Creating a Common Polity - Emily Mackil Hellenistic Culture and Society

Скачать книгу

palpable.152 Despite this difficulty, it is certain that the rupture between the Aitolians and Achaians was complete by 222/1 and led within a year to the conflict known as the Social War. Despite its brevity, the ramifications of the war endured: the Aitolians and Achaians never again regarded each other with anything but distrust or hostility; the fabric of the Achaian koinon was very nearly torn asunder, and the war was largely responsible for creating the conditions in Greece that paved the way for Roman intervention only a few years later.

      Doson was succeeded by Philip V the son of Demetrios II, in the summer of 221.153 The new king was young but showed himself—at least initially—to be a ruler of sound judgment and superb military skill. Along with the Macedonian throne he inherited the role of hēgemōn of the Hellenic Alliance and was immediately drawn into the maelstrom of Peloponnesian politics. The Aitolians and their Elian allies were plundering Achaian territories from Triphylian Phigaleia, which had remained friendly to the Aitolians since about 240.154 Polybios’s claim that these actions were prompted by Aitolian isolation during the 220s is probably overstated, as we have seen; that they regarded the accession of the young Philip as an opportunity to pursue a more aggressive agenda may well be true.155 The Aitolians were probably motivated by a desire to protect their territory from Macedonian and allied depredations, a very real threat since the Akarnanians and Epeirotes were members of the Hellenic Alliance; it must have become more urgent when the Illyrian Demetrios of Pharos took refuge with Philip after violating his agreement with the Romans in 220.156 But there is no denying the evident zeal of individual Aitolians for plundering Achaian territory or the willingness of the Aitolian koinon to be led in its public policy by these private economic demands.157

      The Aitolians’ aggressive policy in the Peloponnese was, according to Polybios, led by two politicians from Trichoneion, Dorimachos and Skopas. Dorimachos, “sent to Phigaleia on behalf of the koinon, on the pretext of guarding the territory and city, but in reality to spy on Peloponnesian affairs,” found himself pressured by a group of Aitolian pirates who were looking for an excuse to plunder the area.158 He granted them permission, and the raids extended even to the private houses of the Messenians, friends and allies of Aitolia. Dorimachos was upbraided by the Messenians and was reportedly so stung by a personal insult he received there that he went back to Aitolia and engineered a declaration of war against the Messenians, on the grounds that they were constantly threatening to ally themselves with the Achaians and Macedonians.159 But the aim was clearly to declare war on the entire Hellenic Alliance, for their first acts of official hostility, late in 221, were to seize a Macedonian ship off the coast of Kythera, to plunder the coast of Epeiros with the help of the Kephallenian fleet, and to make an attempt on Akarnanian Thyrrheion.160 In the Peloponnese, they moved against hard-won allied strongholds, including a fortification in the territory of Megalopolis and the garrison at Arkadian Orchomenos.161 In the early spring of 220 the Aitolians, having mustered a full military levy, crossed the Gulf of Corinth and invaded western Achaia via Elis, plundering the territories of Patrai, Pharai, and Tritaia before moving on to Messenia, the alleged casus belli.162 These westernmost of the old Achaian poleis bore the brunt of the invasion, as they did repeatedly throughout the Social War.

      At a regular meeting of the Achaian assembly, after hearing complaints from the Patraians, Pharaians, and Messenians, the koinon voted to muster a full military levy, which went to the assistance of the Messenians but was completely routed by the Aitolians at Kaphyai, northwest of the garrison at Orchomenos.163 Further outrages against the allies began to mount, and in summer 220 war was declared against the Aitolians.164 Polybios, certainly using the official decree of the alliance as his source, reports that it included the following declaration of intentions (Polyb. 4.25.6–7):

      that they would restore for the allies any territory or city held by the Aitolians since the death of Demetrios, the father of Philip; likewise concerning those who had been compelled by circumstances to join the sympoliteia of the Aitolians against their will, that they would restore all these to their ancestral constitutions [patria politeumata], and possessing their own territories and cities, these should be ungarrisoned, free from tribute, and independent, enjoying their ancestral constitutions and laws [politeiais kai nomois . . . tois patriois].

