The Promise of Human Rights - Jamie Mayerfeld Pennsylvania Studies in Human Rights

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American exceptionalism (treaty loopholes, nonincorporation and nonjusticiability of treaties, demotion of customary international law, and nonratification of the International Criminal Court treaty) created a legal environment more conducive to the authorization of torture.

      Chapter 6 responds to complaints that international human rights law, by limiting policies that states might otherwise adopt, is antidemocratic. I add new arguments to those made in Chapter 2 for the democratic legitimacy of international human right law. Because democracy is not group license, because it can never include permission to violate human rights, international human rights law bars only those policies that governments should not consider anyway. Some will object that this reasoning overlooks cross-national disagreement about the meaning of human rights. I do not deny such disagreement, but argue that international human rights law offers a constructive response to disagreement about human rights.

      In the conclusion I consider how international human rights law stands in relation to the norm of national sovereignty. I show that international human rights law is compatible with a moderate conception of sovereignty. Only an expansive conception of sovereignty is rejected by international human rights law, but since such a conception represents a false political ideal, this is no cause for regret.

       Human Rights and Shared Governance

      I argue not only for a strong international human rights regime but also for the need to give it a decentralized character. States must preserve enough authority and independence to monitor each other’s human rights policies and to safeguard the integrity of the system overall.58 What is needed is a model of shared governance built on the cooperation of international institutions, democratic states, and civil society.

      If we look beyond human rights (or civil and political rights, which are the primary focus of my book), there are urgent reasons to strengthen global (not just transnational) governance. Climate change, nuclear proliferation, and world poverty are global crises requiring global solutions.59 (Other global crises could be added to this list.) The world cannot afford to let individual states block just and necessary solutions to these crises, and these solutions may require a greater degree of centralization than is necessary and appropriate for international monitoring of human rights. (That is to say, the proper degree of centralization may vary according to policy issue.) These matters, however, lie outside the scope of my book.

      By means of international human rights institutions, states can remind one another of their domestic and international human rights pledges, and correct one another’s errors, blind spots, and biases. The “War on Terror” has reminded us of the fragility of human rights, even in constitutional democracies. Human rights are too important to be left to the sole care of one’s government. If all human beings are “endowed with certain unalienable rights” and governments exist “to secure these rights,” then it is incumbent on governments to provide both internal and external safeguards. Transnational institutions form part of the necessary architecture of human rights.

       Chapter 1

      Human Rights

      Human rights are enshrined in international law and the domestic law of most countries. A vast network of local and transnational organizations is dedicated to their defense. All over the world, people believe in and struggle for human rights.

      Many scholars have written about the meaning and justification of human rights. Heated debate on particular controversies masks broad areas of agreement. Appropriating the wisdom of past and present thinkers, I offer a brief account that is neither new nor distinctive but that I hope is persuasive. Toward the end of this chapter and in the rest of the book, it will help us draw out the institutional implications of human rights.

      I claim that human rights are based on a set of principles that can be shared by people holding diverse philosophical and religious views. Highlighting this widely sharable conception of human rights is the main purpose of the chapter. In addition, I argue, albeit briefly, that human rights can withstand the cultural relativist critique, that they do not conflict with one another, that they include certain socioeconomic rights, that they entail both institutional and interpersonal duties, that they are mutually supportive, and (anticipating the larger argument of the book) that they require international protections. Though some of these claims may court controversy, they lead us, I believe, to a sounder understanding of human rights.

      As the term implies, human rights are rights that we have because we are human. They are not conditional on nationality, race, religion, sex, or other group memberships. The guiding thought is that each person is a moral center whose perspective matters and whose interests must be accorded significant weight and respect. Think of the child who (as you are reading this sentence) was most recently born into the world. What kind of life may this child expect? What opportunities will he or she enjoy, and what harms and dangers will he or she endure? Will he or she have enough to eat, enjoy adequate health care, receive an education, be protected from violence and persecution, and be permitted to chart the direction of his or her life? Such questions remind us of the person’s vulnerability to the individual and collective choices of other people. They focus our attention on the minimal entitlements to which we give the name human rights.

      Human rights are distinct from legal rights.1 In the American South before the Civil War, the law gave whites the right to own slaves and denied slaves the right to be free. The first was a legal right that was not a human right; the second was a human right that was not a legal right. At most, the law recognizes human rights; it does not create them.2 The law is nonetheless important to human rights for the following reasons: (1) many human rights require legal backing; (2) some of those legal protections are themselves human rights; (3) the law can transmit the values of human rights; (4) the law provides a forum where we can negotiate provisional (though fallible) agreement about human rights; (5) a well-designed legal system, by structuring thoughtful deliberation, can improve our understanding of human rights.3

      Which rights are human rights? I make the working assumption that the 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights moves us toward the right answer. The Declaration remains the primary inspiration and reference for the contemporary human rights movement. If the Declaration is far off base, then the contemporary human rights movement is far off base. However, I do not believe the Declaration is far off base. Its values and commitments are those we should look for in a conception of human rights.

      The Declaration earns much of its prestige from the circumstances of its creation. It was drafted with the tragedies of the 1930s and 1940s fresh in people’s minds, and emerged from a painstaking and protracted deliberation that drew on the participation of individuals and organizations from around the world. When put to a vote, it was approved without dissent by the General Assembly of the United Nations. Its content has been admired ever since, and its provisions incorporated into numerous national constitutions and international treaties.

      It is a human creation, and therefore unlikely to be perfect. There are few (if any) who on reflection would agree with all its provisions. The real issue is its overall adequacy as a conception of human rights. You may think that it approximates the best overall conception. But even if you prefer a different conception, you may still think that it captures an important part of the truth. Those, for example, who question the six articles (of a total of thirty) that assert the existence of social and economic rights may still find inspiration and enlightenment in the remaining twenty-four, which deal with rights to physical integrity, legal due process, personal liberty, and political participation.4 (Below I defend the inclusion of social and economic rights, but most of my book is concerned with the protection of civil and political rights.)

      Of course, the Declaration does not stand alone. It draws on earlier rights charters and philosophical explorations of rights. Subsequent legal instruments appropriate but also supplement and adjust the Declaration, and it has generated extensive critical commentary. One may regard it as an important moment in a continuing deliberation on human rights.

       Content

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