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characteristics of the industries and the sources of structural change? Who were the players and what was the distinguishing ‘personality’ of each? What were its earnings drivers and how were those changing against the industry backdrop? Finally, where did that mean the numbers were going and what were investors missing?

      From Fish Cakes to Computer Numerical Control (1988–1995)

      Anyone who has ever eaten a California roll at their local sushi place is familiar with surimi. But you have probably never given a thought to where the white, flaky ‘imitation crab’ meat comes from. I hadn't either until one day in 1988 when I was given my first assignment as a new equity analyst at Nomura Research Institute to analyse one of the top Japanese fishery companies. The pelagic fishery industry had been one of the major industries in Japan in the early twentieth century, and most companies made significant profits from it. After the 1960s, given the international pressure to ban whale fishing, fishery companies had to seek other sources of profit. Surimi, the fish cake, was a promising next pillar of profit growth.

      After the fishery industry, I was assigned to cover the capital goods industry. I absolutely loved the sector and visited companies that manufacture products such as bearings, fire engines, tractors, industrial pumps, heat exchangers, knitting machines, and automated diaper assembling equipment. Every company had its own history and a strong sense of pride in its product. As such, when I showed my sincerity and eagerness to learn about their business, they were very generous with their time. I learned new things every day and even started to like the smell of machine oil. I still remember the factory head of a major bicycle parts company commenting that they supplied some critical car parts to a top automotive company with only minimum profit. Although the company was the dominant player in the bicycle parts industry globally and very profitable, they kept the less profitable car parts business to keep up with ‘major league’ manufacturing technologies. The company is still the dominant player in their field today.

      My boss was generous enough to send me to the US West Coast to meet the founders of those private companies. Although I did not have an engineering background, I had studied CNC enough to hold a sensible conversation with them, and they took me seriously. The technology seemed to be legitimate and had a good track record of initial customer wins. The manufacturing facilities were modern and organized. I went back to Japan and cross checked what I had learnt with several industry engineers. Their feedback was generally favourable. So, with due diligence, I wrote a fairly pessimistic report regarding the future profitability of the dominant CNC company. I was completely wrong. The low-cost CNC stayed as a niche product and the dominant CNC company continued to grow their business very successfully and profitably. I learned a painful lesson. I was too excited about the initial idea of a dramatic shift in industry dynamics and did not pay enough attention to the multiple reasons why the incumbent had been so strong.

      This was probably a typical case of ‘confirmation bias’. I loved the story of small start-up companies potentially winning against a dominant large company and was almost unconsciously wishing such a market share shift to happen. So, I probably unconsciously selected to meet engineers who also wished the same result. Given the importance of the topic, I really should have solicited views from a more diverse group of experts.

      Not Just a Japanese Tourist – Becoming a China H-share Analyst (1996–1998)

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