      The decree has two distinct parts. The first clause refers explicitly and exclusively to fellow members of the alliance and can only apply to territories to which they believed they had a claim but that were seized by the Aitolians after 229. The only logical candidates are Ambrakia, formerly a part of Epeiros but which may, as we saw above, have joined the Aitolians when the Molossian dynasty crumbled around 230, and which was certainly in Aitolian hands in 219; and perhaps Phthiotic Achaia, in Thessaly, which they took upon the news of Doson’s accession, and which he may never have managed to regain.165 But the second clause appears to have a much broader rubric, applying to all those who had joined the Aitolian koinon unwillingly, regardless of the date at which they did so. Akarnania certainly applies here, as probably does western Phokis, both of which in their partitioned state belonged to the alliance. Most important, however, it left open the possibility of allied action on behalf of any member of the Aitolian koinon that now professed its participation to have been involuntary.

      During the next three years, there were hostilities in each of these regions, but the Peloponnese remained the heart of the conflict. Here the Achaians were pressed from the northwest, by Aitolians invading from Elis and the Corinthian Gulf coast, and from the south by the Spartans, who were now fully committed to an alliance with the Aitolians.166 In the spring of 219 the Spartans made an attack on southeastern Argos and then seized a fortification in the territory of Megalopolis, while the Aitolians invaded western Achaia, devastating the territories of Dyme, Pharai, and Tritaia, defeating a local force that marched out to oppose them, and seizing fortifications in the territories of Dyme and Telphousa.167

      The Achaians’ principal ally, Philip, was during this same period prosecuting the war in the northwest, returning towns in Epeiros and Akarnania that had been seized by the Aitolians, in accordance with the terms of the declaration of war, and then moved against Aitolia itself, ravaging the territories of Stratos and Kalydon and seizing Oiniadai.168 In the winter of 219/8 he turned his attention to the Peloponnese, making small gains in northwestern Arkadia and conquering Triphylia, which had long been in the control of Elis.169 The Macedonian army also managed to regain Teichos Dymaion.170 Even Philip, however, was running short of both money and grain for his forces by the spring of 218, and the Achaians made a financial arrangement with Philip whereby the Achaians would pay salaries and provide grain for the Macedonian army during the entire period of campaigning in the Peloponnese.171 The funding for the Macedonian army in accordance with this agreement came from taxes paid by the members of the Achaian koinon and from war booty; by late in the year, the burden on member poleis had become very heavy and led, temporarily, to significant military weakness.172

      The year 218 was one of expensive, highly destructive, and ultimately ineffectual warfare. Western Achaia was repeatedly devastated; Messenia remained in the hands of the recalcitrant Spartans; and two venerable sanctuaries—that of Zeus at Dion, in Macedonia, and that of Apollo at Thermon, in Aitolia—were brutally sacked.173 The result was widespread disaffection: the members of the Achaian koinon were disinclined to pay their eisphora, seeing no clear results from the contributions they had already made, and the soldiers, whose pay was in arrears, were not eager to serve.174 Under these conditions the elder Aratos was again elected stratēgos for the year 217/6 and immediately deployed his political clout to address the problem. He persuaded the Achaians to pass a decree (dogma) committing themselves to the maintenance of a specific military force: of mercenaries, eighty-five hundred infantry and five hundred cavalry; of citizens, three thousand infantry and three hundred cavalry; and a total of six ships with their crews, three to be stationed off the Argolid and three off the coast of Patrai and Dyme.175 The resolution suggests that the problem was one of will rather than a true shortage of resources. The challenge of meeting the financial obligation implicit in such a troop commitment was not tested for long. In the late spring and summer of 217 the Achaians enjoyed a string of victories that yielded enough booty to obviate the need for another eisphora levy and at the same time brought the Aitolians to their

Скачать книгу