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a Russian client state, dependent on Moscow for its economy, national security, and political stability. Oil- and gas-rich Azerbaijan is more wary of Putin, due in part to its simmering conflict with Armenia and close ties with Iran, but Moscow is pushing hard for Azerbaijan to join the Eurasian Economic Union as well.²⁹ Arastun Orujlu, head of the Center for East-West Studies, warns that “Azerbaijan is going to be next after Ukraine,”³⁰ while ordinary Azeris believe that “if the West doesn’t do anything to stop Russia, they will be emboldened to take back Azerbaijan by force as they did a hundred years ago.”³¹ Putin already has a toehold here, as Russian-backed Armenian forces already control the Nagorno-Karabakh region in southeastern Azerbaijan. This flashpoint, dormant since the early nineties, could be reignited by Putin, just as Crimea was.

      Georgia has put up more of a fight than its Armenian or Azeri neighbors. In 2007, newly elected Georgian president Mikheil Saakashvili was openly defiant of Putin and vowed to plot a new course forward out of Georgia’s Soviet past, flirting with NATO and even EU membership. In 2008, Putin invaded, seized, and eventually annexed Abkhazia and South Ossetia, two ethnically (and religiously) distinct regions in Georgia. (Abkhazians are Sunni Muslim, and Ossetians are religiously mixed but mostly Christian, like other Georgians.) Even after the war ended, Putin continued a propaganda and economic campaign against Georgia, and against Saakashvili personally. Today, less than a decade after Moscow invaded Georgia, the country is moving closer to Russia and away from the West.³² Saakashvili has been replaced by politicians friendlier to Russia.

      Putin has been unambiguous about what the future in the Caucasus holds: “As for the Trans-Caucasus region, Russia will never leave this region. On the contrary, we will make our place here even stronger.”³³ Indeed, in the region, Putin has things going his way: Armenia has acquiesced, Azerbaijan sees few alternatives, and Georgia is drifting back into Russia’s orbit.

       SCANDINAVIA, FINLAND, AND THE ARCTIC

      Putin has two key objectives in Scandinavia: cowing the countries into accepting Russian regional dominance and securing valuable Arctic energy resources and shipping lanes. Putin knows he will never absorb Sweden or Denmark into the Eurasian Economic Union or any of his other thinly veiled imperial projects. Rather, his goal is to convince them to sit on the sidelines while he makes his move on the nearby Baltic States, and as he stakes aggressive Russian claims to the oil-rich Arctic seabed, where as much as 20 percent of the world’s undiscovered oil lies.³⁴ The Swedes and Finns, though not NATO members, are armed to the teeth, and Putin would rather not challenge them head on. Instead, he has developed a set of intimidation tactics designed to demonstrate just how vulnerable Scandinavia is to Russian attack. These have included numerous violations of national airspace by Russian fighters and bombers on a scale not seen since the end of the Cold War. In one incident, a Russian jet fired a flare at a Swedish fighter, an unsubtle reminder that it could just as easily be a missile next time.³⁵ There have even been sightings of what many suspect are Russian minisubmarines off the Swedish coast, just miles from Stockholm, though the Swedish navy denies that the Russians can sneak up on them so easily.³⁶

      So long as the Scandinavians live in fear of a sudden Russian attack, they will be unwilling to intervene if Putin attacks the Baltics, and halfhearted in their competition with Russia for lucrative Arctic drilling rights. Putin has even gone as far as to plant a titanium Russian flag on the North Pole seabed, staking a claim to billions of dollars of oil and gas.³⁷ And while Green-minded Scandinavians worry about climate change, Putin eagerly awaits melting Arctic ice caps that will open up new shipping lanes on Russia’s northern coast, providing a speedier route to Asia for European exports as well as access to Russia’s vast (and dubious) Arctic territory claims.³⁸ If he can neutralize Scandinavia and Finland with his over-the-top scare tactics, Putin will open the door to Russian domination of the Arctic and increase his odds in the Baltics. If Russia encounters resistance—especially from the non-NATO Finns and Swedes, who would have to fight on their own—Putin may very well go beyond the use of mere flybys and minisubs.

