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investor continues to learn and markets change. The core investment tenets we are discussing may not change, but any completely static process is not growing and evolving. We will discuss where to draw the line between a process that can evolve and become better over time, as opposed to one that is ever-changing and has no foundation.

      My conviction in the core investment tenets described not only comes from 20 years of portfolio management experience but also from the opportunity to watch and interact with some of the world's best managers. The investment business is somewhat unusual in that understanding which decision was an error, even in hindsight, is not always readily apparent. It is possible to make the right decision and have a poor result. It is, also, possible to make the wrong decision and be handsomely paid. Some might not call being handsomely paid a wrong decision, but it may be a decision that nine times out of ten will cost you money; you just happened to be lucky in the timing of the investment.

       Which experiences are beneficial lessons and which are red herrings?

      The conclusions take time to become clear. Major periods of market stress are not very frequent, so the dataset of events to learn from is not large. For this reason, I am very appreciative of having learned not just from my own mistakes but also from watching and talking to the hundreds of global managers that DUMAC has partnered with in the 2010s. My dataset of decisions to analyze and consider has been 100 times what it would have been if I were to have solely managed my own fund and been confined to my experiences.

      The next two chapters delve into more detail on the current market environment and the two forces challenging investment decisions today: central bank intervention and technology-driven disruption.

       Unprecedented global central bank intervention

       Fundamental investing overwhelmed by central bank intervention

       Low rates and the US consumer

      Global central bank policy after the 2008 financial crisis and the 2011 euro crisis has been analyzed in hundreds of books and by brilliant economists. The focus here is not on whether it was the right thing to do or could have been done better but on the effect quantitative easing and low rates has had on companies and investment managers' ability to outperform the market.

Graph depicts the global central bank assets for US Fed, Bank of Japan, and European Central Bank from the year two thousand and two to two thousand and nineteen.

      Europe and Japan have not even attempted to slow levels of monetary support. Sovereign rates in these countries have been pushed into negative territory through the magnitude of central bank intervention, a feat that most investors and academics never thought could happen. In November 2019, an investor expected to pay the German government 0.35% and the Japanese government 0.15% to lend the government money for ten years. The ECB holds close to 20% of the sovereign debt of EU countries and has been buying as much as 90% of new issuance in certain months. Paying to lend a country money (buying sovereign bonds) or anyone for that matter does not make economic sense and blows up traditional quantitative models and risk analyses; yet is becoming a normal occurrence in developed world sovereign markets.

      The Bank of Japan holds over 50% of all Japan sovereign debt outstanding and has led the quantitative easing experiment by also buying corporate bonds and equity ETFs. The BoJ began buying equity ETFs in 2010 to support the country's equity markets after the financial crisis. It continues to support the equity markets ten years later. In the years 2017, 2018, and 2019 the Japanese central bank bought an average of $50 billion of Japanese equity ETFs each year in an attempt to support the country's equity markets. In 2018, the balance sheet of the BoJ surpassed the country's GDP. The BoJ holds over $5 trillion in Japanese financial assets. The buying is not only unprecedented but also not sustainable.

      History is inflationary; governments promise more than they can provide and they never want voters' assets to be worth less than before.

       —Will Durant, historian

      Unfortunately, developed economies are not growing at historic rates, if at all. This is another key driver that keeps central banks from raising rates. Neither Europe nor Japan is showing enough growth to even consider lowering support. Eurozone GDP growth has not hit 2.5% since before 2010 and future expectations are anemic at 1% to 2%. Japan has been even worse despite larger levels of support from the Bank of Japan. Growth rates in the developed world as a whole have been below 2% on average since 2010 and are forecasted to stay at these historically low levels.

      So a lack of growth and inflation despite historically high levels of asset buying and low rates keeps the central banks from raising rates. Interest rates have remained below 2% globally with Europe and Japan rates below zero. Any time investors

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