Скачать книгу

343

      343 344

      344 345

      345 346

      346 347

      347 348

      348 349

      349 350

      350 351

      351 352

      352 353

      353 354

      354 355

      355 356

      356 357

      357 358

      358 359

      359 360

      360 361

      361 362

      362  363

      The Quest for Global Economic Leadership

      C. Fred Bergsten

      polity

      Copyright © C. Fred Bergsten 2022

      The right of C. Fred Bergsten to be identified as Author of this Work has been asserted in accordance with the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.

      First published in 2022 by Polity Press

      Polity Press

      65 Bridge Street

      Cambridge CB2 1UR, UK

      Polity Press

      101 Station Landing

      Suite 300

      Medford, MA 02155, USA

      All rights reserved. Except for the quotation of short passages for the purpose of criticism and review, no part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording, or otherwise, without the prior permission of the publisher.

      ISBN-13: 978-1-5095-4736-4

      A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library.

      Library of Congress Control Number: 2021944914

      The publisher has used its best endeavors to ensure that the URLs for external websites referred to in this book are correct and active at the time of going to press. However, the publisher has no responsibility for the websites and can make no guarantee that a site will remain live or that the content is or will remain appropriate.

      Every effort has been made to trace all copyright holders, but if any have been overlooked the publisher will be pleased to include any necessary credits in any subsequent reprint or edition.

      For further information on Polity, visit our website:

      politybooks.com

      In October 1993, President Bill Clinton was preparing to host the first-ever summit of leaders of the top powers of the Asia Pacific region: China, Japan, South Korea, Indonesia, and a dozen others, along with the United States. I briefed him at the White House on the main recommendations of the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum’s Eminent Persons Group, which I chaired: that the upcoming meeting agree to establish a “community of Asia Pacific nations” that would seek to achieve “free and open trade and investment in the region by 2020.” The President agreed with those proposals and led their unanimous approval at the summit a month later, accelerating the integration and expansion of the most dynamic region of the world economy.1

      Before deciding to do so, President Clinton asked the question that is even more central to US and global economic policy today than it was then: will China simply take the huge opportunities that have been offered to it, to benefit from an open world economy and access to the world’s most important markets, and then “tell us bye-bye when they no longer need us?” Like seven other US presidents before and after him, Clinton decided to gamble on engaging with China – at a time when the United States, basking in the glow of winning the Cold War, was near the peak of its global economic power and leadership position, and China was still in the early stages of its stunning rise.

      China is indeed rising rapidly. Its economy is already larger than that of the United States on some measures, and is growing at least twice as fast. It is the world’s largest trading country and, by far, holder of foreign exchange reserves. It has accounted for a quarter to a third of total world growth for more than a decade – far more than the United States. Its technological capability is growing rapidly and already rivals the United States in such keys areas as the Internet and artificial intelligence (AI).

      Unless it experiences unforeseen setbacks, China will achieve and maintain economic power roughly equivalent to that of the United States for the foreseeable future. It thus represents the first real challenge to American supremacy since the United States became the world’s dominant economy a century ago; the Soviet Union was never an economic factor, and Japan was both much smaller and a reliable ally. China clearly wants to translate its increased power into a much greater role in the world economy (and more broadly) but it is unclear whether it will use that power to provide constructive global economic leadership.

      The United States is not a declining power in any generalized sense. However, its global economic leadership has been waning for a quarter of a century, for both internal and external reasons, and President Trump abdicated much of what remained during his tenure. Its will to maintain that role is in doubt and much domestic reform will be needed to restore it. It will be critical whether President Biden and his successors can credibly regain at least part of America’s traditional role, and whether their policy agendas will succeed in supporting such a reversal, as the rest of the world legitimately questions whether Trump or Biden most accurately approximates the country’s international stance on a sustained basis.

      The coronavirus pandemic, and their respective responses to it, underline the competition between the two economic superpowers. China clearly responded more effectively to the pandemic itself, registering far fewer infections and deaths, and suffered much less setback to its economic growth. But its lack of transparency surrounding the origins and transmission of the disease, and its limited cooperation with international efforts to combat it, sullied rather than enhanced its global status, and thus its leadership aspirations.

Скачать книгу