       THE BALKANS

      Russia has had interests in the Balkans for centuries, and deep religious, linguistic, and cultural connections will always exist between Russia and the countries of the Balkan Peninsula. But Putin’s interest in the Balkans is not academic or benign; the Balkan countries are Europe’s weakest flank, beset by shoddy economies, corrupt politics, and a legacy of ethnic conflict. The EU and NATO have worked hard to achieve progress in the Balkans, expanding their membership and the promise of a European future to much of the region.³⁹ Now, Putin is working to undo all that progress. Leveraging long-standing Russian ties to the Balkans, Putin is attempting to turn countries such as Greece, Bulgaria, Macedonia, and Serbia into Russian allies within Europe. If he succeeds, as he appears to be doing, he will have snuck a Trojan horse into NATO itself and compromised the EU’s consensus-based decision-making process.

      Plainly dissatisfied with European institutions and teetering on the brink of economic ruin, Greece is the most vulnerable of the Balkan states. Putin has been quick to position Russia as Greece’s last true friend, hosting Greek prime minister Alexis Tsipras in Moscow and allowing rumors to circulate that Russia would bail out Greece’s economy if the EU refused to.⁴⁰ The Greeks, understandably starved for positive reinforcement from abroad, like what they are hearing from Moscow.

      Bulgarians, meanwhile, are less enthused about the interest Putin has taken in their country, but a political system dogged by corruption and an oligarch-run economy provide precisely the sort of environment Putin can exploit.⁴¹ Macedonia and Serbia are less integrated into the European system and have strong nationalist movements that view Russia as a traditional ally and natural protector.⁴² Putin has high hopes that he can convert these relationships into lasting political influence that secures Russian interests in the heart of the Balkans and guarantees him a say in all European discussions.

       CENTRAL EUROPE

      Putin’s strategy for Central Europe is focused on exploiting institutional weaknesses in former communist states, such as Hungary and Slovakia, while neutralizing wealthier and more powerful countries, such as Germany and Austria. Hungary’s president, Viktor Orbán, who has vowed to create an “illiberal state”⁴³ and openly repudiates the European and Western values at the center of the European Union, has become Putin’s closest ally in Europe and a dangerous threat to the future of the EU.⁴⁴ Slovakia’s economy is dominated by oligarchs who do considerable business with Russia, making the country a prime target for Putin’s intrigues.⁴⁵ Slovak politicians have little desire to become Russian puppets, but they’re wary of alienating a vital trading partner.⁴⁶ Putin has taken advantage of Slovakia’s hesitancy to rail against EU sanctions on trade with Russia, where Slovakia or Hungary are both capable of ending the EU’s consensus-based sanctions. It would be a political coup for Putin if they did so.

      The Germans may be more wary of Russia than any other country in the world, having fought two devastating wars against Russia in the past century. As such, Putin’s goal is not necessarily to encourage a close relationship between Germany and Russia, though he will take anything he can get, but rather to rupture the close relationship that Germany has with the United States. By encouraging far-left and far-right strains of anti-American politics and rhetoric in Germany, Putin hopes to drive the two countries far enough apart that NATO becomes functionally inoperable and America’s military presence in Europe is compromised. The Germans continue to depend heavily on Russian energy to power their economy,⁴⁷ which in turn drives the European economy. Putin hopes to set up a choice whereby Germany pursues its economic relationship with Russia over its political relationship with America. If Putin succeeds, he will be that much closer to “Finlandizing” the European continent and ending the transatlantic relationship.

       WESTERN EUROPE

      Putin sponsors a range of insurgent political organizations in Western Europe—extremists, nationalists, separatists, and anti-Western and anti-American groups—in order to promote anti-EU policies and disrupt the ability of Western European leaders to formulate a cohesive response to Russian aggression

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