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a January 2013 speech before the CCP’s top 200-odd officials, only two months after becoming CCP General Secretary, Xi posited an existential competition between China’s model and that of the West. He described the post-Cold War period as one in which many developing countries were forced to adopt the Western model, leading to “party feuds, social unrest, and people left homeless and wandering.” He continued on to argue: “We firmly believe that as socialism with Chinese characteristics develops further, our system will inevitably mature; it is likewise inevitable that the superiority of our socialist system will be increasingly apparent.”¹⁶ Four years later at the 2017 19th Party Congress, Xi became the first Chinese leader since Mao Zedong to suggest that China had a political model worth emulating: “The China model for a better social governance system offers a new option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence. And it offers Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind.”¹⁷ While Chinese scholars acknowledge the existence of competition among models, many remain wary of promoting a Chinese model. Yan Xuetong, for example, sounds a cautionary note: “Setting the China model as an example and hoping other countries to follow China can easily lead to an ideological confrontation…. [T]here is no need to compare China with Western countries or to promote the superiority of the China model. This won’t help improve China’s international image.”¹⁸

      Finally, Xi has expressed his desire to “lead in the reform of the global governance system”¹⁹ – transforming the institutions, norms, and values that govern relations among international actors, as well as China’s place within that system. For Xi, this is a long-term ideological battle. In 2014, he asserted, “We should be keenly aware of the protracted nature of the contest over the international order.”²⁰

      While Chinese leaders have long insisted that they support the international system and do not want to undermine it, they also believe that their inability to participate in the development of the post-World War II Bretton Woods System left them at a disadvantage. The rules-based order did not reflect the values, norms, or policy preferences of the newly established People’s Republic of China (PRC). Huang Jing, dean of the Beijing Language and Cultural University, acknowledges that every Chinese leader from Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping has pledged to maintain the international system, but that China’s political system is “incompatible with the mainstream of the existing international order.” As a result, he suggests, when faced with the two choices – China changing to accommodate the system or China changing the system to be accommodated – Beijing has selected the latter.²¹ And with China’s greater standing on the global stage, Xi now claims a new mandate to reform the international system. Changes in global governance, he noted in September 2016, originate in changes in the balance of power.²²

Chinese officials often mask their global governance ambitions in vague and benign-sounding concepts, such as “a new relationship among major powers” and a “community of shared future (or common destiny) for mankind.” These concepts, nonetheless, hold within them the promise of radical change in the values currently expressed in international institutions on issues such as human rights, internet governance, and trade and investment. A main focus of Chinese efforts, for example, is to rebalance the international system’s support away from individual to state-determined rights. These concepts also call for the dissolution of the US-led alliance system. Chinese foreign policy officials often frame US alliances as exclusive and contributing to the insecurity of others;²³ as Fu Ying, a former high-ranking Chinese diplomat, articulated in a 2016 speech: “China has long been alienated politically by the western world. The US-led military alliance puts their interests above others and pays little attention to China’s security concerns.”²⁴ Xi has called frequently for a new form of security partnership that is based on “non-confrontation and non-alliance.”²⁵

      Although Chinese officials leave open the question of whether they expect their country to replace the United States as the world’s hegemon, many Chinese scholars believe that China will soon surpass the United States. Wang Jisi acknowledges that within China, there is a popular perception that US power is declining and that sooner or later China will succeed the United States as “number one” in the world.²⁶ Fudan University professor Shen Dingli believes China already occupies the “moral high ground” in the international community and is now “poised to act as the leading country in the new era.”²⁷ These scholars refrain from answering, however, whether China is ready to play a dominant role in not only defining the rules that govern the international system but also marshaling the international community to respond to global challenges and to serve as the world’s policeman.

      China’s desire to reorder the world order is a tall one. US leadership on the global stage, its democratic alliance system, and the post-World War II liberal international order are deeply entrenched. Moreover, while Beijing’s successful management of the pandemic at home reinforced the Chinese people’s confidence in their system, the country’s strategy on the global stage did not inspire similar confidence in China’s system within the international community. Instead, it presented a complex and, ultimately for many foreign observers, concerning picture of what future Chinese global leadership might entail.

The COVID-19 Test

      In late December 2019, hospitals in Hubei, a relatively well-off province in central China, reported a string of cases of a “pneumonia of unknown etiology.” Dr. Ai Fen, the director of the Emergency Room of Wuhan Central Hospital, was the first to make a connection between the cases coming into the hospitals and reports of people at the Huanan Seafood Wholesale Market falling ill with high fevers. After alerting her hospital, she posted a warning to a number of colleagues. Her message caught the attention of other doctors, including Dr. Li Wenliang, a 34-year-old ophthalmologist, who worked at the same hospital. He sent a message to a group chat with his former medical school classmates: “A new coronavirus infection has been confirmed and its type is being identified. Inform all family and relatives to be on guard.”²⁸ Wuhan’s public security officials moved quickly to silence Li, calling him in for questioning on January 1, 2020. They issued Li a formal reprimand for “making untrue comments” and “severely disturbing social order.” They also detained seven other Chinese citizens for “spreading rumors.”²⁹ Li nonetheless continued to warn people. A few weeks later, he himself contracted the virus. For her part, Ai received a serious reprimand from the hospital’s disciplinary inspection committee, criticizing her for spreading false rumors and warning her not to tell anyone – not even her husband.³⁰

As China’s leaders moved to control the spread of the virus, the strengths and weaknesses of the country’s political model were on full display. The high degree of political centralization and control over information prevented medical officials from alerting the Chinese people and the rest of the world about the virus and contributed to millions of Chinese leaving Wuhan, the virus’ epicenter, to travel during the Lunar New Year celebration, many unknowingly carrying the virus with them. Yet this same centralization of authority also enabled the government to lock down Wuhan on January 23, effectively preventing 11 million people from leaving the city and anyone else from entering. Public transport and highways were closed, and restrictions were placed on a number of other nearby cities and towns. All told, 50 million people in Hubei province were placed under strict quarantine by the end of January. The world watched in awe as Beijing mobilized 7,500 workers to construct two makeshift hospitals in under two weeks and commandeered enterprises across the country to manufacture much-needed PPE, including masks, gowns, and gloves. The CCP’s surveillance technology – more than 200 million cameras tracking people everywhere – and symbiotic relationship with the country’s leading technology companies, such as Tencent and Alibaba, allowed the government to track and ultimately contain the spread of the virus with a relatively high degree of efficiency.

      Despite the government’s success, for the first time since Xi Jinping had come to power in 2012, Chinese citizens took to the internet in large numbers to challenge the official narrative. The death of Dr. Li prompted more than one million Chinese citizens to post their thoughts online: the British

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