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that the FBI didn't do very well with the information it did have. Key signals were never “documented by the bureau or placed in any system from which they could be retrieved by agents investigating terrorist threats” (Seper, 2005, p. 1).

      Structural barriers between the FBI and the CIA were exacerbated by the enmity between the two agencies' patron saints, J. Edgar Hoover and “Wild Bill” Donovan. When Hoover first became FBI director in the 1920s, he reported to Donovan, who didn't trust him and tried unsuccessfully to get him fired. When World War II broke out, Hoover lobbied to get the FBI identified as the nation's worldwide intelligence agency. He fumed when President Franklin D. Roosevelt instead created a new agency and made Donovan its director. As often happens, cooperation between two units was chronically hampered by a rocky personal relationship between two top dogs who never liked one another.

      Politically, the relationship between the FBI and CIA was born in turf conflict because of Roosevelt's decision to give responsibility for foreign intelligence to Donovan instead of to Hoover. The friction persisted over the decades as both agencies vied for turf and funding from Congress and the White House.

      Symbolically, different histories and missions led to very distinct cultures. The FBI, which built its image with the dramatic capture or killing of notorious gang leaders, bank robbers, and foreign agents, liked to generate headlines by pouncing on suspects quickly and publicly. The CIA preferred to work in the shadows, believing that patience and secrecy were vital to its task of collecting intelligence and rooting out foreign spies.

      Senior U.S. officials have known for years that tension between the FBI and CIA damages U.S. security. But most initiatives to improve the relationship have been partial and ephemeral, falling well short of addressing the full range of issues. Ten years after 9/11, Graff (2012) concluded that, “Problems persist and will probably never be fully overcome.”

      Multi‐Frame Thinking

Frame
Structural Human Resource Political Symbolic
Metaphor for organization Factory or machine Family Jungle Carnival, temple, theater
Supporting disciplines Sociology, management science, economics Psychology Political science Anthropology, dramaturgy, institutional theory
Central concepts Roles, goals, strategies, policies, technology, environment Needs, skills, relationships Power, conflict, competition, politics Culture, myth, meaning, metaphor, ritual, ceremony, stories, heroes
Image of leadership Social architecture Empowerment Advocacy and political savvy Inspiration
Basic leadership challenge Attune structure to task, technology, environment Align organizational and human needs Develop agenda and power base Create faith, belief, beauty, meaning

      Lack of imagination—Langer (1989) calls it “mindlessness”—is a major cause of the shortfall between the reach and the grasp of so many organizations—the empty chasm between noble aspirations and disappointing results. The gap is painfully acute in a world where organizations dominate so much of our lives. Taleb (2007) depicts events like the Covid‐19 pandemic or the 9/11 attacks as “black swans”—novel events that are unexpected because we have never seen them before. If every swan we've observed is white, we expect the same in the future. But fateful, make‐or‐break events are more likely to fall outside previous experience and catch us flat‐footed, as was true of the 2020 pandemic. Imagination and mindfulness offer our best chance for being ready when a black swan sails into view, and multi‐frame thinking is a powerful stimulus to the broad, creative mind‐set imagination requires.

      Engineering and Art

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