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and the effect of the Japanese conquest of the Dutch forces, and of the Japanese occupation itself. Tan Malaka wrote: “The interpretation we place on our August revolution and on every step in our struggle is, then, very important since it is on that basis that we must develop the strategy and tactics for the defense of our revolution” (Volume III, p. 68).

      Sukarno himself is the subject of chapter 7 “because it has a strong connection with the question of the Republic of Indonesia’s leadership in this revolutionary period.” This chapter makes trenchant criticism of Sukarno’s political role in cooperating with the Japanese, in making concessions to the Dutch in both the Linggajati and Renville agreements, and in curbing the militancy of the struggle for independence. Chapter 8 is in large part a dramatization of the events in the days leading up to 17 August.

      The proclamation of 17 August was not what Sukarno and Hatta wanted; on the contrary, it took place against their wishes. A proclamation that had the full support of Sukarno and Hatta would have straight away been branded by the Allies as a Japanese proclamation. Many people are going to feel offended by this statement, but history is not a dream, a hope, or a fairy tale to please either the reader or those in power; it consists of real facts.

      It appears that attempts have already been made to whitewash the history of the proclamation. It is to balance such attempts, to defend truth, and to pass on to our descendants its true history that I am writing this explanation of the events, based on what I saw and heard. (Volume III, p. 85)

      Tan Malaka’s explanation and dramatization does indeed place the role of Sukarno and Hatta as “proclamators,” with chief responsibility for the proclamation, in a different perspective than the version of events given at the time, the version which still persists in official histories. In this, Tan Malaka’s account accords with those from the side of the pemuda and their supporters, such as Sidik Kertapati, Subardjo, Adam Malik, and Nasution. On the other hand, Hatta and Sukarno maintained that the proclamation was actually delayed by the actions of the pemuda, although neither denied that it would otherwise have been made at the session of the Committee for the Preparation of Independence of Indonesia established by the Japanese occupation forces, and therefore would have had, as Tan Malaka asserted, a substantially different impact and content.

      The “Testament” Affair. The surat wasiat or surat warisan (testament) affair has been one of the principal grounds for the development of a negative image of Tan Malaka as a manipulator and falsifier. Tan Malaka’s interpretation is given in Volume III, chapter 7. He maintains that the initiative of handing over the leadership of the revolution to him, should Sukarno and Hatta be immobilized (for instance in an occupation of Jakarta), came from Sukarno himself, at their first meeting in early September 1945. Tan Malaka says that, at Hatta’s urging, three others were added to the list to inherit the leadership (Sjahrir, Iwa Kusumasumantri, and Wongsonegoro), and Hatta countersigned the document, which was given to Tan Malaka before he left Jakarta on 1 October 1945.

      Opponents of Tan Malaka have suggested that he substituted a false text, deleting the other three names; that he used this text to build political capital even though Sukarno and Hatta were not immobilized; and that Subardjo did not give copies to the other three inheritors.¹⁴ No evidence has been provided to demonstrate the truth of such charges, and the existence of the testament has been verified by both Sukarno and Hatta. It certainly was not widely publicized at the time, and allegations of Tan Malaka’s misconduct in this “affair” were allowed to circulate when he was under detention in 1946-1948.

      Perjuangan versus Diplomasi. Tan Malaka introduces chapter 10 as follows:

      I based this conclusion on the following considerations:

      1. the conflict between the desires and actions of the head of state and those of people and pemuda everywhere;

      2. the conflict and hostility among the parties (e.g., Islamic versus socialist in Pekalongan and Priangan);

      3. the hostility among the various militias as shown in Surabaya (shooting from behind);

      4. the attitude and actions of the British in acknowledging Dutch sovereignty over Indonesia, and imposing that sovereignty by force of arms on the Indonesian people, who have proclaimed their independence; . . . (Volume III, p. 109)

      The Battle of Surabaya was the final determinant in his assessment of the current course of the revolution, with Sukarno and Sjahrir in the leadership, and his conviction that that course had to change if 100 percent independence was to be achieved. Over the next five chapters he provides documentary evidence on the program of the Persatuan Perjuangan, its adoption and modification, and point-by-point refutation of the government’s program adopted to counter the PP program. Chapter 10 describes in great detail the cabinet of March 1946 in which Sjahrir regained the upper hand. It describes this period as one that “drew the line between the initial and secondary phases of the Indonesian revolution, between the phase of mass action and the phase of diplomacy” (Volume III, p. 132).

      Chapter 15 is most unusual. It is a profit-and-loss political and economic analysis of the Linggajati and Renville agreements in algebraic terms. Couched in Tan Malaka’s caustic style, this fifty-page chapter makes fascinating reading as he dissects and attacks the treaties article by article. To my knowledge, it is the most comprehensive analysis of the implications for Indonesian independence of these treaties. Harsh though it is, this criticism of Tan Malaka’s received subsequent endorsement from Sukarno, who wrote that “Linggajati was a shower of ice water on the fire of revolution.”¹⁵

      The 3 July Affair. Like the Testament Affair, the 3 July Affair (also known as the “coup d’etat of Tan Malaka”), has been used by his opponents to show Tan Malaka’s megalomania and readiness to use extralegal methods. In the concluding chapters of his autobiography Tan Malaka documents the arrest of himself and others on 17 March 1946, and his own experiences in various jails during the ensuing two years, up to the conclusion of the book in March 1948. The government’s “Official Statement” on the 3 July Affair is reproduced, together with his own refutation of the allegations made in that document. Tan Malaka maintains that he was not involved in either the kidnapping of Sjahrir, nor the show of strength at the palace on 3 July. Further, he asserts that his philosophy of mass action excluded such an approach to political change. Certainly, despite every effort over a period of two and a half years, the government was unable to lay charges against him. The introduction to Volume III was written in October 1948, after Tan Malaka’s release from jail and after the Madiun Affair (both of which took place in September). It contains the following bitter comment on the affair, likening the republican government’s actions to those of the colonial and imperialist powers.

      My experiences over more than a quarter of a century in prisons in many parts of the world have never once concluded with a satisfactory feeling of justice achieved. In March 1922 the “East Indies” judiciary did not “permit” me to face “Gerecht, Recht en Rechtvaardigheid” (Judiciary, Jurisdiction, and Justice) Dutch style. In Manila at the beginning of August 1927 the United States, which idolizes “democracy and justice,” was not even willing to permit me to come face to face with its legal experts in its court of justice, as I had been promised when arrested. England, which brags about being “democratic” and praises to the skies its “British justice,” preferred to detain and isolate me in its Hong Kong prison for several months at the end of 1932. Even our republic, supposedly a nation of law, which claims to have had cause for our arrest in Madiun, had to think for two and a half years about constructing a charge against us. When Sukarni and I were freed on 16 September 1948 from the prison at Magelang, this charge still had not been formulated and presented to us. (Volume III, p. 9)

      Besides being one of the few contemporary primary sources on the revolution, From Jail to Jail is of particular importance because Tan Malaka was the first “loser”; the principal advocate of the perjuangan course of action that lost out to diplomasi. It is, ipso facto, an analysis that runs counter to official histories and memoirs of those whose policies carried the day.

      Tan Malaka makes no bones of the fact that this presentation of his life story is made to serve particular ends. He does not purport to be writing an unbiased and objective history

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