LITMIR.BIZ

Preface

      I cannot remember precisely when it was. It may have been in 2001 or 2002, or it might have been in 2004 or 2005, after I had already started to work on the armed forces. However, the memory itself remains quite distinct. In my first years at Exeter University my office was directly opposite that of Barry Barnes, who held the professorial chair of the department. I was very lucky. Our proximity in the department was congenial and instructive for me. As an eminent sociologist, Barry was a very fine mentor and friend. I met Barry frequently, as a result, and we talked about many things, including sociology and social theory. In one of those conversations, as was common, he invited me into his room and, as we chatted, he showed me a small, yellow booklet, the reading list from an old course on ‘Social Order’ which he had taught at Edinburgh. On the cover of this booklet was the photocopy of an engraving of a late fifteenth- or early sixteenth-century siege, in which cannon had breached a wall, while soldiers attacked a gate as defenders poured burning oil upon them. Barry motioned excitedly at the image and cried: ‘Look at all the social stuff going on there.’ His point was, of course, that once humans were able to form social groups and cooperate with each other, there was almost no limit to their powers – for good or ill.

I would like to say that, from the moment I saw that image, I decided to take Barry up on his challenge and to write a sociology of urban warfare. Yet, that would not be true. I remembered the image and Barry’s exhortation as a general lesson about sociological analysis, not as an injunction to write a particular book. The idea of a book on urban warfare only came much later as I was finishing my book on command in 2018. At this point, British and American and, indeed, Western armed forces generally were beginning to think seriously about urban operations. Their concerns about the increasing likelihood of urban operations, as well as their intense experience of them over the previous decade or more, attracted my interest. I had, in fact, written about urban tactics in The Combat Soldier, published in 2013. However, Barry’s image of that early modern siege became increasingly significant to me as I researched urban warfare. So in the end, this book might be read as a circuitous answer to Barry’s challenge. It is a sociology of urban warfare; it is an attempt to show how the changing size and density of military forces and cities, as social groups, have reconfigured the urban battle in the twenty-first century. I do not mention the work of Émile Durkheim in this book anywhere. Yet, for anyone who knows his work, its influence on my thinking about urban warfare past, present and future should be obvious.

      As always, many friends and colleagues helped me with this book. I am grateful to them all. I offer special thanks to the following. I could not have conducted the military research I have without the support of the British Army and the Royal Marines, and especially 40 and 45 Commando Royal Marines. I am personally grateful to: Ben Baker, James Bashall, Jules Buczacki, Matt Cansdale, Alec Case, Innes Caton, James Cook, Kevin Copsey, Mike Cornwell, Gerry Ewart-Brookes, Adam Fraser-Hitchen, Paddy Ginn, Stephen Greenberg (USMC), Paul Hammett, Sigolene Hobson, Rupert Jones, James Martin, Nick McGinley, Charles ‘Jack’ Nicholson, Nick Perry, Jamie Powell, Dan Reeve, Clo O’Neill, Dom Rogers, Simon Rogers, Dickie Sernberg, Jolyon Simpson, Al Speedie, Zac Stenning, Andrew Stuart and Matt Taylor. Stephen Bowns, Peter Dixon, Robert Goodin and the Royal Anglian Regiment were extremely generous in their support for my research on Belfast in 1972 and the permission to use some images. I would also like to thank Ben Barry, Virginia Comolli and Antonio Sampaio at the International Institute for Strategic Studies; Marcus Geisser at the International Committee of the Red Cross; and James Denselow at Save the Children. At Warwick, Jon Coaffee and Stuart Elden provided very useful guidance, as did Randall Collins and Jeremy Black.

The US Army was no less helpful. At West Point, the Modern Warfare Institute has provided invaluable support, especially John Spencer (who has been particularly kind), John Amble, Liam Collins and Noel Siosson. I am indebted to Doug Winton not only for some fascinating conversations but also for allowing me pre-emptively to read his excellent doctoral dissertation on urban warfare, which I look forward to seeing in print and which I would recommend to everyone interested in the topic. I am very grateful also to Sean MacFarland, Joseph Martin, Joe O’Callaghan and Danilo Pamonag (Filipino Army) for their time and insights. At NATO, Jeff Biddiscombe, Frode Rieger, Simon Thomsett and Jan van der Werf were very helpful.

      At Polity, I am very grateful to John Thompson, who initially saw potential in the project; Louise Knight, who has been a brilliant editor; Inès Boxman for her assistance; and Sarah Dancy. Will Crosby helped check the references. As always, I am indebted to those who read and commented on the manuscript. Charles Heath-Saunders and Patrick Jackson at the MOD confirmed that the book did not breach operational or personal security and provided useful comments. The feedback from Christopher Dandeker, Chris Torchia and two anonymous reviewers at Polity was very helpful indeed. I am particularly grateful here to Patrick Owen, an excellent student from my first cohort at Warwick. Finally, as always, Patrick Bury provided perceptive and very pertinent guidance about how to improve the manuscript.