Скачать книгу

and Maryland. Notorious for exhausting the soil, tobacco culture was not necessarily bereft of reform. William Galt, Jr. was just one farmer who sought to diversify for the sake of the market and the soil. Farmers like Galt grew tobacco by clearing new land and rotating crops, while experimenting with new varieties. It was the success in the 1840s of brightleaf tobacco that resurrected the crop and gained in popularity both in traditional tobacco-growing zones as well as west to Kentucky and north to the Connecticut River Valley. Although their efforts did not stave off all negative consequences of tobacco culture, planters did reform their methods, incorporating new technology, employing changes in land maintenance, and innovating curing methods, for example, by employing charcoal by the 1850s (Craven 2006 [1926]; Herndon 1978; Clark 1990; Olmstead and Rhode 2008; Swanson 2014).

      Having surveyed a few of the common agricultural pursuits across North and South, let us turn to a question that has motivated many agricultural historians who have studied this period—how much market intensification did antebellum farmers undertake? And considering that there was at least some commercial expansion in various regions, to what extent did reliance on the market undercut farmers’ independence? Were they self-sufficient or dependent? Did the very character of American farming change?

      In the North, the earliest and most extensive commercial production arose in garden crops, wheat, and dairy. Demand for food steadily increased in developing urban areas, making surplus production a better bet for farmers. By the 1850s, competition had become steep in some zones. For example, many wheat farmers purchased newly developed reapers, while those who could not afford the upgrade fell behind. Atack and Bateman characterized antebellum northern farmers as willingly drawing closer toward market participation. And while they argued that farmers remained in tune with the market, producers sometimes failed to maximize their opportunities. After 1830, as the market intensified, farmers who traditionally had engaged in reciprocal obligations or trade in kind in their dealings with one another gradually relied more on cash exchange among themselves. Local exchange between farmers that did not involve cash remained significant in rural communities, but its importance diminished. Farmers also shifted to a cycle in which they desired more cash in order to purchase goods, but needed more credit to make the improvements necessary to increase planting in order to acquire more cash (Atack and Bateman 1984; Clark 1990; Kulikoff 1992).

      Panning to the southwest, Richard Nation found that southern Indiana farmers similarly conceived of the agricultural transformation in terms of dependence on their local community being exchanged for a dependence on a broader network. But they preferred the local one, and proceeded cautiously. Southern Indiana farmers did not seek to amass wealth. Their most immediate goal was to provide for their families, after which they sought to profit enough to be able to support the next generation’s acquisition of land. Hoosiers practiced “safety-first” farming and sold surplus produce. Like many other areas of antebellum America, it was fiber and textiles that first drew southern Indiana farmers into the marketplace. When they produced their own material for cloth, they had relied on flax and wool. Over time, southern Indiana farm families preferred to purchase cloth, especially cotton. As a result, flax declined. Wool remained in significant production but farmers’ relationship to it changed. They were more likely to take their wool to someone else to spin, weave, and dye before making their clothing at home. In Hoosiers’ reckoning, distant markets proved useful but not essential. In fact, they represented a danger—farmers could dabble in them, but not trust them. Nation argues that when southern Indiana farmers produced larger surpluses for the market it did not so much indicate that they were capitalists but that they were careful (Nation 2005).

      In the North Carolina piedmont, the lack of transportation other than protracted and expensive wagon trips discouraged farmers from marketing grain surpluses until the arrival of railroad networks in the 1850s. Even with that development, farmers there lived by the safety-first pattern. For example, farmers of the North Carolina piedmont proved less willing to take risks on new crops like the brightleaf tobacco. In Tennessee, subsistence farmers raised a bale or two of cotton for market but remained focused on self-sufficiency. Tennessee “plain folk” entered the market willingly but with caution. Corn was essential to their strategy because it could either go to market or supply the family with food (Escott 1989; Edwards 1999).

      Did antebellum farmers’ growing market focus infringe on their ability to feed themselves? Studies on the question have found the answer to vary depending on region. The deep dives pursued by agricultural historians Jeremy Atack and Fred Bateman represent the sort of inquiry historians have employed to understand the implications of greater commercialization in antebellum farming. They found that in many areas of the northeast, because the farming population declined, operations did not always produce much food surplus. For example, corn and grain surpluses were much higher in the west than east. The largest northern surpluses of corn came from Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, and Kansas while the northeast often experienced a deficit. On the other hand, the Midwest generated a smaller surplus of dairy. While most northern farms produced dairy products, northeastern farmers in particular increased their production of butter, cheese, and milk in the antebellum years. All in all, while some parts of the North produced surpluses in one food product, that could come with the deficit of another (Bateman 1978; Atack and Bateman 1984).

      To return to Clark’s study of Western Massachusetts, a whopping 70–80 percent of the Connecticut Valley’s workforce remained in agriculture in 1860. This was in stark contrast to many areas of the eastern North. While the bulk of farmers in the area purchased flour as wheat production declined, their efforts overall remained fairly diversified. This was in part a lesson learned from the Panic of 1837, a devastating economic slump that had prompted caution among Western Massachusetts’ farmers. Due to their continued production of corn, potatoes, wheat, rye, butter, cheese, and livestock, Connecticut Valley farmers continued to feed themselves in the antebellum period

Скачать книгу