Dark Seas - JE Harrold Britannia Naval Histories of World War II

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and the entry of Italy into the war gravely compromised the British situation in the Mediterranean. These events were followed in October 1940 by Mussolini’s treacherous attack on Greece with a view to gaining control over the Eastern Mediterranean. He met with an unexpected set-back and in January 1941 the Italian forces were falling back on Valona in Albania. Germany was already preparing to enter the lists. On 1 March, 1941 Bulgaria signed the Three Power Pact complying with Hitler’s demand to allow twenty fully mechanised German divisions to enter Bulgaria and take post along the Yugoslav frontier, a very evident warning of a German attack on Greece.

      A lull had occurred in the Libyan Campaign. Tobruk and Benghazi had been captured from the Italians in January and the British Government decided to send two infantry divisions (one Australian and one New Zealand) and an armoured brigade from Libya to assist Greece in the impending attack. On 2 March, Mr. Eden, Secretary of State for War, and General Sir John Dill, C.I.G.S., were in Athens conferring with the Greek Government. The transfer of this force (Operation ‘Lustre’), which began to move on 4 March, absorbed for a time all the energies of the Mediterranean fleet. Its transport required, during March and April, 27 escorted convoys (15 northbound and 12 southbound) between Egypt and Greece, while the forces disembarked numbered 58,364 personnel and 8,588 vehicles, guns and tanks.

      Enemy air forces were active; Italian submarines were on the move; mines laid by air in the Suez Canal blocked the passage of the Formidable on her way through the Red Sea to the Mediterranean to replace the Illustrious and she did not reach Port Said until 9 March. It is satisfactory to note that in spite of attacks by air and submarine not a soldier was lost on the way to Greece. Italian submarines failed to stop the convoys and one of them (the Anfitrite) attacking a convoy from the Aegean was sunk by the Greyhound on 6 March; but behind the submarines lay the Italian fleet, which might at any moment appear on the Aegean route. It is in the light of these circumstances that the Battle of Matapan was fought for nothing less than the control of the Eastern Mediterranean and all the vast commitments dependent upon it.

      The Naval Situation, March 1941

      In the nine months that had passed since Italy entered the war the Italian fleet had made very few major sorties, of which two led to running fights with out Fleet, viz.: the action off Calabria on 9 July, 1940 (Battle Summary No. 8) and the action off Cape Spartivento on 27 November, 1940 (Battle Summary No. 9). Both of these encounters had ended in dismal retreat. On another occasion, 30 September 1940, their retreat took place before action was possible, although their preponderance of force, i.e., battleships 5 to 2, cruisers 11 to 5, destroyers more than 2 to 1 might have tempted them to an encounter (Naval Staff History (Med.), Vol. I, Sec. 861). Furthermore, they had submitted tamely to the attack on Taranto (11 November, 1940), the bombardment of Valona (18 December, 1940), the bombardment of Bardia (3 January, 1941), the passage of a through convoy from Gibraltar to Greece on 7–10 January, 1941, and the bombardment of Genoa (9 February, 1941). What finally stirred them into action were the prospects of a great Spring offensive in the Balkans and the urgency of German protests.2 Signs of increasing activity became apparent about 25 March. There was increasing aerial reconnaissance to the south and west of Greece and Crete, accompanied by daily attempts to reconnoitre Alexandria harbour, and other indications all pointing to some prospective action by the Italian fleet.

      In the opinion of the C.-in-C. this action might take one of three forms: (1) attack on the British convoy routes in the Aegean with the despatch of an Italian convoy to the Dodecanese; (2) a diversion to cover a landing in Cyrenaica or Greece; (3) an attack on Malta. The most vulnerable target, in his opinion, was to be found in the British convoys to Greece, whose passage had to be safeguarded at all costs.

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      Plan 3, detail of Battle of Matapan off Gavdo

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      Plan1, detail (2) of Battle of Matapan, General Plan

      The Commander-in-Chief’s Plans

      The threat from enemy surface ships might be met by moving our battle fleet into the area west of Crete, but from that area it would sooner or later be bound to return to harbour for fuel, leaving the enemy free to attack. The C.-in-C. therefore decided to clear merchant shipping out of the area between Crete and Egypt for a time, and to dispose all his available forces to bring the enemy to action.

