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href="#ulink_ed930b74-4566-57cb-b615-c55bc64d48fd">Table 1.1 shows the various forms of a DF model.

Franchisee model Compensation Area Benefit to power sector
Outsourcing Outsourcing of some of the activities like billing and collection Fixed fee Rural Improved operational efficiency
Collection-based revenue franchisee (CBRF) Allowed for billing and collection Provisions for incentives and penalties based on collection while ensuring fixed percentage of collection toward compensation of labor used Rural Improved operational and collection efficiency
Revenue collection with O&M Operation and maintenance related responsibilities in addition to billing and collection Fixed fee and incentive Rural Improved operational and collection efficiency Reduction in manpower
Input-based distribution franchisee (IBDF) Perform the same tasks as that of a distribution licensee except it must buy electricity from the licensee at some predecided input rates Right on revenue Urban Improved operational and collection efficiency Reduction in manpower and distribution losses Avoided investments

      Figure 1.4 Input-based franchisee model.

      Again, the input rate is decided by the licensee based on a loss reduction trajectory. As the tariff is the imposed control on a franchisee to reduce AT&C losses, the main objective of the franchisee is to reduce AT&C losses in its network. Thus the profit label of the franchisee totally depends upon its performance toward reducing losses as framed in a performance-based multiyear tariff framework. If the franchisee is not able to achieve the targeted loss reduction, it is also penalized and suffers from the loss. As a result, the primary focus of the DF model has shifted toward loss reduction. The DF model has tremendous potential toward reducing losses, improving collection efficiencies, and is synonymous with a privately owned DISCOM. Because of these features, this model has attracted lot of interest by various utilities. Involvement of private companies reduces the political interference and ensures adequate private capital investment. The relative concerns with this model involve:

       The takeover time is too long as the transition of asset and manpower requires an audit.

       Bid norms are such that only big players get a chance and therefore bidding is very restrictive: bidding talent becomes a problem.

       After a takeover, the focus of the DF shifts toward operations and asset management, thus neglecting the prime focus of loss reduction.

       Loss handling is weakly addressed as operation and maintenance supersede the loss handling system and method.

       Power management status is very poor as the DF is not allowed for market participation.

       Investment toward system up-gradation and augmentation related works are poor due to lack of availability of sufficient capitals.

       Investment needed for implementations, technologies, and innovations is missing because of the unavailability of adequate capital.

       Capital mobilization toward renovation and modernization works are not sufficient.

       DF is not able to ensure sufficient capital mobilization toward physical structure development and future investment because the tariff is not within its control.

      Poor innovation capability and adaptation of an inappropriate business model for the power distribution sector has acted as an obstacle toward incorporating the latest technologies, especially designed for the sector. For example, specific technologies have been designed for ToD/ToU metering, demand-side management (DSM) initiatives, loss reduction, distributed generation (DG) promotion, etc., but the adopted business model has failed in harnessing benefits from these specially designed technologies. Therefore, developing an appropriate business model that can capture values from these technologies is highly essential for the effective and efficient performance of the power distribution sector.

      1.4.1 Description of the Novel Business Model

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