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lost and the damage caused to the targets using the respective mathematical models taken from IABG’s air war model.4 Never have I forgotten the disputes between players and OR analysts. The blue players considered the target damage calculated as too low and the loss of their air sorties as too high. In the midst of the game they suggested that the analysts manipulate the “critical” inputs of the assessment models so that the outputs would be closer to their judgment. Not surprisingly, the analysts rejected the suggestion arguing that rather than manipulating the game halfway, to improve its results for Blue, it would make more sense to end the game and, thereafter, revisit its data and the assumptions underlying the assessment models. That is what we did.

      The results were discussed at a Workshop with international experts organized by the German Strategy Forum on “Long‐Term Development of NATO’s Forward Defense,” held 2–4 December, 1984, in Bad Godesberg/Bonn. The overall conclusion of the analysis suggested that properly equipped and trained reactive defense forces being available on short notice might be an effective and efficient tool to absorb the initial attack by fighting, at the demarcation line, an attrition‐oriented delaying battle thus providing the time for the active defenses to deploy at the points of the enemy’s main thrusts and for counterattacks into the enemy’s exposed flanks. The main reason why the Bundeswehr and its NATO partners did not consider following up the options investigated by IASFOR was that restructuring the all‐active forces, deployed at the time, in the Central Region close to the demarcation line, would involve some time of conventional weakness and strategic risk considering the strategic situation in the 1970s and 1980s. However, given today’s strategic situation between NATO and Russia, it seems that NATO partners in the East might well revisit some of the reactive options investigated by IASFOR for their territorial defense forces.

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