      As it was important, however, to avoid arousing his suspicions and it was hoped that convoys in the Aegean would draw the Italians out, one convoy was left at sea – A.G.9,3 bound north for the Piraeus. This was a troop convoy of six ships which had sailed from Egypt on 26 March with an escort of three British destroyers and a Greek flotilla leader. It was ordered to turn south at nightfall on 27 March so as to be eastward of the battle fleet at daylight 28 March. The sailing of a southbound convoy (G.A.8)4 from the Piraeus was cancelled at the same time and the authorities in the Aegean were warned to keep the area clear of all shipping. The battle fleet was to proceed to sea from Alexandria under cover of night on the evening of 27 March.

      The British fleet5 was organised in four groups as follows:–

      Force A Battle fleet – Warspite (Flag of Admiral Sir Andrew Cunningham, C.-in-C.), Barham, Valiant, Formidable.

      Force A Destroyers (14th flotilla) – Jervis (Captain D.14), Janus, Mohawk, Nubian.

      Force B Cruisers – Orion (Flag of Vice-Admiral Pridham-Wippell, Vice-Admiral, Light Forces), Ajax, Perth, Gloucester.

      Force B Destroyers (2nd flotilla) – Ilex (Captain D.2), Hasty, Hereward, Vendetta.

      Force C Destroyers (10th flotilla) – Stuart (Captain D.10), Greyhound, Griffin, Hotspur, Havock.

      Force D6 – Juno, Jaguar, Defender. Submarines Rover and Triumph.

      Orders for appropriate disposition of the cruisers and destroyers were issued on 26 March as follows:

      (a) Force B, consisting of 4 cruisers and 4 destroyers under Vice-Admiral, Light Forces, was to be S.W. of Gavdo Island, Crete, at daylight 28 March.

      (b) Force C, consisting of 5 destroyers (Stuart, Greyhound, Griffin, Hotspur, Havock) was to join the VALF at that time.

      (c) The T.S.R. squadrons (F.A.A.) in Crete and Cyrenaica were to be reinforced.

      (d) The R.A.F. in Greece was requested to do its utmost with reconnaissance and bombing aircraft in the Aegean and to the west of Crete on 28 March.

      (e) H.M. submarines Rover and Triumph were to patrol in the Aegean off Suda Bay and Milo respectively.

      (f) Force D, consisting of 3 destroyers (Juno, Jaguar and Defender) at the Piraeus, was to be at short notice.

      (g) The cruiser Carlisle was to proceed to Suda Bay, in Crete, to augment the A.A. defences there.

      (h) The Greek naval forces were warned to be at short notice. This disposition was adopted with the intention of countering a possible cruiser raid into the Aegean. “It was designed to give flexibility and allowed for a quick change of plan if more intelligence came to hand.”

      Of the Fleet Air Arm, 37 aircraft7 were available, viz.: A/c

      (1) HMS Formidable. 13 Fulmars (803 and 806 Sqdns.), 10 Albacores (826 and 829 Sqdns.) and 4 Swordfish. 27

      (2) Royal Naval Air Station, Maleme, Crete. 5 Swordfish (815 Sqdn.) 5

      (3) Catapult aircraft (700 Sqdn.). 2 Swordfish in Warspite; 2 Swordfish in Valiant; 1 Walrus in Gloucester 5

      The R.A.F., at the request of the C.-in-C., ordered the following aircraft to be held in readiness in Greece:

      At Menidil8 aerodrome 12 Blenheims, No. 84 Sqdn. 12 Blenheims, No. 113 Sqdn.

      At Paramythia9 aerodrome 6 Blenheims, No. 211 Sqdn.

      These were armed with 500 lb. and 250 lb. S.A.P. Bombs. In addition, 201 Group R.A.F. undertook reconnaissance of the area of operations with Sunderland flying boats working from Malta and Alexandria.

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