LITMIR.BIZ

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the mind only all that may be done by means of these physical organs without the use of the latter.

      With reference to their physical manifestations, but not as they are in themselves, the classes into which the Indriyas are divided may be described as the sensory and motor nervous systems. As the Indriyas are not the physical organs, such as ear, eye, and so forth, but faculties of the Jīva desiring to know and act by their aid, the Yogī claims to accomplish without the use of the latter all that is ordinarily done by their means. So a hypnotized subject can perceive things, even when no use of the special physical organs ordinarily necessary for the purpose is made.{215} The fact of there being a variety of actions does not necessarily involve the same number of Indriyas. An act of “going” done by means of the hand (as by a cripple) is to be regarded really as an operation of the Indriya of feet (Padendriya), even though the hand is the seat of the Indriya for handling.{216} By the instrumentality of these Indriyas things are perceived and action is taken with reference to them. The Indriyas are not, however, sufficient in themselves for this purpose. In the first place, unless attention co-operates there is no sensation (Ālochana) at all. To be “absent-minded” is not to know what is happening.{217} Attention must therefore co-operate with the senses before the latter can “give” the experiencer anything at all.{218} Nextly, at one and the same moment the experiencer is subject to receive a countless number of sensations which come to and press upon him from all sides. If any of these is to be brought into the field of consciousness, it must be selected to the exclusion of others. The process of experience is the selection of a special section from out of a general whole, and then being engaged on it, so as to make it one’s own, either as a particular object of thought or a particular field of operation.{219} Lastly, as Western psychology holds, the senses give not a completed whole, but a manifold—the manifold of sense. These “points of sensation” must be gathered together and made into a whole. These three functions of attention, selection, and synthesizing the discrete manifold of the senses, are those belonging to that aspect of the mental body, the internal agent (Antahkarana), called Manas.{220} Just as Manas is necessary to the senses (Indriya), the latter are necessary for Manas. For the latter is the seat of desire, and cannot exist by itself. It is the desire to perceive or act, and therefore exists in association with the Indriyas.

      Manas is thus the leading Indriya, of which the senses are powers. For without the aid and attention of Manas the other Indriyas are incapable of performing their respective offices; and as these Indriyas are those of perception and action, Manas, which co-operates with both, is said to partake of the character of both cognition and action.

      Manas, through association with the eye or other sense, becomes manifold, being particularized or differentiated by its co-operation with that particular instrument, which cannot fulfill its functions except in conjunction with Manas.

      Its function is said to be Sangkalpa-Vikalpa. That is, selection and rejection from the material provided by the Jnānendriya. When, after having been brought into contact with the sense objects, it selects the sensation which is to be presented to the other faculties of the mind, there is Sangkalpa. The activity of Manas, however, is itself neither intelligent result nor moving feelings of pleasure or pain. It has not an independent power to reveal itself to the experiencer. Before things can be so revealed and realized as objects of perception, they must be made subject to the operation of Ahangkāra and Buddhi, without whose intelligent light they would be dark forms unseen and unknown by the experiencer, and the efforts of Manas but blind gropings in the dark. Nor can the images built up by Manas affect of themselves the experiencer so as to move him in any way until and unless the experiencer identifies himself with them by Ahangkāra—that is, by making them his own in feeling and experience. Manas, being thus an experience of activity in the dark, unseen and unrevealed by the light of Buddhi, and not moving the experiencer until he identifies himself with it in feeling, is one in which the dark veiling quality (Tamasguna) of Shakti Prakriti is the most manifest.{221} This Guna also prevails in the Indriyas and the subtle objects of their operation (Tanmātra).

      Ahangkāra the “I-maker” is self-arrogation{222}—that is, the realization of oneself as the personal “I” or self-consciousness of worldly experience, in which the Jīva thinks of himself as a particular person who is in relation with the objects of his experience. It is the power of self-arrogation whereby all that constitutes man is welded into one Ego, and the percept or concept is referred to that particular thinking subject and becomes part of its experience. When, therefore, a sensation is perceived by Manas and determined by Buddhi, Ahangkāra says: “It is I who perceive it.”

