LITMIR.BIZ

Скачать книгу

ties to al-Qaeda and others pledging allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State. In late 2015, al-Mourabitoun’s al-Qaeda faction affiliated with AQIM. The Macina Liberation Front, which aspires to reinstate the nineteenth-century Macina Empire in modern Mali, originated among Fulanis in central Mali in 2015. Although it was led by a fundamentalist cleric and collaborated with AQIM, MUJWA, and Ansar Dine, the organization presented itself as a liberation movement rather than a jihadist organization. In March 2017, Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, and the Macina Liberation Front merged to form Jama’at Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin (Group for the Support of Islam and Muslims).

      Nigeria: Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad (People Committed to the Propagation of the Prophet’s Teachings and Jihad), established in 2002, is commonly known as Boko Haram (Western Education Is Forbidden). In 2014, the UN Security Council listed the organization as an associate of AQIM. However, in 2015 Boko Haram pledged allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State and began to refer to itself as the Islamic State in West Africa Province. Jama’atu Ansarul Muslimina Fi Biladis-Sudan (Vanguards for the Protection of Muslims in Black Africa), commonly known as Ansaru, splintered from Boko Haram in 2012. In 2014, the UN Security Council listed Ansaru as an associate of AQIM.

      Somalia: Al-Shabaab (The Youth), inspired by Somali veterans of the Soviet-Afghan War, originated as a youth militia linked to the Islamic Courts Union. It established ties to al-Qaeda following a US-backed Ethiopian invasion in 2006 and became an official branch of al-Qaeda in 2012. Its focus was primarily local. However, it also attacked Ethiopia and countries that contributed to an AU peacekeeping mission in Somalia.

      Tunisia: Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia, established in 2011, had strong links to al-Qaeda. The Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade, which drew much of its membership from Ansar al-Shari’a, described itself as an AQIM battalion. In 2014 some members of both groups switched their allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State.

      The Islamic State

      The Islamic State is also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL).²¹ In contrast to local Salafi jihadist groups that focus on establishing or purifying a Muslim state in a single country, the Islamic State aims to establish a caliphate that would unite Muslims worldwide in one political entity—a phenomenon last achieved in the eighth century. The origins of the modern Islamic State can be traced to the US-led military intervention in Iraq in 2003, which precipitated the Second Gulf War (2003–11). The invasion and occupation sparked a Sunni insurgency led by the Jordanian-Palestinian militant Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who transformed his organization, Jama’at al-Tawhid wa’al-Jihad (Organization of Monotheism and Jihad), into al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI), which targeted US military and international coalition forces as well as local collaborators. After Zarqawi was killed in a US airstrike in 2006, his successors began to refer to the al-Qaeda branch and associated organizations as the Islamic State in Iraq. When civil war broke out in Syria in 2011, the Islamic State expanded its reach into that country, and by 2013 it was calling itself the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Under the leadership of Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who honed his ideas and mobilizing skills in an US internment camp, the Islamic State recruited followers from among the Sunni minority that had been favored under Saddam Hussein but was marginalized politically after his ouster by US and coalition forces. In February 2014, al-Qaeda severed its ties to the Islamic State, criticizing its persistent aggression against Jabhat al-Nusra, al-Qaeda’s Syrian affiliate, as well as its brutal treatment and indiscriminate killing of Muslim civilians, particularly Shi’as.²² Noted for its ruthless methods, the Islamic State attracted international jihadis who felt that al-Qaeda was too moderate. However, both Muslims and non-Muslims widely condemned the organization for its harsh practices and attacks on civilians.

      A number of African entities have pledged allegiance to the Islamic State leader. Like those that developed links to al-Qaeda, these groups emerged from local conditions and only later established ties to the international jihadist organization.

       AFRICAN ORGANIZATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH THE ISLAMIC STATE

      Algeria: Jund al-Khilafah (Soldiers of the Caliphate) in Algeria split from AQIM in 2014 and pledged allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State.

      Egypt: Ansar Beit al-Maqdis, established in 2011, was influenced by al-Qaeda ideology but was not a formal affiliate. The organization fractured in 2014 when many Nile Valley members retained links to al-Qaeda, while others in Sinai pledged allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State and named their faction Wilayat Sinai (Province of Sinai) or Islamic State–Sinai Province.

      Libya: A brigade of fighters from eastern Libya, who had fought on behalf of the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria, returned home in 2014 and reconstituted themselves as the Islamic Youth Shura Council in Derna. They declared eastern Libya to be a province of the Islamic State, which they called Cyrenaica Province. Two other Islamic State provinces were established in Libya in 2015: Tripolitania Province in the west and Fezzan Province in the south. In early 2015, Ansar al-Shari’a in Sirte split into two factions, with some members retaining ties to al-Qaeda and others pledging allegiance to the leader of the Islamic State.

      Mali: Although most Malian jihadist organizations retained their ties to al-Qaeda, some al-Mourabitoun members left the organization in 2015 to form the Islamic State in Mali, subsequently renamed the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (sometimes translated as the Islamic State in the Sahel).

      Nigeria: Jama’atu Ahlis-Sunna Lidda’awati Wal-Jihad, commonly known as Boko Haram, switched its allegiance from AQIM to the Islamic State in 2015 and adopted the name Islamic State in West Africa Province.

      Somalia: Abnaa ul-Calipha (Islamic State in Somalia), based in Puntland, broke from al-Qaeda-linked al-Shabaab in 2015. Another al-Shabaab splinter, Islamic State in Somalia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda (also known as Jahba East Africa or the East African Front) emerged in early 2016.

      Tunisia: Following a government crackdown, some remnants of Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia, previously associated with al-Qaeda, pledged allegiance to the Islamic State leader in 2014. Some members of the AQIM-linked Okba Ibn Nafaa Brigade also switched allegiances in 2014 and established a new organization, Jund al-Khilafah in Tunisia, which aligned with the Islamic State. The Tunisian jihadist group Mujahidin of Kairouan pledged allegiance to the Islamic State leader in 2015.

       Conclusion

      Sustaining a pattern established during decolonization and the Cold War, foreign governments and other entities intervened in African affairs in the decades that followed. Although individual states continued to intercede unilaterally, multilateral intervention by organized groups of states and by nonstate actors became more frequent than previously. In some cases, the presence of nonstate actors associated with international terrorist networks provoked intervention by foreign states or institutions. In other cases, intrusion by foreign entities stimulated local insurgencies that in turn attracted international terrorist support. State-based actors justified their involvement as a response to instability, an effort to protect civilian lives, and a necessity for advancing the war on terror. However, they also promoted their own more parochial interests. Conflicting agendas often weakened multilateral efforts, and the priorities of the most powerful countries generally took precedence. While African political and military leaders participated in war-making and peace-building processes, African civil society representatives remained in the background. These deficiencies undermined the prospects for a lasting peace, as the following case studies demonstrate.

      Chapter 4, which focuses on Somalia, is the first of two chapters that explore post–Cold War intervention in East Africa. When foreign powers withdrew their support for the Somali government after the Cold War, insurgent forces overthrew the authoritarian regime. Concerned about the humanitarian crisis inside the country as well as the potential for regional destabilization, multilateral organizations, extracontinental

Скачать книгу