      Irrefutably, the placement of the chapters GP III: 54 and 51 highlight the ambiguity related to Maimonides’ view of human perfection. In III: 51, Maimonides discusses Moses and the patriarchs who appear to transcend the limits imposed by matter. Maimonides states that Aaron and Miriam “died in the pleasure of this apprehension [of the intelligibles] due to the intensity of passionate love.”¹⁹² The deaths of Moses, Aaron, and Miriam testify to the divide between the attainment of intellectual perfection (theoretical perfection) and ethical perfection (practical perfection). While their death is defined as “salvation from death,” Maimonides makes sure to stipulate that this salvation does not relate to the existential permanence of matter, but rather to remaining “permanently in that state of intense pleasure, which does not belong to the genus of bodily pleasures.”¹⁹³ Recalling our argument related to different audiences and different goals, we should note that in the seventh chapter of Eight Chapters, Maimonides argued to the contrary, namely that Moses’ intellect continued being tied to matter. The difference in this argumentation might reflect on Maimonides’ goal of highlighting Moses’ uniqueness as a receiver of divine law in the former case, and of underscoring the limits of human perfection in the latter case. Already in GP I: 1, Maimonides establishes the need for intellectual apprehension: “that which is meant in the Scriptural dictum, let us make man in our image, was the special form, which is intellectual apprehension, not the shape or configuration” (221; emphasis added).¹⁹⁴

      As argued above, matter continues to be a thorny issue that leads one away from either intellectual perfection or ethical perfection and might result in human evilness. How is Maimonides dealing with these inclinations and what role do the commandments play in eroding or at least in mitigating the evilness?

      Human Nature and the Commandments

      Maimonides differentiates between man-made laws¹⁹⁵ (the nomos) and divine law. We recognize that expecting humans to follow a man-made law has different implications than the expectation of the observance of divinely ordained commands. In GP II: 40, Maimonides identifies law as divine¹⁹⁶ by its ends and utility and posits that divine law, which, despite being attentive to “the soundness of the circumstances pertaining to the body,” places focus on “the soundness of belief” in order to “inculcate correct opinions with regard to God.”¹⁹⁷ Maimonides states: “You must know that this guidance comes from Him, may He be exalted, and this Law is divine.”¹⁹⁸ Contrary to the nomos, divine law is predicated upon the belief in God. And yet, divine law should be imparted to the humans in the manner similar to that of the nomos by the most perfect individuals. Maimonides asserts that God placed “the faculty of the ruling” in certain individuals, namely, “the prophet or the bringers of the nomos” for whom “this guidance comes from Him, may He be exalted, and that the Law is divine.”¹⁹⁹

      

      With the divinity of the Law established in GP II: 39–40, Maimonides discusses the purpose of the commandments throughout III: 25 to 49. In GP III: 25, ­Maimonides elucidates the four kinds of actions: vain, futile, frivolous, and good or excellent. The latter kind of actions results in the attainment of noble end and is related to the acts of divine legislation. Maimonides argues that all commandments have reasons and purpose. In GP III: 35, Maimonides divides the commandments into fourteen classes and then further separates these commandments into two larger groups: “transgressions between man and his fellow man and transgressions between man and God.”²⁰⁰ The latter differentiation points out that according to Maimonides, the former are specific to the social/political concerns, while the latter relate to the metaphysical issues. In GP II: 39, Maimonides addresses the divine Law aimed at the individual perfection. Recalling his view of the welfare of the body as contrasted with the welfare of the soul, ostensibly, it is the commandments that relate to the metaphysical issues that pertain to the individual perfection.

      This still does not answer the question as to why humans should abide by the commandments. In GP III: 44, Maimonides states that the commandments are “the constant commemoration of God, the love of Him and the fear of Him.” In the Laws of the Principles of the Torah,²⁰¹ Maimonides specifically addresses the commandments that focus on love for God and on His awesomeness. Only when one is obeying God out of love and without any expectations of a reward, is human perfection exemplified.²⁰² We note here, without claiming a direct analogy, that one’s love of God is reminiscent of Shinran’s conception of shinjin free of hakarai, any calculative thinking.

      Moral Virtue and Individual Perfection

      There still remains a question whether there is a relationship between moral issues and one’s individual perfection? Does human perfection testify to moral perfection? We recall that an outcome of being embraced by Amida, a human becomes perfected by Amida’s perfection. How does it compare to Maimonides’ view on human perfection? In GP III: 27, Maimonides is explicit in holding morality inferior to rational perfection. Some scholars argue that Maimonides differentiates between ethics known by intellect and ethics resulting from generally accepted opinion; hence, he maintains two types of ethics: rational and conventional.²⁰³ This distinction allows taking into account different circumstances and is in line with Maimonides’ view that most people cannot achieve intellectual perfection. When viewing ethics’ primary goal in terms of the well-being of humans (the generally accepted opinions ethics), the improved conditions can potentially lead to attaining intellectual perfection.²⁰⁴ Yet, for the most people, the doctrine of the mean is the most suitable approach. Therefore, the commandments, which are used to govern society-at-large rather than focus on the exceptional individuals, are perceived as an approach from the standpoint of the mean.

      Do the improved human conditions always lead to human moral perfection? Furthermore, does moral perfection result in subsequent intellectual perfection? Some scholars

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