      This is the “I” of phenomenal consciousness as distinguished from “this” the known. Buddhi functions with its support.{223} Buddhi considered with relation to the other faculties of experience is that aspect of the Antahkarana which determines (Adhyavasāyātmikā buddhih).{224} “A man is said to determine (Adhyavasyati) who, having perceived (Manas), and thought, ‘I am concerned in this matter’ (Ahangkāra), and thus having self-arrogated, comes to the determination, ‘This must be done by me’ (Kartavyam etat mayā).”{225} “Must be done” here does not refer to exterior action only, but to mental action (Mānasīkriyā) also, such as any determination by way of the forming of concepts and percepts (“It is so”) and resolutions (“It must be done”). Buddhi pervades all effects whatever other than itself. It is the principal Tattva because it pervades all the instruments (Indriya), is the receptacle of all the Sangskāras or Karmic tendencies, and is in Sāngkhya the seat of memory.{226} It is the thinking principle which forms concepts or general ideas acting through the instrumentality of Ahangkāra, Manas, and the Indriyas. In the operations of the senses Manas is the principal; in the operation of Manas Ahangkāra is the principal; and in the operation of Ahangkāra Buddhi is the principal. With the instrumentality of all of these Buddhi acts, modifications taking place in Buddhi through the instrumentality of the sense functions.{227} It is Buddhi which is the basis of all cognition, sensation, and resolves, and makes over objects to Purusha—that is, consciousness. And so it is said that Buddhi, whose characteristic is determination, is the charioteer; Manas, whose characteristic is Sangkalpavikalpa, is the reins; and the Senses are the horses. Jīva is the Enjoyer (Bhoktā)—that is, Ātmā conjoined with body, senses, Manas, and Buddhi.{228} In Buddhi Sattvaguna predominates; in Ahangkāra, Rajas; in Manas and the Indriyas and their objects, Tamas.

      Chitta{229} in its special sense is that faculty (Vritti) by which the mind first recalls to memory (Smaranam) that of which there has been previously Anubhava or Pratyaksha Jnāna—that is, immediate cognition. This Smaranam exists only to the extent of actual Anubhava. For remembrance is the equivalent of, and neither more than less than, what has been previously known;{230} remembrance being the calling up of that. Chinta, again, is that faculty whereby the current of thought dwells, thinks, and contemplates upon (Chinta){231} the subject so recalled by Smaranam, and previously known and determined by Buddhi. For such meditation (Dhyāna) is done through the recall and fixing the mind upon past percepts and concepts. According to Vedānta, Buddhi determines but once only, and the further recall and thought upon the mental object so determined is the faculty of the separate mental category called Chitta. Sāngkhya, on the principle of economy of categories, regards Smaranam and Chintā to be functions of Buddhi.{232} In the works here translated and elsewhere Chitta is, however, currently used as a general term for the working mind—that is, as a synonym for the Antahkarana.{233}

      To sum up the functions of the subtle body: the sense-objects (Bhūta, derived from Tanmātra) affect the senses (Indriya) and are perceived by Manas, are referred to the self by Ahangkāra, and are determined by Buddhi. The latter in its turn is illumined by the light of consciousness (Chit), which is the Purusha; all the Principles (Tattva) up to and including Buddhi being modifications of apparently unconscious Prakriti. Thus all the Tattvas work for the enjoyment of the Self, or Purusha. They are not to be regarded as things existing independently by themselves, but as endowments of the Spirit (Ātmā). They do not work arbitrarily as they will, but represent an organized co-operative effort in the service of the Enjoyer, the Experiencer, or Purusha.

      The subtle body is thus composed of what are called the “17,” viz., Buddhi (in which Ahangkāra is included), Manas, the ten senses (Indriya), and the five Tanmātra. No special mention is made of Prāna by the Sāngkhya, by which it is regarded as a modification of the Antahkarana,

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